8th ARMY SITUATION
LATE JULY 1950
The advance party extracted from the plan a fragmentary warning order suitable for radio transmission. This message was delivered to Eighth Army headquarters with a request that it be sent immediately to the Brigade at sea.[119] Now Craig assumed that Snedeker and Murray would have a reasonable impression of the situation awaiting them.[120]
[119] Stewart, 15 Jan 54.
[120] Ibid.
At an Army briefing on the 29th, the Marines learned that the UN left flank was collapsing. An air of uneasiness pervaded Taegu, and Eighth Army headquarters began preparations for displacement to Pusan. Craig was told that the Brigade definitely would be committed in the southwest, unless a more critical situation suddenly sprang up elsewhere. Again the Army officers added that the Marine unit actually must be prepared to move in any direction on short notice.[121]
[121] Craig, 25 Jan 54 and 17 Apr 54.
With the approval of the Eighth Army, the Brigade commander immediately sent a message to COMNAVFE requesting that the Marine air group be made available to support the ground force by 2 August, and that VMO-6 be transported to Korea as quickly as possible.[122] Time was drawing short.
[122] Ibid.
On 30 July, General Craig had a final conference with Generals Walker and Partridge. This time, Walker himself told the Marine leader that the Brigade would be sent to the southwest; and that the unit, once committed, would be free to push forward without interference from Eighth Army.[123] Partridge interjected that his planes would be available to support Craig’s ground troops if Marine air did not arrive in time.[124]