Nesselrode accompanied the Emperor to Troppau and Laybach; those who studied the character and deportment of both observed that their minds appeared to be undecided: there was a kind of uncertain hesitation between the liberal ideas they had lately entertained and the strongly repressive tendency advocated by Austria. Metternich made use of all his talents and influence to convince the Emperor of the dangers by which all the European sovereignties were threatened, if they did not decide upon one of those great military demonstrations which, by their overwhelming force, at once made an end of rebellion; when, just at the most critical moment, intelligence was brought to the Russian minister of a mutiny that had taken place in one of the regiments of guards at St. Petersburg. This news quickly determined the Emperor's opinion; Nesselrode received orders to enter with the utmost vigour into the plans proposed by Austria, and the downfall of Capo d'Istria appeared impending.
One thing must be particularly observed in this struggle between liberal principles and those of absolute dominion; and that is, that Capo d'Istria had always been the faithful interpreter of an idea of independence for Greece, consequently, when liberal opinions were in the ascendant, he was not likely to continue in favour. The great misfortune of the Greeks at this moment, and what retarded their emancipation, was the circumstance of their insurrection taking place at the same time as the revolt in Piémont and the proclamation of the constitution of the Cortes; rendering it difficult always to discriminate exactly between an unruly military movement which terrified the regular governments, and the noble spectacle of Greece, with a spirit worthy of her forefathers, raising the holy symbol of her religion on her banners, stained and torn in many a former heroic struggle. Capo d'Istria's affection for Greece led to the loss of the Emperor's favour; and he, the protector of the Hellenists, was stabbed to the heart by a Greek,[49] affording a melancholy proof of the ingratitude of revolutions.
Then took place the intimate fusion of the Russian and Austrian system of politics, occasioning the absolute triumph of Metternich; and this situation was continued at the congress of Verona under Nesselrode, from that time forth sole minister of Russia, and chief of the chancellerie under Alexander. At the congress of Verona he held the pen, and all the resolutions regarding Spain were taken in concert; the diplomatic notes were drawn up by the two ministers together; Metternich wrote to the Austrian minister at Madrid, while Nesselrode, recalling the Russian ambassador, fulminated a sentence of proscription against the Cortes. It was no longer the liberal and generous Alexander they had to deal with, but an imperious prince, who, through his ministers, laid down the law in a sovereign and dogmatic manner. When M. de Villèle craftily objected for a short time to engage in an expensive and hazardous campaign, Nesselrode, without the slightest hesitation, wrote to him, in the name of the Emperor, that Russia was determined to venture every thing in order to repress the spirit of revolt in the Peninsula. The impulse was so powerful it was no longer possible to resist it.
The close of Alexander's life was greatly harassed by these feelings; the sacred cause of the Greeks weighed upon his mind as a subject of remorse, and the sorrow it occasioned him was imprinted on his countenance, which now bore the appearance of ill health. Yet what was to be done? The panic of impending revolutions had seized upon his mind, and delivered him over to a thousand terrors, for his dread of the spirit of the secret societies was extreme. Liberalism filled him with alarm, he viewed it as a spectre threatening him with the seditions that might arise in his empire, and he did not comprehend that the most effectual means of employing the national effervescence of the Russians would have been to march them against Turkey for the deliverance of Greece. The causes of the unexpected death of Alexander have formed the subject of much inquiry; perhaps this acute sorrow was not entirely unconnected with it: he was a man of a deeply religious mind, with a mild disposition and a tender and impressionable heart; thus he felt deeply for the sufferings of Greece. Every stroke of a yataghan which caused the head of a woman or child to roll in the dust, among the ruins of Athens or Lacedæmon, made his heart bleed.
Soon after Alexander had been gathered to his fathers, a commotion, at once political and military, took place in Russia. In southern Europe people are not sufficiently acquainted with the character of the noble family of the Czar: there was a degree of enthusiasm in the filial affection entertained by the Emperor Alexander for his aged mother, and the deepest respect existed in the hearts of Constantine and Nicholas for their elder brother Alexander. His death took them all by surprise, and upon his tomb burst forth the military movement prepared by the secret societies, and by a generation of young officers, dreaming of the old Sclavonian independence.
Was the accession of the Emperor Nicholas likely to make any alteration in Nesselrode's position? One powerful reason which operated against any diminution of the minister's influence was the respectful admiration of Nicholas for the policy and the opinions of his deceased brother, and being also inexperienced in business, he considered it indispensable to surround himself with the men who had been acquainted with the politics of Russia ever since the great epoch of 1814. These men of traditions are essential to governments; they preserve the history of all the precedents in the cabinets; they know what has been the conduct of Europe during a long series of years, what are the springs by which she has been actuated, and the acts she has been called upon to concert; comprising information of the most essential utility for the comprehension of treaties and the conduct of negotiations: besides this, it was impossible to deny that Nesselrode was possessed of very great ability in unravelling events, and had always shewn an enlightened, though passive obedience, to the wishes of his sovereign. The Emperor Nicholas, then, being desirous of continuing the policy of his brother, to whom could he better address himself than to the man who had had the direction of affairs during the last fifteen years? Nesselrode also enjoyed the esteem of the Empress-Mother; and what power that remarkable woman had exercised over political affairs! She alone always manifested a sovereign contempt for Napoleon—she alone swayed the mind of her son Alexander, even after Erfurt; and, according to the patriarchal fashion, all her children appeared, to a certain degree, to do homage to her for the crown, as if they owed the supreme power to her from whom they had derived their existence.
Nevertheless, Nesselrode soon found it necessary to modify his opinions. Ideas had advanced since the death of Alexander, and it was impossible to restrain the Russian spirit, which had decided in the most energetic manner in favour of Greece; it therefore required military food, and a war was indispensable. The influence of Metternich over the cabinet of St. Petersburg daily lost ground from this moment, and Nesselrode began to draw off from Germany, and become more essentially Russian in his principles and ideas; he also began to take a decided turn in favour of the Greeks. Nor in this conduct ought he to be reproached with inconstancy, for the times and circumstances were no longer the same, the monarchical principle having triumphed every where, in Piémont as well as at Madrid and at Naples, while Poland appeared entirely subject to her viceroy Constantine. Under these circumstances it was less difficult to discern the holy and heroic principle of the Greek revolution, and to rekindle the ardent hope of an independence, acquired by means of so many pious sacrifices. From this new tendency of affairs, Nesselrode found himself the antagonist of Metternich, with whom he had hitherto been agreed; but the Russian interest now prevailed over the Austrian spirit.
The friendship between France and Russia dates from the year 1815, and was increased at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, under the influence of the Duc de Richelieu; but at that period, as we learn from the despatches of Count Nesselrode, France was too much overwhelmed by the fatal consequences of the two invasions to take an active part in affairs, or afford a support that would make her alliance worth seeking by the various cabinets of Europe: but from the year 1819 France exhibited such a developement of vital powers and military energy, that Russia hastened to include her in her diplomatic means. The inclinations of the French cabinet turned in this direction, under the Duc de Richelieu and M. Dessolles; and they continued thus until the more English administrations of Polignac, of Montmorency, and of Villèle. The ministry of M. de la Ferronays again was favourable to the Russian alliance; and the ties that now bound France to Russia were not merely those of gratitude for the services rendered at the restoration, but the well-grounded conviction that the Russian alliance could on no occasion injure our interests, but might, on the contrary, on many occasions augment our diplomatic influence and our territorial boundaries. The collection of the despatches of Nesselrode and Pozzo di Borgo during this interval, and all the diplomatic papers that exist in the Foreign Office, attest the good-will of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and the offers made secretly by it to obtain the alliance and concurrence of France on the Eastern question.
Another cause which made this friendship so greatly desired, was the rivalry that had already become apparent between Russia and England. The system of the alliances in 1815 had overturned all the ancient diplomatic ideas, and all private jealousies had given way before the common object of Europe,—the destruction of Napoleon's power. But one great fault then committed by England was her inordinate augmentation of the power of Russia, thus, to a certain degree, creating her future omnipotence; for it was with the money and subsidies of England that the cabinet of St. Petersburg acquired the means of influencing for ever the southern interests. Nesselrode, who had been engaged in the greater part of the transactions of 1815, was obliged to detach himself from the traditions of the alliance of 1812, and great ability is required in order to make these transitions without abruptness; supple minds possess their influence as well as those of a more decided character, and ruin follows close upon the attempt to resist too much. Nesselrode is essentially the man of transitions; he has never assumed an inflexible attitude in a system or an idea, but has constituted himself the translator of times and interests: from which cause, as I have before observed, it sometimes occurred that his opinions as chancelier d'état to the Emperor Nicholas were opposed to those he professed when he held the same situation under Alexander. The ideas of these two princes were not alike, neither were they placed in the same situations; yet Nesselrode served them both with the same fidelity and the same intelligence. It is a talent in public affairs to know how to make one's self the interpreter of another person; there are but a few of those very superior minds who, being deeply impressed with their own conceptions, obtain a dominion over times and characters, and even they frequently fall. But many very distinguished ministers never are able to attain that point of elevation, and, not daring to make themselves types, they are content with being impressions. They agree with all periods, all situations, and all difficulties.
From the accession of the Emperor Nicholas to the revolution of 1830, the Russian policy was in some measure absorbed by the war with the Porte. All the ancient theory of the Holy Alliance was abandoned for less undecided interests, and less fear was entertained concerning revolutions at the time the most complete revolution took place. Whatever judgment may be formed of the event of 1830, it must suddenly have awakened a new train of emotions in the Russian chancellerie; for the popular principle which had caused this violent irruption had demonstrated as much energy, as did formerly the military power of Napoleon, against whom all Europe had risen in arms. The old education of Nesselrode was here destined again to be of service to him; for the first consequence of the revolt was, though not exactly to revive the treaties of the Holy Alliance, an old parchment which had fallen to pieces, at least to pave the way for a treaty of mutual guarantee. All private dissensions were naturally compelled to give way, that people might hasten to provide against the most pressing danger; Metternich appeared entirely to resume his former ideas, as if he were returning to the projects of 1815, and the diplomatic school abandoned many serious plans for the chances of a crusade against democratic principles. We are inclined to think Nesselrode did not dislike this reminiscence of the principles of political repression, being those which he most perfectly understood, and which he had particularly dwelt upon during his early years of study and labour: but age had now supervened; in 1830 Nesselrode was no longer young, and it is not at the second period of existence people are able to encounter the great perturbations which shake the world to its centre. In recapitulating the causes of the maintenance of peace, people have not sufficiently considered the dread of change that possessed those wearied existences. Truly, it was not without reason that the Greeks placed in the hands of the aged the decision concerning peace or war. Let us suppose Metternich with the impetuosity of youth, and Nesselrode fifteen years younger, who can tell what might have occurred? Perhaps a violent war might have broken out, and with it all the chances of disorder.