[289] Ibid.
Overloaded trucks had shuttled Lieutenant Colonel Wood’s artillery battalion forward on 16 August. Although registration fires were completed by evening, the haste of the displacement and the doubtful information at the front left much to be desired from the standpoint of accuracy.[290]
[290] Annex item to Brig SAR; and Craig, 4 Mar 54.
While Obong-ni Ridge was known to be heavily defended, it was generally thought that Hill 207—Brigade Objective Two—would be the hard nut to crack. And the potential of Objective Three, towering Hill 311, was by no means minimized in preattack estimates.[291] Later events proved these assumptions to be the reverse of reality, but Marine planners could do no better with the meager intelligence then available.
[291] Stewart, 15 Jan 54; Murray, 15 Feb 54.
The regimental commander and General Craig concluded that a frontal assault on Obong-ni Ridge with a column of battalions was the only answer to the problems posed by the terrain and situation.
Since the Brigade commander had been specifically charged with the security of the MSR, it was necessary that 3/5 remain in position on Cloverleaf Hill until Objective One was taken. Taplett’s battalion had a second responsibility in guarding the Brigade’s left (south) flank, because Craig considered the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, too far out to provide the required close-in protection.[292]
[292] Craig, 4 Mar 54.
The Brigade commander, unaware of Murray’s arrangement with Colonel Hill, could not have envisioned an approach to the enemy’s left through the 9th RCT zone. He expected the Army unit to advance side by side with the Brigade and give supporting fire as directed by General Church. On the other hand, an envelopment of the enemy’s right seemed out of the question. Using the southern approach to Obong-ni Ridge would have created a gap of several thousands yards in the center of the critical area, and the low, barren marshland to the left would have impeded the movement of tanks and the employment of the 5th Marines’ integral supporting arms.[293]
[293] Ibid.