To face p. 246.
On September 26th a Bulgarian officer with a white flag appeared before the British lines; General Milne sent him to General Franchet d’Espérey, who, however, replied that he could only deal with parlementaires provided with proper credentials. The Bulgarian Government, in the meanwhile, was trying, through Mr. Murphy, the American Chargé d’Affaires in Sofia, to obtain the intervention of that Government, which was not in a state of war with Bulgaria. Mr. Murphy, in fact, had tried to intervene, and asked permission to accompany the plenipotentiaries which the Sofia Government decided to send to Salonica, but the C.A.A. did not see fit to adhere to this request. The useful part played by Mr. Murphy with his propaganda in Bulgaria in favour of a separate peace with the Entente should not be forgotten, but it appears that he tried, without success, to obtain favourable armistice conditions for the Bulgarians. In the meanwhile General Franchet d’Espérey had telegraphed to Paris, asking for authority to negotiate an armistice. The authorization arrived on the 27th, together with instructions as to the terms of the agreement to be negotiated. On the 28th, the official Bulgarian delegation reached the British front. It was composed of M. Liapcheff, Finance Minister, General Lukoff, Commander of the II Army, and the diplomat, M. Radeff, with two A.D.C.’s. Soon afterwards a huge German Staff car, adorned with the Royal arms of Bulgaria, flashed down the Janesh road and reached Salonica, conveying the first enemy plenipotentiaries coming to sue for peace with the Entente. After a first meeting with General Franchet d’Espérey, the delegates withdrew to their lodgings, and the official meetings began on the morning of the 29th, at the house of the Commander-in-Chief. The negotiations were short and business-like, but the Bulgarians tried to turn to account the fact that their country had never been very enthusiastic about the war, and had no particular sympathy for the Germans, nor animosity against the Allies. M. Liapcheff even went so far as to suggest that Bulgaria had now become a neutral State, and might almost be considered an ally. But General Franchet d’Espérey curtly replied: “You are defeated, and you must submit to the Allies’ terms. Bulgaria is not a neutral country, but a military zone, and it is inadmissible that we should not pass through it.”[44]
The Bulgarian delegates, duly authorized by their Government, accepted all the conditions imposed on them by the Armistice. They only raised some difficulties over the occupation of Bulgarian territory by the Serbs and Greeks (one of the secret clauses of the Armistice gave the Allies the right to occupy certain areas in the interior of Bulgaria), but General Franchet d’Espérey waived aside these objections, saying that the Entente was a group of peoples, great and small, but all free, whereas in the enemy Alliance Germany was the mistress and the others were her vassals. Therefore the Greeks and Serbs should be able to take part in the occupation of Bulgaria like the other Allies. However, the Prince Regent of Serbia, having heard that some of his Generals were insisting on being allowed to occupy Bulgarian territory, in order to satisfy their national pride and avenge the persecutions inflicted on Serbia by the Bulgarians, telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief that he preferred to waive this right in order not to embitter relations between Serbia and Bulgaria still more; he wished, on the contrary, to contribute to the pacification of the Balkans. M. Venizelos made a similar pronouncement. The decision was certainly a wise one; reprisals and acts of revenge were thus avoided, for the Serbs and Greeks, if they had been in occupation of the land of the hated enemy, would not have been able to restrain themselves.
The Armistice provided:—
(1) The immediate evacuation of the territories still occupied by the Bulgarians in Serbian and Greek Macedonia;
(2) The immediate demobilization of the whole Bulgarian Army, except 3 infantry divisions and 4 cavalry regiments for the defence of the Turkish frontier and the Dobrugia, and for guarding the railways;
(3) The arms and other material of the demobilized units to be stored in places to be subsequently determined, under Allied control;
(4) All material of the IV Greek Army Corps (which had surrendered to Germany), and was still in Bulgaria, to be handed over to Greece;
(5) The Bulgarian troops to the west of the meridian of Uskub were to surrender as prisoners of war;
(6) The Allies had the right to use all Bulgarian prisoners of war until peace was signed, but Bulgaria must hand over to the Allied authorities all Allied prisoners and deported civilians without reciprocity;