Bacon’s theological standpoint.
The mere plan of the Opus Maius thus indicates that it is not exclusively devoted to natural science. “Divine wisdom,” or theology, is the end that all human thought should serve, and morality is the supreme science. Children should receive more education in the Bible and the fundamentals of Christianity, and spend less time upon “the fables and insanities” of Ovid and other poets who are full of errors in faith and morals.[2074] In discussing other sciences Bacon’s eye is ever fixed upon their utility “to the Church of God, to the republic of the faithful, toward the conversion of infidels and the conquest of such as cannot be converted.”[2075] This service is to be rendered not merely by practical inventions or calendar reform or revision of the Vulgate, but by aiding in most elaborate and far-fetched allegorical interpretation of the Bible. To give a very simple example of this, it is not enough for the interpreter of Scripture to know that the lion is the king of beasts; he must be so thoroughly acquainted with all the lion’s natural properties that he can tell whether in any particular passage it is meant to typify Christ or the devil.[2076] Also the marvels of human science strengthen our faith in divine miracles.[2077] Bacon speaks of philosophy as the handmaid of “sacred wisdom”;[2078] he asserts that all truth is contained in Scripture, though philosophy and canon law are required for its comprehension and exposition, and that anything alien therefrom is utterly erroneous.[2079] Nay more, the Bible is surer ground than philosophy even in the latter’s own field of the natures and properties of things.[2080] Furthermore, “philosophy considered by itself is of no utility.”[2081] Bacon believed not only that the active intellect (intellectus agens) by which our minds are illuminated was from God and not an integral part of the human mind,[2082] but that all philosophy had been revealed by God to the sainted patriarchs and again to Solomon,[2083] and that it was impossible for man by his own efforts to attain to “the great truths of the arts and sciences.”[2084] Bacon alludes several times to sin as an obstacle to the acquisition of science;[2085] on the other hand, he observes that contemporary Christians are inferior morally to the pagan philosophers, from whose books they might well take a leaf.[2086] All this gives little evidence of an independent scientific spirit, or of appreciation of experimental method as the one sure foundation of scientific knowledge. We see how much of a medieval friar and theologian and how little of a modern scientist Roger could be. It must, of course, be remembered that he is trying to persuade the Church to support scientific research; still, there seems to be no sufficient reason for doubting his sincerity in the above statements, though we must discount here as elsewhere his tendency to make emphatic and sweeping assertions.
Bacon’s scholastic side.
Writers as far back as Cousin[2087] and Charles have recognized that Bacon was interested in the scholasticism of his time as well as in natural science. His separate works on the Metaphysics and Physics of Aristotle are pretty much the usual sort of medieval commentary;[2088] the tiresome dialectic of the Questions on Aristotle’s Physics is well brought out in Duhem’s essay, “Roger Bacon et l’Horreur du Vide.”[2089] Bacon’s works dedicated to the pope, on the contrary, are written to a considerable extent in a clear, direct, outspoken style; and the subjects of linguistics, mathematics, and experimental science seem at first glance to offer little opportunity for metaphysical disquisitions or scholastic method. Yet, here too, much space is devoted to intellectual battledore and shuttlecock with such concepts as matter and form, moved and mover, agent and patient, element and compound.[2090] Such current problems as the unity of the intellect, the source of the intellectus agens, and the unity or infinity of matter are introduced for discussion,[2091] although the question of universals is briefly dismissed.[2092]
Attitude to Aristotle and other authorities.
Two other characteristic traits of scholasticism are found in the Opus Maius, namely, continual use of authorities and the highest regard for Aristotle, summus philosophorum,[2093] as Bacon calls him. Because in one passage in his Compendium Studii Philosophiae Bacon says in his exaggerated way that he would burn all the Latin translations of Aristotle if he could,[2094] it has sometimes been assumed that he was opposed to the medieval study of Aristotle. Yet in the very next sentence he declares that “Aristotle’s labors are the foundations of all wisdom.” What he wanted was more, not less Aristotle. He believed that Aristotle had written a thousand works.[2095] He complains quite as much that certain works of Aristotle have not yet been translated into Latin as he does that others have been translated incorrectly. As a matter of fact, he himself seems to have made about as many mistakes in connection with the study of Aristotle as did anyone else. He thought many apocryphal writings genuine, such as the Secret of Secrets,[2096] an astrological treatise entitled De Impressionibus Coelestibus,[2097] and other writings concerning “the arcana of science” and “marvels of nature.”[2098] He overestimated Aristotle and blamed the translators for obscurities and difficulties which abound in the Greek text itself. He declares that a few chapters of Aristotle’s Laws are superior to the entire corpus of Roman law.[2099] His assertion that Robert Grosseteste paid no attention to translations of Aristotle is regarded as misleading by Baur.[2100] He nowhere gives credit to Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas for their great commentaries on Aristotle[2101] which are superior to any that he wrote. He bases some of his own views upon mistranslations of Aristotle, substituting, for instance, “matter” for “substance”—a mistranslation avoided by Albert and Thomas.[2102]
Bacon’s critical bent.
Despite its theological and scholastic proclivities, Bacon’s mind had a decidedly critical bent. He was, like Petrarch, profoundly pessimistic as to his own times. Church music, present-day sermons, the immorality of monks and theologians, the misconduct of students at Oxford and Paris, the wars and exactions of kings and feudal lords, the prevalence of Roman Law—these are some of the faults he has to find with his age.[2103] The Opus Maius is largely devoted, not to objective presentation of facts and discussion of theories, but to subjective criticism of the state of learning and even of individual contemporary scholars. This last is so unusual that Bacon excuses himself for it to the pope in both the supplementary treatises.[2104] Several other works of Bacon display the same critical tendency. The Compendium Studii Philosophiae enlarges upon the complaints and criticisms of the three works. In the Tractatus de Erroribus Medicorum he detected in contemporary medicine “thirty-six great and radical defects with infinite ramifications.”[2105] But in medicine, too, his own contributions are of little account. In the Compendium Studii Theologiae, after contemptuous allusion to the huge Summae of the past fifty years, he opens with an examination of the problems of speculative philosophy which underlie the questions discussed by contemporary theologians. As far as we know that is as far as he got. And in the five neglected sciences to which his Opus Maius was a mere introduction he seems to have made little further progress than is there recorded; it has yet to be proved that he made any definite original contribution to any particular science.
Criticism easier than construction.
After all, we must keep in mind the fact that in ancient and medieval times hostile criticism was more likely to hit the mark than were attempts at constructive thought and collection of scientific details. There were plenty of wrong ideas to knock down; it was not easy to find a rock foundation to build upon, or materials without some hidden flaw. The church fathers made many telling shots in their bombardment of pagan thought; their own interpretation of nature and life less commands our admiration. So Roger Bacon, by devoting much of his space to criticism of the mistakes of others and writing “preambles” to science and theology, avoided treacherous detail—a wise caution for his times. Thus he constructed a sort of intellectual portico more pretentious than he could have justified by his main building. To a superficial observer this portico may seem a fitting entrance to the temple of modern science, but a closer examination discovers that it is built of the same faulty materials as the neglected ruins of his contemporaries’ science.