All kinds of fruits, of reptiles, too, and gems.”
Thus Physica is more inclusive than the modern science of Physics, while Hugh evidently does not employ it in the specific sense of the art of medicine, of which the word physica was sometimes used in the medieval period. Hugh goes on to say that Physica is sometimes still more broadly interpreted to designate natural philosophy in contrast to logical and ethical philosophy. His quotation from the Georgics also causes one to reflect on the prominent part played in natural science from before Vergil to after Hugh by the semi-human characteristics ascribed to animals and the occult virtues ascribed to herbs and gems.
The study of history.
Hugh’s attitude to history is interesting to note in passing. In his classification of the sciences he does not assign it a distinct place as he does to economics and politics, but he shows his inchoate sense of the importance of the history of science and of thought by attempting a list of the founders of the various arts and sciences.[14] In this connection he adopts the theory of the origin of the Etruscans at present in favor with scholars, that they came from Lydia. He regards the study of Biblical or sacred history as the first essential for a theologian, who should learn history from beginning to end before he proceeds to doctrine and allegory.[15] Four essential points to note in studying history in Hugh’s opinion are the person, the event, the time, and the place.
The two mathematics: astrology, natural and superstitious.
In discussing the quadrivium Hugh explains the significance of the terms, mathematica, astronomia, and astrologia. Mathematica, in which the first letter “t” has the aspirate, denotes sound doctrine and the science of abstract quantity, and embraces within itself the four subjects of the quadrivium. In other words it denotes mathematics in our sense of the word. But matesis, spelled without the aspirate, signifies that superstitious vanity which places the fate of man under the constellations.[16] Hugh thus allows for the common use since the time of the Roman Empire of the word mathematicus for an astrologer, and the frequent use of mathematica in the sense of the Greek word mantike or divination. He correctly states the Greek derivation of astrology and astronomy and employs those words in just about their modern sense. Astrology considers the stars in order to determine the nativity, death, and certain other events. For Hugh, however, it is not wholly a superstition, but “partly natural science, partly a superstition,” since he believes that the condition of the human body as well as of other bodies depends upon the constellations, and that sickness and health as well as storms or fair weather, fertility and sterility, can be predicted from the stars, but that it is superstitious to assert their control over contingent events and acts of free will,—the same distinction as that made by Abelard.
The superlunar and sublunar worlds.
In an earlier discussion of the universe above and beneath the moon[17] Hugh had further emphasized the superiority of the heavenly bodies and their power over earthly life and nature. He distinguished three kinds of beings: God the Creator (solus naturae genitor et artifex) who alone is without beginning or end and truly eternal, the bodies of the superlunar world which have a beginning but no end and are called perpetual and divine, and sublunar and terrestrial things which have both a beginning and an end. The mathematicians call the superlunar world nature, and the sublunar world the work of nature, because all life and growth in it comes “through invisible channels from the superior bodies.” They also call the upper world time, because of the movements of the heavenly bodies in it determining time, and the lower world temporal, because it is moved according to the superior motions. They further call the superlunar world Elysium on account of its perpetual light and peace, while they call the other Infernum because of its confusion and constant fluctuation. Hugh adds that he has touched upon these points in order to show man that, in so far as he shares in this world of change, he is like it, subject to necessity, while in so far as he is immortal he is related to the Godhead.
Discussion of magic.
Hugh’s brief, but clear and pithy, account of magic occurs in the closing chapter of his sixth and last book,[18] and seems to be rather in the nature of an addendum. It is, indeed, missing from the Didascalicon in some of the earliest manuscripts[19] and is found separately in the same collection of manuscripts, so that possibly it is not by Hugh. At any rate, magic is treated by itself apart from his previous description and classification of the arts and sciences and listing of their founders. The definition of magic makes it clear why it is thus segregated: “Magic is not included in philosophy, but is a distinct subject, false in its professions, mistress of all iniquity and malice, deceiving concerning the truth and truly doing harm; it seduces souls from divine religion, promotes the worship of demons, engenders corruption of morals, and impels the minds of its followers to every crime and abomination.” Hugh had prefaced this definition by much the usual meager history of the origin of magic to be found in Isidore and other writers, but his definition proper seems rather original in its form and in a way admirable in its attitude. The ancient classical feeling that magic was evil and the Christian prejudice against it as the work of demons still play a large part in his summary of the subject, but to these two points that magic is hostile to Christianity or irreligious, and that it is improper, immoral, and criminal, he adds the other two points that it is not a part of philosophy—in other words, it is unscientific, and that it is more or less untrue and unreal. Or these four points may be reduced to two: since law, religion, and learning unite in condemning magic, it is unsocial in every respect; and it is more or less untrue, unreal, and unscientific.