Just as 2/5 was ascending Hill 255, Lieutenant Colonel Murray received word from Brigade of the Marine commitment. The 5th Marines commander canceled Roise’s orders and directed him to relieve both Cahill’s platoon and the 2d Battalion, 5th RCT, and to seize the remainder of Hill 342.[189]
[189] Ibid.; and Annex How.
At 1120 on 7 August, General Craig received a telephone message from General Kean directing the Brigade commander to assume control of all troops in the Chindong-ni area until further orders. With this overall responsibility, Craig went forward to observe the 5th RCT in action. He ascertained by personal reconnaissance that enemy resistance was light, although few friendly gains were being made because of the scattered and confused nature of the fighting.[190] The MSR between Sangnyong-ni, at the base of Hill 342’s spurs, and the vital Tosan junction was jammed with men, vehicles, and equipment, while infantrymen probed the surrounding high ground in an effort to weed out snipers and infiltrators.
[190] Craig, 12 Jan 54.
When 2/5 reached the road junction at which Cahill had been met by the Army guide during the night, Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered Company D to move up the north fork, tracing the base of 342’s eastern spur, and seize both the spur and great hill itself. Company E, now commanded by 1st Lieutenant William E. Sweeney, was to pass behind Sangnyong-ni and seize the west spur. Such a deployment would leave the battalion spread thinly, but Roise’s orders were to protect the wide valley formed by the two long ridges. This could be done only by occupying both spurs and 342 itself.[191]
[191] Roise, 5 Feb 54.
Outside of Chindong-ni, Major Morgan J. McNeely, 2d Battalion S-3, had picked up Captain John Finn, Jr., CO of Company D, and the two officers drove ahead by jeep to the village of Taepyong-ni at the eastern base of Hill 342. The staff officer informed Finn that Dog Company was to relieve a 5th RCT unit on the high ground above the clump of thatched huts. Both McNeely and an Army guide said that the Marines would meet no organized resistance in their climb.[192]
[192] Capt J. Finn, Jr., ltr to authors, 1 Mar 54 (Finn, 1 Mar 54).
Having spent a sleepless night on the road from Changwon to Chindong-ni, Finn’s infantrymen were fagged. It was now midafternoon, and the heat began to take its toll of Dog Company.
Just as the leading elements reached Finn at Taepyong-ni—30 minutes after McNeely’s departure—the column came under rifle and machinegun fire from the high ground above the road and from the hamlet of Tokkong-ni across the valley on the right. The Marines thought they were being shot at by Army troops, but the chatter of Communist “burp guns”[193] soon convinced them that they were meeting enemy resistance.[194]