The Diplomatists of Europe

by M. Capefigue

The Austrian cabinet, no doubt, takes ample precautionary measures, but there is no cruelty or oppression in its system; and whoever has had an opportunity of conversing with Prince Metternich ought to ask himself, whether it is possible a man of so calm and reasonable an intellect should be guilty of an act of barbarity without even a motive for his conduct?

The strict repressive measures upon which the system of Prince Metternich in Germany and Italy is founded occasioned a movement of reaction; for liberty, that master passion of the mind, does not allow itself to be crushed without making some despairing efforts. Far from the secret societies having been dissolved in Germany, they were regularly organised in the universities among the students, and the heated state of their minds was encouraged by the influence of poetry and the political writings, which called upon the courage and patriotism of all those who possessed noble hearts to lend their assistance to the German unity. This unity, so loudly appealed to by the young generation, was in reality only a sort of federative republic, in which all the states, while enjoying their individual freedom, were to be united by the practice of virtue, and would thus tend to the general happiness of mankind. The old German sovereignties were obliged to curb these associations, which burst forth in the assassination of Kotzebue.

Metternich had just been travelling in Italy when the universities distinguished themselves by this sanguinary crime. He was loaded with the benefits of his sovereign; he now bore the title of prince, and stars of almost all the orders of knighthood in Europe glittered on his breast. The state of fermentation which existed in Germany had not escaped his statesmanlike penetration, and it was solely at his suggestion that a congress took place at Carlsbad, where severe and distrustful measures were adopted against the organisation of the public schools in Germany. The conduct of the universities, the repression of seditious writings, the establishment of a political police,—nothing was neglected in this regular crusade, undertaken by the government against the revolutionary feelings by which the heated imaginations were then inflamed. After great disturbances have taken place in a state, the sole anxiety of the government is to check any disposition to disorder, and they are excited to do so by public opinion, and by the middle classes, who entertain a dread of fresh revolutions, and with good reason.

In the year of the Congress of Carlsbad, the Propaganda menaced the kingdoms of Europe with a fresh revolution. Let us observe accurately their situation in 1820. Towards the south there was the insurrection of Spain and the Cortes, and the proclamation of a government more liberal than even that of England; at Naples, almost by a magical echo, the constitution was also proclaimed; from Naples the cry of liberty was heard in Piémont, and the king was deprived of his throne. In Paris the disturbances were so great that the government was exposed every evening to a change in its political system. This year of 1820 might be considered as the first edition of the stupendous event of July, which took place ten years later with all the fracas of an insurrection.

Austria was particularly endangered by these revolutions, for the extremities of the kingdom of Naples and Piémont came in close contact with her Italian possessions. The people had declared themselves; the sovereigns then became aware of the danger, and roused themselves for their defence; congresses were held at Troppau and at Laybach, and Metternich, without hesitation, urged the adoption of powerful measures to quell the revolutionary spirit now manifested; he was so deeply convinced of their indispensable necessity, that he opposed every kind of delay, and only required the moral support of Prussia and Russia, declaring at once that an Austrian army was about to march into Italy and occupy Naples and Piémont. The Emperor Alexander, whose mind was full of the dread of secret societies and plots in Europe, lent his support to Metternich. There was but one single instance of opposition with regard to Piémont, and it is known from whence proceeded these objections. To such a degree has history been disfigured! It proceeded from the dignity of Louis XVIII., and the despatches of the Duc de Richelieu and M. Pasquier. The revolutionary spirit was breaking out in the streets of Paris in 1820, and the restored sovereign declared to Metternich, that if the Austrian army entered Piémont their occupation could not be of long continuance, as France could not allow of the Austrians upon the Alps.

In this wrestling, to use the old expression of M. Bignon, the cabinets had the advantage over the people. Naples was overcome in a few marches, and Piémont was occupied by the Austrian troops. The repressive impulse being once given, a combined system was every where manifested with the design of suspending political liberty. War was declared by the cabinets against all forms of government which owed their birth to military excitement or to an exclusively revolutionary spirit. Metternich was present at the Congress of Verona, a meeting which appears to me to have been the final expression of the will of Europe regarding the spirit of insurrection. France was charged with the suppression of the Spanish Cortes, as Metternich had executed by force of arms the will of the allied powers against Naples and Piémont. Here the cabinets were again successful, the revolution was completely suppressed, as far as regarded its power of action, and only kept a place in the disordered imagination.

All these acts of government, and all the proclamations which followed the assembly of the Congress, were the especial work of Prince Metternich. The Chancellor of Austria possesses a remarkable flow of language, a pure taste, and a noble manner of expressing his ideas, even in a diplomatic despatch, where the sense is almost always hidden under technical, and, it may be added, heavy modes of speech. To him is owing the style distinguished by the elevation of ideas, which always appeals to posterity and to the justice of future times, from the opinion formed by contemporary passions. He even allows himself to be carried on too far by his anxiety to express his meaning, and by the literary ornament he is desirous of conferring upon the most trifling despatch that leaves his cabinet; he takes the principal part in their composition, he writes in French with extreme elegance and precision, and he reads all the newspapers regularly, even to the part which contains merely literary and theatrical critiques. Those who saw him in 1825, when the unfortunate illness of his wife obliged him to visit Paris, were surprised to find him possessed of the most exquisite literary taste. He was acquainted with all our good authors, and shewed remarkable sagacity in the judgment he formed of the writers of our own times. One could hardly imagine how a politician, whose life had been spent in affairs of so much importance, could have found time to study the most trifling productions of literature.

Affairs were now settled in Europe. The governments began to emerge a little from the undecided political condition proclaimed by the Holy Alliance. From the beginning of the year 1827, Metternich had felt some uneasiness concerning the proceedings of Russia with regard to the Ottoman Porte, which was likely to be productive of extreme danger to the Austrian influence. If the Russian projects were realised, Austria would see herself deprived of her ascendancy over the Porte, which was nearly as old as that of France. At this time Metternich caused the French ministry to be sounded, but he was hardly listened to, for the most decided negotiations were in progress between the three cabinets of Russia, London, and Paris, on the Greek question; and here it is well to explain the refusal of Metternich to interfere with the transactions which led to the treaty of July 1827.

Since the year 1824, the cause of the Greeks had assumed a degree of consistency and a European character. Every era has its policy of sentiments, and people were now infatuated with a classic fanaticism for the Greeks. No doubt there was something glorious in the heroism which strove to burst the chain of the barbarians; but the enthusiastic declarations of Russia, her strong and pressing despatches in favour of the Greeks, were, in their main object, less the expression of a religious sympathy than the proceedings of a skilful policy, which sought to abase the Ottoman Porte, in order subsequently to reduce it into a state of vassalage. Russia, therefore, applied to Charles X., by speaking of the cross which had brought salvation to the world. In England it roused into action the Greek committee, and it was under the influence of these philanthropic prepossessions that the treaty of July 1827, and the battle of Navarino, which was the consequence of it, led to serious uneasiness on the part of Metternich. This minister instantly divined the full consequences of this shortsighted policy. The battle of Navarino, by crippling the power of the Porte, killed it, in a political sense, for the advantage of Russia: it was the prelude to the campaign of 1828 to the Balkan. Russia had succeeded in getting M. de la Ferronays placed at the head of foreign affairs in France: he was an honest man, but rather Russian in his inclinations and habits; consequently, Metternich could not draw France into a scheme of confederation and armed league against Russia. He was more fortunate in England with the Duke of Wellington, who acknowledged the mistake into which Mr. Canning had fallen, and pronounced the battle of Navarino an untoward event. England had thus returned to a perfect understanding of which were her real interests.