The Orations of Lysias

by Lysias

LAWS.

9. You have heard that the law expressly states that a fine is imposed on those who speak evil in the council; but I have brought witnesses that I did not enter the place of assembly, nor ought I to have been fined unjustly, nor could I with justice pay that amount. 10. For if it was plain I did not enter the council, and the law states that those who misbehave within it are to be fined, I am shown not to have transgressed in any way, but to have been fined unreasonably from motives of personal dislike without ill-doing (on my part). 11. And they were conscious that they acted wrongly; for they neither submitted an account of the matter nor came to the courts and established their proceedings as legal by a (judicial) vote. But then, even if these men fined me legally, and established their accusation before you, as the stewards remitted the fine, really I should have been acquitted of the charge. 12. For if they were competent to enforce or remit the fine, I would not with reason have to pay the money, though fined legally; and if it is possible for them to remit and they give account of their doings, if they have proceeded illegally, they will easily obtain the penalty which they deserve.

13. You know now how I was transferred and fined; but you ought to know not only the reason for the charge, but the pretext for their enmity. For I was a friend of Sostratus before incurring their hatred, knowing that he had materially benefited the state. 14. But although his friend, I never took advantage of his power to punish an enemy nor aid a friend. For during his life I remained inactive through necessity and on account of my age, and when he died neither by word and deed did I injure any of his accusers, and I can say so much, from which I should deserve much more gratitude from my opponents than ill-treatment. Their enmity they showed for the reasons which have been given, although (in reality) they had no reason for enmity. 15. So while on oath to enroll those who had not served, they violated their oaths and proposed to the assembly to deliberate about my freedom, (16) fining me on the ground that I spoke evil of the government, and utterly disregarding justice, being bound to injure me on some plea or other. What would they have done if they were really going to injure me greatly and benefit themselves, they who care so little for their unfairness (even) when neither of these objects is accomplished? 17. For they had small opinion of your assembly and had no respect for the gods, but behaved so contemptuously and illegally as not to attempt to defend their acts, and at last, thinking they had not punished me sufficiently, finally banished me from the city. 18. While acting so illegally and violently, they did not care to conceal their unfairness, but bringing me up again on the same charges, though I have done no wrong, they accuse and revile me, bringing charges not at all corresponding to my habits, but which harmonize and accord with their own characters.

19. These men are then eager in every way for me to meet punishment; but do not, I beg you, be swayed by their slanders and condemn me, nor set aside those who came to a better and juster decision. For these have acted both in accord with custom and precedent, and evidently have done no wrong, caring most for justice. 20. So if these (the prosecutors) act illegally, I would be somewhat disturbed, considering it is established to treat enemies ill and friends well; but if I did not meet fair treatment at your hands, I should be much more troubled. For then I should not seem to have been ill-treated through private enmity, but through the viciousness of the state. 21. Nominally I am contending about the writ, but actually about my citizenship. For with fair treatment I would remain in the city (for I trust to your decision); but if, being brought up by these men, I should be unjustly convicted, I should have to leave the city. What hope would I have to buoy me up in living with you, or why should I intend (to do so), knowing the desire of my accusers, and not knowing at whose hands to expect justice? Care then more for justice (than for anything else) and bear in mind that you grant pardon about charges evidently unjust, and do not allow those who have committed no wrong to meet through individual malice the most unfair treatment.

ORATION X.

THEOMNESTUS.

1. I think, gentlemen of the jury, that I shall have no lack of witnesses, for I see many of you sitting on the jury who were present when Lysithous was impeaching Theomnestus for speaking in the Assembly when it was illegal, as he had thrown away his shield. In that trial he said I had killed my father. 2. Now if he had claimed I had killed his father, I should have overlooked his words, (for I thought him of no account and insignificant), (3) but now it seems a disgrace not to punish, a man who said this in relation to my father, who benefited you and the state so signally. And now I wish to know from you whether he shall pay the penalty, or whether he alone of the Athenians is allowed to act and speak illegally just as he pleases.

4. This is my thirty-third year, gentlemen of the jury, and the twentieth since the restoration (of the Democracy). So I was clearly thirteen years old when my father died at the hands of the Thirty. At that age I neither understood what an oligarchy was, nor could I have helped my father under his unjust treatment. 5. And I could not have had reason to plot against him for the sake of the money, for my elder brother Pantaleon took everything and as guardian took our patrimony, so that on many accounts, gentlemen of the jury, it was for my interest to desire my father's life. So it is necessary to call these facts to your minds, and I shall need but few words; you know well enough that I speak the truth. And nevertheless I will furnish evidence for these facts.

EVIDENCE.

6. Now probably, gentlemen of the jury, he will make no denial of these facts, but will say before you, as he dared to affirm before the arbiter, that one does not use a forbidden word in saying some one has "killed" his father, for the law does not forbid this, but forbids the use of the word "homicide." 7. But I think that you should make your decision not about the letter of the law, but its intention. You all know that those who kill others are homicides, and those who are homicides kill others. For it would be a great task for a lawgiver to write all the words having the same signification, but in mentioning one term, his meaning covers all. 8. This is the case then, is it not, Theomnestus,—if any one called you a beater of father or mother, you would think he should be punished, but if any one said you beat your father or mother, you would then think he should go unfined as saying no forbidden word! 9. For I should like to hear from you (for in this you are skilled in practice and speech). If any one should say you "flung away" your shield, and in the law was written that a man was liable to punishment if any one declares he "threw it away," would you not have prosecuted him, and would it have been enough for you to say if some one declared you "flung it away," I do not care, for flinging and throwing are not the same thing. 10. Now could you admit the charge as one of the Eleven, if some one brought in a man on the charge of having stripped off his cloak or shirt but you would have discharged him because he was not called a "clothesstealer." And if any one should be caught carrying off a boy, you would not say he was a kidnapper, if you quibble with terms, and will not pay attention to the facts to express which terms are invented. 11. Consider this now, gentlemen of the jury. For this man seems never to have gone to the Areopagus through indolence and indifference. For you all know that there, whenever they are conducting a trial for murder, they do not make their depositions with this term, but with that by which I have been abused. For the prosecutor makes a deposition that "he killed," the defendant that "he did not kill." 12. Accordingly it would be absurd to acquit the one who evidently committed murder because he pleads he is a murderer, when the prosecutor charges the defendant of "killing." For what is the difference of which this man speaks? And you yourself brought suit against Theon for saying you "flung away" your shield. Nothing is said in the law about "flinging," but if any one declared he has "thrown away" his shield, it decrees a fine of 500 drachmae. 13. Would it not be terrible if whenever it were necessary for you to punish your enemies for slander, for you to interpret the laws as I do now, but whenever you speak illegally of another, to think you ought not to be punished? Are you so powerful as to be able to employ the laws as you wish, or have you such influence as to believe that those whom you wrong will not get a recompense? 14. Are you not ashamed to have the thought that you should claim advantages, not from your services to the state, but from your unpunished deeds? But read me the law.