Tertullian was a Montanist and one of the most serious charges made against the Montanists was that some of their prophets received interest on money loaned by them.[18] Tertullian is above suspicion in this respect. He demonstrates by quotations from both the Old and New Testaments that it is absolutely contradictory to Christianity. Interest on money is the only property institution in regard to which the teaching of the early Church is consistent. Every reference we have in regard to this practice condemns it—not mildly as a venial offense—but fiercely and savagely as a heinous crime like incest or murder. "Fenerare est hominem occidere" is a favorite formula. In this respect the most pronounced apologists of private wealth like Clement of Alexandria are in perfect accord with the most pronounced communists like Tertullian. The only difference to be noted is one of emphasis. In the earlier writers there are relatively few references to interest, which may perhaps be due to the fact that in the earlier time there were relatively few Christians possessed of surplus means requiring investment. As might naturally be expected, the writers of the period after the establishment of Christianity as a legal religion make more frequent and more bitter reference to the matter. The vehemence of denunciation indulged in by these later writers almost exceeds credibility. The most improbable and strained exegesis is resorted to in an effort to explain away the words of Christ in the parables of the pounds and talents. But this vehemence is by no means confined to the Nicene and post-Nicene fathers. So statesmanlike a bishop as Cyprian, in a long railing accusation against certain opposition bishops brings forth as their final sin that they had "multiplied gain by usury."[19] Usury is not to be taken, of course, in its present sense of excessive or burdensome interest and it is evident that Cyprian did not use it in such a sense. He is simply condemning interest as such. In the minds of the early Christians the difference between taking five percent interest or fifty percent was exactly the same as the difference between stealing one dollar or ten. The sin was essentially the same irrespective of the particular amount involved. Indeed this comparison is scarcely a valid one; for taking interest was conceived as a much worse sin than plain robbery. It is perhaps worth noting that the moral distinction between interest and usury is of very late development. The credit, if it be such, of making it, is to be ascribed to Calvin and is not unconnected with the predilection of certain types of pecuniary interest for that reformer's system of ecclesiastical polity. The Roman law did indeed fix a maximum legal rate of interest, varying at different times and even at the same time for different forms of commercial risk. During the first three centuries A.D. it was, for example, consistently twelve percent on ships and varied from six to twelve percent on other forms of investment. But this has little moral connotation.
Early Christian condemnation of interest on loans was by no means confined to the expression of opinion by church writers. Council after council legislated against it with ever increasing severity. The forty-fourth Apostolic Canon prohibited the practice to clerics. The Council of Elvira 310 A.D. forbade it to both clerics and laity. The Council of Arles 314 A.D. provided that clerics guilty of the practice should be deposed from the ministry. The seventeenth canon of the Council of Nicea 325 A.D. provided that they should be excommunicated. The penalty is reiterated in the twelfth canon of the First Council of Carthage 345 A.D. There is no need to continue the list. It is sufficient to say that nearly every council whose canons have come down to us has legislation against interest. Again and again it is absolutely forbidden to clergy and laity alike under the severest ecclesiastical penalties—and it is necessary to remember that after 325 A.D. these penalties could, if need be, be enforced by governmental authority.
This attitude of the early Church toward interest on loans is a matter of very considerable historical importance. Although, as we shall endeavor to show later, the ecclesiastical laws were frequently and largely evaded, they still had such influence that their contribution to the sum of economic forces which accomplished the overthrow of ancient civilization is by no means an insignificant one. Nor did the influence of this attitude cease at the fall of Rome. It rather increased thereafter and for several centuries, the so-called "Dark Ages," civilization was strangled by the power of this idea of the sin of usury. To this day the Roman Church regards interest on money as a reprehensible thing which, however, is not, for practical reasons, to be spoken of as sinful by the clergy.[20] This attitude has been no inconsiderable factor in the relatively late industrial development in Catholic countries.
The early Christian concept of interest was not an idea original with Christianity. It was not derived from Christ at all. It was taken over bodily from Old Testament Judaism and contemporary pagan philosophy. It is a well known fact that the views of Plato and Aristotle, of Cicero and Seneca on interest, correspond in a very astonishing way to the views of Deuteronomy and Isaiah, of the Psalms and Ezekiel. The strength of the concept in the early Church was due to this fact. In regard to no other concept was there such a unanimity of opinion. The Christian convert found that the sacred scriptures of his new faith confirmed in the strongest language the condemnation of interest which he had become familiar with from the writings of the noblest pagan philosophers. When reason and religion were in accord it is not wonderful that their judgment was accepted—as a theory.
In spite of this union of pagan philosophers and Hebrew prophets, of Christian Fathers and Ecclesiastical Canons, the condemnation and prohibition of interest on money was a theory only. A very ordinary knowledge of classical civilization is sufficient to explain the reason of this. More nearly than any other institution, the financial machinery of antiquity corresponds to that of modern life. Trusts and millionaires were phenomena of their economic life as of ours. Banks were numerous and ubiquitous. They were of all sizes and degrees; from the great metropolitan corporation with correspondents all over the civilized world, to the hated money lender in a shabby office on a side street. The great bankers were men of the first importance in society. From their number were regularly recruited the officials of the imperial treasury. They were almost without exception men of the strictest financial integrity. The Roman banking laws protected the depositor more securely than the laws of any modern nation, and these Roman laws were rigidly enforced. Every banking institution had to obtain government authorization in order to do business and this authorization was withdrawn on the discovery of the smallest discrepancy in the accounts. The regular rate of interest on ordinary deposits was four percent; under certain peculiar conditions the rate went as low as two and a half and as high as six percent. The rate published by a bank had to be paid even though payment swept away the banker's entire private property. The banker lost everything before the depositor lost anything. The banks were used by the government in carrying out such fiscal measures as could not be conveniently handled by the treasury department directly. They played a still more important part in the ordinary commercial life of the times. A relatively small volume of business was, or could be, carried on by transfers of specie. The great bulk of commercial transactions were of necessity carried on by checks, drafts, discounts, bills of exchange and similar instruments of credit. It was a matter of simple impossibility for any man in ordinary commercial or industrial life to carry on his business for even a single day without participating directly or indirectly in transactions involving loans and interest.
Our excuse for reciting these commonplace details of Roman commercial life is that their very commonplaceness explains the discrepancy between early Christian theory and practice in the matter of interest. It would be an easy task to convict the early Christians of hypocritical pretense in this regard. Nothing more would be necessary than to print their theory in one column and their practice in a parallel one. Yet the early Christians were not hypocrites. As regards sincerity of profession they compare very favorably with any religionists of any age. As a matter of fact the historians have long ago shown that it is altogether impossible and unjust to argue from a sect's opinions to their feelings and actions. To quote Macauley[21] "Only imagine a man acting for one single day on the supposition that all his neighbors believe all that they profess or act up to all that they believe. Imagine a man acting on the supposition that he may safely offer the deadliest injuries and insults to everybody who says that revenge is sinful; or that he may safely intrust all his property without security to any person who says it is wrong to steal. Such a character would be too absurd for the wildest farce." "The law which is inscribed on the walls of the synagogues prohibits covetousness. But if we were to say that a Jew mortgagee would not foreclose because God had commanded him not to covet his neighbor's house, everybody would think us out of our wits."[22] Yet that Jew is no hypocrite in his religion. He is sincerely and honestly devoted to his faith and will sacrifice time and money; will undergo social obloquy and contempt in support of it. So it was with the early Christians. By the process of abstracting their theory and practice of interest from the social matrix which alone makes the theory or practice intelligible, it is easy to show a logical inconsistency. It would be equally foolish and false to deduce from this inconsistency any conclusions one way or the other as to early Christian morality. It is if course no aim of this thesis to attack or defend any religious or moral opinions. It is a matter entirely apart from our present concern to evaluate interest or non-interest in ethical terms. Our purpose is not to explain away the inconsistency of the early Christians. Admitting the inconsistency in the fullest degree, our aim is to explain it as natural, and, under the social conditions then prevailing, practically inevitable. The early Christians left funds to care in perpetuity for the family burial lot.[23] Under any religious creed; Pagan, Jewish, or Christian, decent provision for the care of graves of relatives was not only admissible, it was a positive demand of social reputability; to say nothing of the demand of natural affection.
Similarly annual agapes were established by bequests as a charity to the poor brethren.[24] These agapes were no innovation. As an institution they were perfectly familiar and in universal observance among the pagans. The agapes were simply ordinary Roman silicernia with the name changed. To the Romans, founding a silicernium was like wearing a toga or going to a bath. It possessed the sanction of law and the benediction of religion; but its real compulsion lay in social custom. No person could escape this pressure of the mores and retain self respect, to say nothing of the respect of others. The pagan silicernium was morally respectable; it perpetuated friendship and promoted good feeling. There was no reason for avoiding it, if avoidance had been possible—as it was not. The Christians not only preserved this pious institution; they improved it. Their annual agapes fed the poor, which the silicernia, excellent as they were, seldom did.
The explanation we have endeavored to give of the endowment of family burial lots and annual agapes is applicable, mutis mutandis, to other cases of interest. It therefore is not surprising to learn that Callixtus (pope 218-223 A.D.) was a banker previous to his elevation to the papacy; that large numbers of Christians, particularly widows and orphans—entrusted their money to his bank, and that he had large loans out at good interest to Jewish bankers.[25]
The truth is that the early Christian horror of interest, while absolutely honest and even desperately sincere, was a strictly legalistic, ceremonial, and ritualistic horror. It was purely formal and was not at all concerned with any economic principle. The thing that was wicked, was not income from capital invested, but income in the form of interest on money. To own a ship and sail it and make profits from ownership by freight charges was perfectly honest, but to invest money in a shipping corporation and receive dividends was wicked. So it was honest to own a building and get money as rent. It was immoral to invest money in the construction company that erected that building and receive income in the form of interest. Rent, profit, and interest are merely three forms of the same thing, income from invested capital. Any endeavor to distinguish between them in this respect is entirely devoid of moral or economic justification. The ancient Church fathers were as well aware of this as we are. The real point and importance of their concept of interest was their defense of that concept. That defense was a curious one and illustrates the difference between ancient and modern reasoning on economic matters—and on other matters also. The difference in a word is that of mistaking means for ends on the theory of course that we moderns are right and the prophets, philosophers, Christian fathers, et al. wrong. According to modern social science, interest is merely a means adopted for the attainment of certain ends—economic, educational, religious or whatever. The goodness or badness of interest is to be judged strictly and solely by the convenience and economy with which it serves these ends. If any other property institution can, in a given situation, serve a given end more easily and more cheaply than the institution of interest, then, in that situation, the institution of interest—other things being equal—is immoral and should be abolished. If, in the given situation, no other property institution can serve the given end more easily and more cheaply than the institution of interest, then that institution is moral and should be retained. That is, from the modern sociological point of view, the institution of interest is inconceivable except as a means to some end outside itself. As a means it is to be judged in a purely objective and pragmatic manner by the ordinary standards of cost price, economic, social, and other.
The method of the ancients is entirely otherwise. Assuming still the correctness of the modern viewpoint, which viewpoint be it said is not unassailable and indeed is assailed by divers radicals, socialists and others, but for the most part persons lacking in pecuniary reputability; the mistake then, that the Early Church fathers make is that of taking the means for an end. They have many arguments against interest but all these arguments can be criticised for this one error. The fathers elevate interest to the dignity of an end in itself. Interest, qua interest, is condemned. It is taking advantage of a brother's necessity. It is grinding the face of the poor. It is producing pride, luxury, and vice. As soon as moral value is attached to anything, it of course, is viewed as an end in itself. If it be true that interest is an end in itself, then the fiercest diatribes of the fathers are none too severe. Assuming their premises, their conclusions follow inevitably. The modern man—he is not unknown—who talks about the "sacred rights" of private property is guilty of the same error as the ancient Christians, the error of mistaking means for ends. The early Christians could not see that the property institution of interest is neither good nor bad except as it is good or bad for something. The something determines the judgment. As a matter of historical fact the condemnation of interest developed in certain early stages of human civilization and at those stages interest was socially detrimental. At those stages, however, it was exceedingly rare and correspondingly infamous. In any country where there is abundance of good, free land the phenomenon of interest on money will disappear, provided labor is free. So it disappeared in the northern states of this Union in the later part of the 18th century. These phenomena caused the southerners to adopt slavery though all their English traditions had declared it immoral for more than three centuries. The relation of interest to slavery under a condition of free land is the relation of cause and effect, i.e., the requirement of interest will produce slavery and the abolition of interest will abolish slavery.[26] These social phenomena are of importance in our consideration of the early Christian doctrine of interest. That doctrine was largely evaded and disobeyed but it still had great effect and that effect was toward the abolition of slavery. We do not mean that this economic doctrine alone resulted in the abolition of slavery, or even that it was a chief cause in the abolition of slavery, it was not obeyed well enough to be such a chief cause; but so far as it was obeyed, it tended in that direction.