The Diplomatists of Europe

by M. Capefigue

The campaign of 1812 began. The Austrian corps of 30,000 auxiliaries was posted on the Vistula, and, if not required to take an active part in the operations, it still was a check upon the Russian army, which already threatened the flanks of Napoleon's troops. Metternich watched with extreme anxiety the movements of the invading army in Russia; its disastrous retreat was an appalling and unlooked-for catastrophe, and Prince Schwartzenberg went to oppose the Russian troops.

A new train of ideas, a new series of negotiations were now to be entertained. The retreat from Moscow had been so calamitous, that it had not spared to the French enough troops to protect the line of the Oder, far less to retain possession of that of the Vistula. If Prussia and Austria had been faithful to their alliance with Napoleon, they ought immediately to have combined their forces, and opposed all their strength to the Russians, who were already making incursions on every side. The situation of the two courts was very difficult, for the whole German nation was so unanimous in their dislike to the French, that it would have been impossible for the cabinets of Berlin and Vienna to take any steps in their favour, without placing themselves in direct opposition to the people they governed; and, besides, after the deep humiliation they had both endured at the hands of Napoleon, was it not natural they should seek some motive, or, if the expression be preferred, some pretext, for delivering themselves from a state of subjection so fatal to them? Prussia, who was foremost, had no hesitation in abandoning an alliance that was so dishonourable to her. Metternich did not immediately follow her contagious example, but, a cessation of hostilities having taken place between the Russian and Austrian armies, the eyes of France fell upon the cabinet of Vienna, as the mediatorial power which was to prepare a peace, on a foundation in better keeping with the general equilibrium of Europe. In his conferences with M. Otto, the imperial chancellor gave him clearly to understand, that the Austrian government would not depart from the principles of the French alliance, but that the nature of their situation had been altered by the late military events, and, as the frontier of Austria might become the theatre of war, the cabinet of Vienna would naturally assume a more decided attitude, in order to bring to a conclusion a struggle which would for the future so closely affect the empire.

The mission of Prince Schwartzenberg and Count Bubna, at Paris, was conducted in the same spirit. Without giving up the alliance, the Austrian government signified that it could no longer rest upon the same basis, in fact, that they must take a more decided part in the approaching military crisis. Metternich's object in this new negotiation was to lay the foundation for a general peace. Such a resolution was by no means disinterested on his part, for, in the new settlement of the boundaries of the different states of Europe which must ensue, Austria would obtain an accession of territory, as a consequence of the position in which the course of events had placed her. The English party was gaining ground at Vienna, and Lord Walpole had arrived with offers of subsidies and augmentation of territory; in proportion, also, as the French army met with fresh reverses, the popular feeling of Germany assumed a more decided character; still Metternich persisted in his mediatorial system, from the conviction that it would be for the real advantage of his country.

These negotiations continued all through the winter of 1812-13. In the meanwhile, M. Otto had been replaced by Count Louis de Narbonne, the representative of the family alliance. He had been appointed by Napoleon, in the hope that his presence would remind Austria that an archduchess sat upon the throne of France; and, by the decree of the senate and the emperor, this same archduchess had just been officially proclaimed regent during the absence of Napoleon: the government being placed in her hands was a fresh guarantee to Austria of the personal feelings of the emperor's son-in-law. In politics alliances are formed upon positive interests, and Napoleon had too greatly abused his victories; the decree had gone forth, the empire, which extended from Hamburg to Venice—the protectorate, which pressed heavily upon Germany, Prussia, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland—the diplomatic oppression which burdened Sweden and Denmark—all must have an end: after action, a reaction must be expected.

During this time considerable levies took place in every part of the Austrian territory, for it was determined the army should be made up to its full complement of 300,000 men. Metternich justified these warlike preparations by the natural position in which Austria was placed: when the belligerents came so closely in contact with the territory of a neuter party, it appeared quite natural that the neuter should take precautions to preserve its own independence. The position which Metternich had given to Austria had made her a predominant power, with the right of insisting upon real advantages, by way of indemnity; this was an admirable change of circumstances, which left Austria at liberty to come to a definitive decision.

Baron Weissemberg then started for London, under the official pretext of bringing about a general peace, but in reality for the purpose of sounding the English cabinet upon the advantages likely to be offered to Austria, in the way of subsidies and accession of territory, in case she should declare openly in favour of the coalition, and should be willing to furnish so considerable a force as 450,000 men. Now all this occurred in the month of March 1813, and the armaments of Austria received a fresh augmentation, when the thunders of the artillery were heard at Lutzen and Bautzen; 200,000 men were already located in Bohemia: against whom could these immense bodies of troops be intended to act? At this juncture, Metternich again appeared in his mediatorial capacity, to prepare the armistice of Plesswitz, afterwards definitively settled at Nieumarch: Austria constantly declared that, as the conflicting armies occupied four hundred leagues of her frontiers, it was impossible she should any longer refrain from taking an active part in the struggle, if the belligerent powers would not agree to terms of reconciliation. A step was thus taken, from a state of alliance with Napoleon, towards a condition of armed neutrality, and how could so powerful a country as Austria long continue in this situation? In the heated state of the public mind in Germany, how was it possible to calculate the exact point where the mediation would stop for the casus belli?

It was the interest of Russia and Prussia to keep on good terms with a court capable of drawing up a body of excellent troops 200,000 strong. After some bitter and ill-advised observations, Napoleon also accepted the mediation; it was a sort of break in the military operations, an expression of the weariness felt by an army now worn out with battles. We may see how great a part Metternich had created for Austria in these negotiations, for, on former occasions, the plenipotentiaries could treat the Austrian interests as a separate concern, while in her new position Vienna became the indispensable intermediate agent in any treaty that might be contemplated. The question was, Did Austria offer her mediation in good faith, with a sincere wish for peace? or was it merely as a lure, to enable her to render her military establishment more complete? This becomes an important question for history.

It must be remembered that, after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, the desire for peace was universal, even in France, and in the tent of Napoleon, in the military night-watch, as well as on the morning of battle; the troops still fought, but it was no longer with the willingness, the enthusiasm of the victories of Austerlitz and Jena. Napoleon submitted to the powerful voice of public opinion, but could his iron disposition bend to circumstances? Until that time as general and consul, and afterwards as emperor, he had been accustomed to say to the vanquished states, "These are my conditions, you have no choice but to accept them; and, if there are any alleviating circumstances, it is to my clemency alone that you will owe them." In 1813, the tables were turned: cabinets now appeared with powers quite equal to that of France, animated, too, with the ardour of battle, and burning with the desire of repairing their former humiliation, and reconquering their independence. The allied powers had signed the armistice of Nieumarch, one great inducement being the opportunity gained for carrying on a secret negotiation with the crown prince of Sweden, and also for the sake of persuading Austria to join the league. I think their anxiety for peace was less than their wish to gain the time necessary to complete their vast military arrangements, by detaching Austria from her part of mediator, and inducing her to join them in the war against the common enemy; pious Germany, having gained her feet, now wanted to make an end of her oppressor. Now, would Metternich continue to preserve this neutral position? would not the Austrian government be inclined for a change of system?

Let us not forget how Austria was at that time situated. Had she not a right to obtain, by diplomatic means, all the advantages offered by her present position? We know the heavy losses she had sustained in Italy; the Milanese, the Tyrol, and the Illyrian provinces, had been successively torn from her: and was it not natural she should take advantage of her armed mediation, a favourable position in which Metternich had contrived to place her? Had she derived the expected advantages from the general peace, she would not have joined the coalition against Napoleon; failing in that, she must endeavour to recover by force of arms all she had been deprived of during the war. It was for the purpose of justifying this delicate situation that Metternich first introduced the elegant system of high and noble diplomatic language, a style of which Baron Gentz has since been the most distinguished organ—Gentz, whose life has been so busy, and so full of disappointments, who, in his old age, came to utter soft love speeches at the feet of Miss Fanny Elssler.