The Diplomatists of Europe

by M. Capefigue

Talleyrand at this time refused the ministry for foreign affairs, as it would merely have added to his responsibility without increasing his power of action; but he accepted the embassy to London, which was a much more important office, as affairs of the greatest consequence would necessarily come under consideration there, it being upon the prompt decision of this cabinet that must mainly depend the consolidation of the new order of things; for, although England had been the first to recognise the events that had taken place, she had shewn some disposition to reserve regarding an alliance with the new government. The affairs of Belgium occasioned so much difficulty in the negotiations, and added so greatly to the danger of the political crisis, that it was necessary a person possessed both of talent and great consideration should be deputed to London, to secure the support of the English cabinet in the negotiations that had been begun, especially as the despatches received from Russia rendered the necessity for a good understanding with England particularly urgent.

When Talleyrand arrived in London, the Duke of Wellington was still in the ministry, and the violent Tories had the direction of the cabinet,—a state of affairs which prevented his carrying on his manœuvres as he wished; he was perfectly aware of the attachment of the Tories to the secret treaties concluded in 1815, and, therefore, used all his efforts to overturn the Duke of Wellington. He also renewed his old intimacy with Lord Grey, he sought the society of Lord John Russell, and lived in a most magnificent style.

The revolution of July had produced an effect in England; the march of opinion became too powerful for the Tories, and Lord Grey was placed at the head of the cabinet, affording a complete triumph to the moderate Whigs. The course being now clear, Talleyrand could assume the position he wished: and hard had he laboured to prepare it! He now was able to work openly for a treaty with France.

It ought to be known that, during the embassy of Prince Polignac, a conference had been arranged in London between the plenipotentiaries of Russia, England, and France, to decide upon all the questions relating to Greece; and the same course had been pursued afterwards, under the Duc de Laval. England attached great importance to it, and Talleyrand proposed its renewal, for the purpose of watching and deciding upon the general affairs of Europe, and also advised that the plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia should be admitted. They were to take the Belgic question into consideration, and decide what course should be pursued, in consequence of the dismemberment of the kingdom of the Low Countries, established in 1815; and Talleyrand being personally acquainted with all these plenipotentiaries, his position soon became as brilliant in London as it had been at Vienna in 1815. He was connected with Prince and Princess Lieven by the ties of old and intimate friendship, and the families of Talleyrand and Esterhazy had also long been well acquainted: Baron Bulow, the Prussian minister, was one of the second-rate diplomatists, who all entertained the greatest respect for Talleyrand and his long experience in public affairs.

Conferences were, therefore, undertaken upon very indefinite subjects, for their principal object was to seek the opportunity of meeting and maintaining peace. No doubt there was something very undecided in the numerous protocols signed at that time upon the affairs of Belgium, and the greater part of them were never put in force. In addition to this, though they had been the result of a common agreement, the Russian and Austrian plenipotentiaries never received the formal assent of their governments: the conduct of Prince Lieven and Prince Esterhazy was, in the first instance, disclaimed on the part of their courts, and they were shortly afterwards recalled; but the result of these conferences in London, the happy consequences of their developement, was the maintenance of peace, whose existence had at one time been greatly threatened. In 1831, when the foreign ministers met in such close communication with each other, it was almost impossible explanations should not take place, and that there should be any misapprehension between the governments; the proceedings of Talleyrand were, therefore, successful; for his main object was the preservation of the European status quo, by preventing those conflicts among the cabinets, those clashings among people, which fill history with tales of bloodshed; and the conferences in London were of service, because the close contact into which men were brought with each other was a means of reconciling affairs.

According to his general custom, the French ambassador received a great deal of company; his entertainments were splendid; his evening parties, in particular, were remarkable for the good taste and distinguished company so much prized in England. I should not exceed the truth if I were to say that his wishes influenced certain votes in the House of Commons. No ambassador had ever before enjoyed so much consideration. But Lord Grey was aware of an approaching storm: the difficulty of his political situation had not consisted in overturning the Tory ministry—that was a simple and natural victory, for the agitation of minds and events had been sufficient to displace the Duke of Wellington, but the really dangerous part of Lord Grey's position was, on the contrary, the inevitable and powerful progress of the Whig principles, which sought to proceed to extremities; for when a nation lays its hand upon its ancient institutions, one change often leads to another. After having reformed the state, and given a greater latitude to elections, must they not reform the Church? did not the situation of Ireland require modification? The Dissenters complained, and with justice, of their grievances; it would have been an absurd attempt to set a limit to a reformed parliament, to say to the nation "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." The parliament became impatient, while religious scruples arose in the mind of Lord Grey, in the old party of which Canning was formerly the head, now represented by Mr. Stanley, and, above all, in the heart of William the Fourth.

Talleyrand was as well aware of the danger as Lord Grey himself, for he well knew the powerful influence exercised by young and ardent opinions; it soon became impossible to arrest the parliamentary agitation. The venerable Lord Grey was suddenly seized with disgust for the whole proceeding; he would not raise a sacrilegious hand against the Church; he sent in his resignation, and England well remembers the touching explanations he gave upon his own ministerial conduct in the House of Lords. From the time of the appointment of Lord Melbourne, the French ambassador foresaw the invincible tendency of affairs, the triumph of the Ultra-Whigs, and, perhaps, of Lord Durham,[15] and began to think of retiring, for he no longer played the principal part, of which he was always ambitious.

Another circumstance added to this feeling. In the revolution just encountered by the ministry, Lord Palmerston had still retained the Foreign Office, his opinions being of a less moderate cast than those of Lord Grey; and as his disposition was one rather difficult to deal with, serious dissensions had already arisen between him and Talleyrand. From the first formation of their ministry, the Whigs had felt the necessity of augmenting their consideration with foreign powers; they were not ignorant that the English nation, which preferred them for their popular opinions and their patriotic sentiments, did not feel equal confidence in their habits of business and their comprehension of the situation of Europe. Lord Palmerston considered that, after the treaty of the 8th of July, which secured such great advantages to Russia, a certain armed demonstration was inevitable upon the Eastern question, and he, therefore, proposed to Talleyrand that the squadrons of France and England should be united, and sail under the flags of both nations in the Black Sea.

Talleyrand perfectly understood the interest felt by the Whigs in this armed demonstration, but he considered it far too bold a step to be ventured upon in their actual situation. As a continental power, France might well call upon the alliance of England if necessary, or, on the other hand, afford to her all possible assistance; but then the whole of the Holy Alliance was close upon her, and this demonstration might lead to a real war. In the opinion of Talleyrand it was necessary to fortify the moral alliance, and place a barrier to resist the encroachments of Russia; but it would be a hazardous undertaking to make a direct attack on her flag in the Black Sea. He, therefore, held back from the propositions of Lord Palmerston: he explained to him that, instead of an armed demonstration, which would be of doubtful advantage, nay, possibly altogether useless, it would be desirable to prepare an act, expressive of future policy; and made it evident to him that a treaty of quadruple alliance, which would unite the south of Europe against the north, could not fail to lead to great results, even in the midst of the various but transient events of a party war. The treaty concluded between France, England, Spain, and Portugal, owed its existence to this idea, this favourite conception of Prince Talleyrand; he would, however, have been much better pleased could he have also included Austria, according to the desire he had cherished in his mind ever since 1814.