[142] BrigGen E. W. Snedeker ltr to CMC, 21 Apr 54.
The chief of staff registered an expression of astonishment.
“Did you get my orders?” Craig called to Murray when the Pickaway slid against the dock.
“No, sir!”[143] replied the CO of the 5th Marines.
[143] Murray, 15 Feb 54.
Craig ordered a conference at 2100 for the Brigade staff, Murray, battalion commanders, and the leaders of supporting units. When the officers entered the wardroom of the Clymer at the specified time, the last ship of Task Group 53.7 was being moored in its berth.
After introductory remarks by the general, his G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Ellsworth G. Van Orman, launched the briefing with a grim narrative of the enemy situation. Next came Stewart, who outlined tentative operations plans. The Brigade would definitely begin moving forward at 0600 the next morning, although a specific destination had yet to be assigned by the Army. Travel would be by road and rail. The necessary trains were already awaiting in the Pusan terminal, and the 50 trucks procured by Chidester were standing by, complete with Army drivers.[144]
[144] Stewart, 15 Jan 54.
Craig then summed up his earlier discussions with Walker. The Army leader had voiced a strong desire to use the Marines in an attack, for he felt it was high time to strike back at the Red invader. Employment of the Brigade as an offensive force was a natural conclusion to its commander, and he told his subordinates how he had won assurances for the integrity of the air-ground team. This was an encouraging note on which to close one of the strangest combat briefings in the history of the Corps. The leaders of over 4,000 Marines rushed from the ship to alert their units for movement into a critical tactical situation. They would leave in a few hours, but didn’t know where they were going.[145]
[145] Ibid.