These treaties were a great assistance to the fortune of Talleyrand, being almost all followed by presents of considerable value, according to the custom observed in negotiations between one state and another.
On these occasions the minister did not exhibit sufficient modesty, I might say, sufficient discretion, for people had a tolerably good idea how much he had gained by each treaty, in money and diamonds. No doubt there was some exaggeration in the charges brought against him by discontented people, but I repeat it, one great defect of M. de Talleyrand was an inclination to play with bribery and corruption, and to establish it as a theoretic principle, even in his conversation: the stain remains upon his name. He held men in too much contempt, and this is a sentiment which society always returns with interest. It was now necessary he should lay the foundation of a new fortune; he entered boldly into various speculations: while avaricious and economical in little things, he gambled in the stocks with a perfect frenzy, and even lost considerable sums of money in them. Immediately after the peace of Amiens he had speculated upon a rise, and his gain appeared almost certain, but it happened by one of those caprices which stock-jobbing can alone explain, that the public funds fell more than ten per cent after the signing of the treaty, and he lost several millions of francs in a single turn of the stocks. These caprices of fortune occurred repeatedly in the course of his long life, and explain the necessity he was constantly under of repairing his fortune.
The late Bishop of Autun had just been entirely restored to secular life by permission of Pope Pius VII. While the negotiation concerning the concordat was in progress, the First Consul insisted M. Portalis should write to Rome, and request a brief from the pope authorising the secularisation of M. de Talleyrand; and the venerable Pius VII., who made so many sacrifices to obtain peace for the Church, consented to the act, though he rather exceeded his powers by so doing, as according to the canon the character of priest is indelible. It is said that this brief was not entirely explicit, the pontiff did not establish a principle permitting the marriage of priests; he merely, in virtue of his discretionary power, granted an act of indulgence and personal pardon to M. de Talleyrand for a deed he had already committed.
The ex-bishop had hardly laid down his crosier before he was compelled to submit to the imperious requisitions of the First Consul. Buonaparte, who piqued himself upon his strict morality, insisted he should enter the state of matrimony—a most grievous yoke to impose upon a man of wit and good taste, for, with his habitual tact, Talleyrand had been well aware of the amusement afforded to the Fauxbourg St. Germain by the silliness and ignorance of Madame Grand, and when she should be legally invested with the title of Citizeness Talleyrand, how she would expose herself to the sarcasms and the ridicule of the aristocracy! But there was no help for it, for the First Consul had decided it should be so. The marriage was accordingly celebrated at the municipality and in the church, and as people expressed it, the Bishop of Autun took to himself a wife.
The ministry of the First Consul now comprehended two men of great importance, Talleyrand and Fouché. The one represented at the court of Buonaparte the ancient aristocracy restored—he was essentially the man of diplomatic forms and traditions; Fouché, on the contrary, was the representative of Jacobinism and the revolutionary principle, which the First Consul considered as an internal malady fatal to his power. A deeply-rooted and continual competition could not fail to arise between two characters who had been led to accept office by such different ideas, and who met in the presence of Napoleon as the expression of such different systems. Both were men of incontestable ability, and were constantly informing against each other, or, at least, keeping a careful watch over the proceedings of their rival colleague; in addition to which, Fouché was very anxious to obtain the direction of Foreign affairs. Buonaparte was perfectly aware of the hatred that existed between them, but he was too wise to sacrifice one of the ministers to the other; each served as a check upon his rival, and he listened to the information they gave him, quite certain that neither would allow the treacherous dealings of the other to escape. It was in this manner Fouché delivered to Buonaparte the minutes of the secret treaty with Paul I., which Talleyrand had communicated to the court of London through the medium of one of his agents. The agent was sacrificed, but Buonaparte did not venture to touch his principal, because there was some danger in making known the treachery. Talleyrand afterwards employed the same agent in several subordinate negotiations; indeed, it is well known that he rather preferred people who were not much incommoded by scruples of conscience, men of whom he could boldly disclaim all knowledge if necessary, and who were content he should do so.
We now come to the lamentable affair of the Duc d'Enghien; and there is not the slightest doubt that Talleyrand was as well acquainted as General Savary with Buonaparte's determination to seize the prince. He denied it in vain, for positive proofs exist of the truth of our assertion; amongst others, his letter to the Baron of Edelsheim, minister of Baden, which has been preserved in an entire state. The following is an extract from it: "The First Consul has considered it necessary to order two detachments to proceed to Offemburg and to Ettenheim, to secure the authors of so odious a crime, which is sufficient to deprive the persons who have been concerned in it of the benefit of the law of nations."
After the arrest of the unfortunate prince, Talleyrand was acquainted with all the proceedings of this horrible affair, and he was present at the privy council where his condemnation was determined upon, or, at least, discussed. I dare not believe the cold and laconic reply attributed to him in the drawing-room of his old friend, the Duchess of ***, the very evening the Duc d'Enghien was tried at Vincennes. This reply was not only an atrocious expression, but it also involved a degree of imprudence which did not make part of his character. It is bad enough to have been concerned even indirectly in so fearful a crime.
In the midst of the active negotiations in which Talleyrand felt obliged to appear and to take a part, was there a political system formed in his mind, or merely a general principle? He still retained a strong bias towards English ideas, and a wish for an alliance with that country. This system, on which his earliest diplomatic plans were based, was constantly in his mind; he had not forgotten his residence in England at the beginning of the French revolution under M. de Chauvelin; he was also intimately connected with the Whig party, and considered Great Britain as the political ally of France against Russia, which last appeared to him, of all the powers in Europe, the most dangerous, as far as the civilisation of the world was concerned. He had not observed that by her situation Russia is our easiest, our most natural, and our most disinterested ally, for France and Russia do not clash either in a political or commercial point of view. But there are some early impressions which never wear out, and Talleyrand had passed some of the best years of his life in England, and on terms of friendship with Lord Grey, Lord Russell, Fox, and Sheridan.
He received the title of Grand Chamberlain at the accession of Napoleon to the throne, for which event his diplomatic correspondence had already prepared Europe, and he had also entered into a solemn justification of it to all the different cabinets. Napoleon liked to be surrounded by people of illustrious birth, and it appeared useful to the brilliancy of his crown to have a Boson de Périgord among the officers of his palace; it was in accordance with his passion for aristocratical honours, and his wish to restore the old state of society. M. de Talleyrand played a great part in the first negotiations with Germany, before and after the peace of Presburg, that peace which effected such a radical change in the political and territorial situation of the German nation. It was he who, with the assistance of M. Reinhard, contrived to bring about the Confederation of the Rhine, which made an end of the predominancy in Germany of the ancient house of Austria. After these negotiations were concluded, he received the title of Prince of Benevento, with a real feudal authority under the protectorate of France, which afforded him a revenue of 150,000 livres per annum, and made with his salary as minister for foreign affairs about 500,000 francs.[10] The peace of Presburg was certainly a most brilliant epoch in his ministry. As the representative of the magnificent military government whose grandeur overshadowed the earth, he assumed a certain degree of majesty in his manners and habits. The Prince of Benevento held a cour plénière for the German electors, who came to request from him a fief, or a portion of his supreme power. At the summit of his greatness, Talleyrand's mind still turned to the English alliance, and when Fox succeeded Pitt at the head of affairs, he again conceived the project of opening negotiations with a view to peace; he was firmly convinced that no general peace could be concluded in Europe without the concurrence of England, and he was desirous a vast system of compensation should be arranged, which might incline her towards pacific measures, for no treaty can be durable that is not based upon equity. But these projects were interrupted by one of the most serious circumstances that occurred in the whole course of his life.
It has been said that Talleyrand retired from office because he did not agree in the opinions of Napoleon regarding the war in Spain. I have deeply studied the question, and I believe this report to be utterly untrue. There is but a slight approximation of dates between his resignation and the treachery of Bayonne; it is this approximation that has been laid hold of to gild the disgrace of the minister. Talleyrand was, in fact, replaced by M. de Champagny a little before the Spanish war, but he took part with the cabinet in all the intrigues which led to the events of Aranjuez. The reunion of the Peninsula in one political system with France agreed well with his historical ideas upon the family compact, and several letters are still in existence from the Prince of Benevento which confirm his participation in all these events, as well as a curious report to the Emperor, demonstrating the advantages that would accrue from reuniting both crowns in his family, in imitation of the grand political scheme of Louis XIV.