The Diplomatists of Europe

by M. Capefigue

Europe, with all her desire of acting vigorously against Buonaparte, possessed neither money nor credit, and this to such a degree, that Prussia, for instance, had not a million of florins at her disposal; England not only provided subsidies, but also the means of negotiating loans: she became security for Prussia, Austria, and Russia; thus taking upon herself the credit of the world. The whole of the subsidies were not paid in money—arms, clothing, and provisions were also sent; and this extraordinary effort gave employment to her machinery, work to the labouring classes, and immense occupation to her mercantile navy. Her inexhaustible liberality demanded in return the abatement of the tariffs and free entry for her manufactures; by which means she regained a great portion of the advantages she afforded. In order to be convinced of this, it is only necessary to consult the rate of exchange for that period, which was almost always in favour of London; that is to say, that while she appeared to be furnishing money, it was merely changing the location of her funds. Hamburg, Frankfort, Vienna, and Berlin, were in debt to London, and the loans thus compensated themselves; shewing the prodigious strength of the commercial principle, and the magnificent power of an aristocratic state, directed by a superior mind.

The principal object Lord Castlereagh had in view was to bring about a degree of persevering unity in the European coalition; it was the ruling idea of Mr. Pitt and the labour of his life: but the statesman had so often failed in his object. The weakness of Europe against Buonaparte resulted from its divisions, from its conflicting interests, and the separation of one cabinet from another; it was therefore necessary to unite them all in one common cause, and this was not the least difficult task he had to perform. If they might reckon upon the willingness of Russia to proceed to extremities against Napoleon, if the national spirit had been roused in Prussia to strive earnestly for the fall of the Emperor, were they likely to meet with the same concurrence, the same absolute devotion on the part of Austria, and of Sweden under Bernadotte? What obstacles and opposition Lord Castlereagh had to encounter in the course of the year 1813, at the time of the armistice of Plesswitz and the congress of Prague! Fresh discussions were incessantly started, and the coalition was repeatedly ready to fall to pieces, from the selfish tendencies of private interests. As for him he had but one object, one desire—the fall of Napoleon and the dissolution of the French Empire, and no words can express the power possessed by a man who has one idea constantly present to his mind, and follows it up with undeviating energy. The dissolution of the congress of Prague was occasioned by this absorbing passion in the mind of Lord Castlereagh, who induced Metternich to engage more decidedly in the coalition; he was like the intrepid hunter who sounds the halloo in pursuit of the stag at bay.

The vast plan he had conceived rested upon two points—exertion on the part of the various governments to promote the march of troops, and a general rising among the people to second the efforts of the cabinets. The material impulse was given by Russia, and he allowed it to proceed and develope itself, well knowing the example of that great power would be followed by Prussia and Austria, and that their efforts would be sufficient for the liberation of Germany. It then became necessary in the north to urge Sweden to take the field, and with her Denmark and Holland; all his efforts were therefore directed to this point, and gave rise to the mission of Sir Charles Stewart and General Graham. He considered there would be no difficulty in inducing a revolt among the oppressed Dutch and Belgian population, and a popular movement would bring about the restoration of the House of Orange; while in the south the armies of England overspread Spain and Portugal, and France was thus attacked at both extremities at the same time. This has always been the favourite political system of England; by acquiring influence in Spain and Portugal, and also in Belgium, she prevents France from affecting her either commercially or diplomatically; and as English statesmen, in what situation soever they may be placed, never lose sight of the hereditary diplomatic traditions, one plan is transmitted through many generations, in the same manner that it formerly descended in our monarchy, when under the dominion of kings, and of able and distinguished ministers. Nothing is done in that country from a sudden impulse; every plan is maturely weighed, and England in the nineteenth century is swayed by the same principles as in the sixteenth.

Lord Castlereagh's task, however, increased in difficulty as the allied armies drew near France, and their interests became more personal and more divided. It then became a question whether Austria would be willing to overturn France, and whether the Emperor Francis would sacrifice his son-in-law; there was also a doubt whether Russia would consent to the proposed augmentation of Austria and Prussia, which would add so considerably to their importance; and in addition to all the other questions, what compensation was likely to be awarded to England? Such were the difficulties that arose at every step after the Allies had reached the Rhine, until at last Pozzo di Borgo was despatched to England, with the firm determination to induce Lord Castlereagh, if possible, to visit the Continent; his presence now seemed really indispensable amidst the clashing of ideas and interests, which threatened to lead to the dissolution of the coalition. England alone was capable of reconciling all their wishes, and restoring to the various forces the unity which, like the bundle of sticks in the fable, rendered them invincible when united, though each separately would be easily overcome.

Lord Castlereagh arrived on the Continent to confer with Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart, and his own brother Sir Charles Stewart; and from this time the influence of the British legation was complete and paramount. The intervention of the English minister was indispensable, as I have before observed, to fortify the bonds of cohesion between the various cabinets, and more especially for the purpose of enforcing the principle, that no treaty was possible with Napoleon. In the conferences that took place between Metternich and M. de St. Aignan at Frankfort, the English legation observed that the Allies appeared rather inclined to a pacific arrangement, which would leave the Rhine as the boundary of the French empire, and would consequently include Belgium; but never would England have consented to a proceeding which would abandon Antwerp to France: she had too long coveted her fleet and great arsenal, and many had been the expeditions she had undertaken with that object!

The opinion of Castlereagh was therefore inflexible; France, he declared, must be reduced within her ancient limits, and this resolution led to the conviction that with the ancient frontiers the ancient dynasty would be necessary. It was not that the English minister had entered into any engagements with the house of Bourbon; the Tories might consider the restoration of Louis XVIII. as a desirable circumstance after the general disorder that had existed in Europe, but it did not make one of the necessary conditions of a general peace, for the selfishly English interest was paramount over every other consideration. This state of affairs is evident in the correspondence between Lord Castlereagh and the French princes who had taken refuge in England; and though he might insinuate to the Comte d'Artois and the Duc d'Angoulême that they might appear on the Continent, he would not officially approve of their conduct, so as not to make the restoration a necessary condition for the re-establishment of peace. This caution affords an explanation of the Duke of Wellington's conduct after the battle of the Pyrenees; he made no objections to the Duke of Angoulême's presence in the south of France, but the white flag was not hoisted, because Lord Castlereagh was completely engaged in the negotiations at Châtillon.

In these conferences, so fatal to our interests, the predominance of the English minister was manifested in the highest degree. As England furnished the subsidies, she exercised very great influence over the movements of the Allies, and Lord Castlereagh's language often assumed an imperious tone. Upon the first hesitation manifested by Austria, he declared that England would no longer be security for the money borrowed by the cabinet of Vienna, if they should attempt to enter into a separate treaty; and he was supported in his design of a general unity against Napoleon by Pozzo di Borgo, who had not left his side since they had travelled together from London. In fact, he was convinced it was not possible to make a treaty with Buonaparte. What peace would there be for Europe as long as he continued to wear the French crown? Had they not for many years been engaged in a protracted and constantly recurring struggle? For this reason, upon firm conviction, he supported as a statesman the maxim adopted by the Tory party,—The ancient territory and the ancient dynasty.

Although Lord Castlereagh held no acknowledged diplomatic office at the congress of Châtillon, he nevertheless swayed all the resolutions formed there; he was the principal author of the treaty of Chaumont, which placed the military direction of the campaign under the influence of England. It was a singular example of the power that may be exercised by a commercial and monied government over military powers, for England had hardly any soldiers engaged in this war, but by means of her subsidies alone she set in motion a million of men, and made them subservient to her national and exclusive interests. Thus it was admitted as a general principle, that France was to be reduced within her ancient limits, and the object of England was gained by our being deprived of Antwerp; her vast arsenal was no longer dangerous, and her fleet was to be divided. It may be said that the treaty of Paris in 1814, which was the consequence of the treaty of Châtillon, formed in some measure a realisation of the leading ideas of Toryism; that is to say, the re-establishment of the House of Orange, with a territory extending to our frontier; Prussia increased in strength and importance, Austria assumed a predominant position in the south of Germany, while they both served as barriers to Russia; and above all, the maritime and commercial supremacy of Great Britain, to such a degree that, in the secret treaty of 1814, Lord Castlereagh imperatively insisted on the rupture of the family compact among the various branches of the House of Bourbon, for the purpose of rendering her influence as secure over Spain as over Holland.

One might have supposed that, after this long and painful struggle against Buonaparte, the English minister would have enjoyed some rest from his anxieties; but such was far from being the case, for the Colossus had scarcely been hurled from its base before intestine dissensions arose in the coalition which had so lately set the world in motion. Various interests were the subject of secret discussion at Vienna; and the questions concerning Saxony, Poland, and Italy occasioned him extreme uneasiness. Throughout the whole period of the French revolution, England had undoubtedly played the principal part, and her perseverance alone had saved the Continent from a general and overwhelming oppression; but in diplomatic matters, as in politics, ancient services are less considered than the new situation in which countries are placed: England had been too much engaged in continental affairs not to continue to feel great anxiety concerning them, and on the question of Poland, Lord Castlereagh was opposed to the plans of the Russian cabinet, and he did not restrain the expression of his dissatisfaction respecting the Polish suzeraineté, which the Emperor Alexander was desirous of reserving to himself. No one ever surpassed his lordship in the union of firmness of character with the most polished manners, the distinguishing mark of a true gentleman; there was a degree of steadiness, I may almost say of nobleness, in his private conferences with Alexander, in the midst of the splendid salons of Vienna, that was quite admirable.

No aristocracy in Europe is more magnificent than that of England. Lady Castlereagh's parties at Vienna exceeded in splendour those even of the Emperor of Austria, and were replete with every pleasure and amusement; while her ladyship, who was a woman of extraordinary abilities, afforded considerable assistance to the diplomatic proceedings of her husband. The bold and rather presumptuous manner of Sir Charles Stewart, Lord Castlereagh's brother, were tempered by the studied mildness of Lord Aberdeen and the military profusion of Lord Cathcart; and the soirées of the English legation were cited as the most brilliant of the season, not excepting those of the sovereigns. The English minister, however, was not satisfied with the decidedly Russian tendency of the congress. He had carefully studied the character of Alexander, and was well aware that vast ideas and infinite ambition lay concealed under the religious mysticism he had adopted under the influence of Madame Krüdner; and looking at it under this point of view, he naturally came to the conclusion that, if the English policy had been the means of saving the Continent from the absorbing power of Napoleon, it would be necessary to guard against a new danger, and prevent the power of Russia from becoming too great and exercising too absolute a dominion over the destinies of the world. This feeling, common to them all, formed a tie between Castlereagh, Metternich, and Talleyrand, all of whom were equally convinced that the combination of the three sovereignties would not be too much to oppose the projects of Russia; and their dissatisfaction increased so much towards the termination of the congress, that the three plenipotentiaries signed the treaty of alliance concluded in February, 1815, to guard against any possibilities that might arise regarding Saxony and Poland. Thus the man who had been the keystone of the coalition, whose powerful hand had cemented and directed it, contributed at this moment to introduce divisions into its bosom, because the common danger had passed away.