| Photographs | |
| Sixteen-page sections of photographs follow pages [70] and [156]. | |
| Maps and Sketches | |
| Page | |
| The Strategic Triangle | [2] |
| The Far East | [5] |
| Korea | [11] |
| NKPA Order of Battle | [35] |
| NKPA Invasion, 15 July 1950 | [44] |
| Japan and Korea | [61] |
| Eighth Army, Situation of Late July | [69] |
| Brigade Action on the Southwestern Front | [102] |
| Chindong-ni Area | [107] |
| Sachon Offensive, 8–10 August 1950 | [130] |
| Sachon Offensive, 10 August 1950 | [133] |
| Sachon Offensive, 11 August 1950 | [134] |
| Sachon Offensive—Changchon Ambush | [145] |
| Sachon Offensive, Situation 12–14 August | [149] |
| Enemy Counterattack, Hill 202 | [154] |
| First Naktong Counteroffensive | [180] |
| First Naktong, Situation 17 August 1950 | [185] |
| First Naktong, Situation 18 August 1950 | [199] |
| First Naktong, Seizure of Objective Two | [202] |
| First Naktong, Seizure of Objective Three | [205] |
| Second Naktong Counteroffensive, 3–5 September 1950 | [218] |
| Second Naktong, Marine Attacks of 3–4 September 1950 | [223] |
| Second Naktong, Enemy Counterattack | [232] |
CHAPTER I
Korea, Doorstep of Strategy
The Historical Background—The Russo-Japanese War—Korea as a Japanese Colony—The Partition of Korea—Red Victory in China—Civil Strife in Korea
It meant little to most Americans on 25 June 1950 to read in their Sunday newspapers that civil strife had broken out in Korea. They could hardly have suspected that this remote Asiatic peninsula was to become the scene of the fourth most costly military effort of American history, both in blood and money, before the end of the year. Yet the danger of an explosion had been present ever since the end of World War II, when the United States and the Soviet Union rushed into the political vacuum created in Korea by the defeat of Japan.
The Korean question came up officially for the first time at the Cairo Conference of December 1943. With Soviet Russia not yet being represented as a belligerent in the Far East, the United States, Great Britain and China agreed that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”[1]
[1] Quoted in James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper, 1947), 221.
Any discussion of this issue had to take into consideration Korea’s status as a Japanese possession since 1910. Government, industry, commerce, agriculture, transportation—every phase of Korean life had been administered by Japanese for the benefit of Japan. As a consequence, the 25,000,000 inhabitants of the peninsula were woefully lacking in experience to fit them for the responsibilities of independence.
Syngman Rhee, the elderly Korean patriot, had long been clamoring for recognition of his Korean government in exile. The United States hung back because of reluctance to offend Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, at a time when Russia was a powerful military ally. Moscow had a strong bargaining point, moreover, in the prospect of giving military aid to the United States in the fight against Japan. Such an alliance was particularly desirable from the American viewpoint early in 1945 because of the losses resulting from Japanese kamikaze tactics. In the belief that active Soviet participation might shorten the war and save thousands of American lives, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was disposed to compromise with Stalin.
