The Diplomatists of Europe

by M. Capefigue

I have consulted upon the events of this period the two men who played the principal parts in the diplomatic transactions of the war, Count Pozzo di Borgo and Prince Metternich. I asked them, "Was there really a sincere desire for peace at Prague?" They both answered in the affirmative. Pozzo di Borgo, in his hatred for Napoleon, described to me the anxiety he felt at witnessing the hesitation of Austria; and Metternich justified himself to Europe for the indecision of his conduct by his desire to bring his diplomatic mediation to a happy issue, for the interests of Napoleon, Austria, and the general peace.

A notification from the court of Vienna announced to Count Nesselrode and Prince Hardenberg, that, for the future, Austria, as a member of the coalition, would locate 200,000 men, in large bodies, behind the mountains of Bohemia. The joy of the Allies was not to be expressed; one should have heard Count Pozzo di Borgo recount the magical effect produced by this letter of Metternich; it arrived in the middle of the night at a barn, in which were reposing the Emperor Alexander, the King of Prussia, Count Nesselrode, Prince Hardenberg, and all the staff of the allied troops. They arose and embraced each other, as if the salvation of Europe were achieved, and Napoleon tumbled from his throne. The manifesto of Austria, which was the work of Metternich, appeared ten days later. In spite, however, of this rupture, Caulaincourt remained at Prague, and the chancellor of state still assured him he was ready to proceed with the negotiation if France would agree to the independence of the Germanic Confederation and of Switzerland, and to the reconstruction of the dominions of Prussia on a scale of greater importance. Napoleon, still unwilling to give in, applied to Count Bubna, in the persuasion that he would be able to exercise a favourable influence over his father-in-law, the emperor; at last, on the 14th of August, he gave his consent to the proposals of the Austrian cabinet, and his answer was despatched to Prague; but it was too late. Metternich declared the impossibility of entering into a separate treaty, and said it would be necessary to refer simultaneously to the three courts whose political interests were henceforth inseparable.

Still Napoleon did not abandon all hope of drawing Austria over to his interests, and he proposed entering into a negotiation, even after the commencement of hostilities, when the Austrian army was actually in motion. 200,000 Austrians came forth from the mountains of Bohemia, and turned the flank of the French army. Then the general rising in Germany took place; a transitory lustre was conferred by the admirable battle of Dresden, but Leipsic witnessed the last expiring gleam of the French glory. By the end of 1813, the line of the Elbe was lost, and even that of the Rhine was compromised. All Germany was in arms, and the whole of Europe had assumed a threatening posture.

Austria had hardly joined the coalition before difficulties arose in this vast body, agitated by so many different interests. Some jealous feelings had already been entertained concerning the title of generalissimo of the armies, which had been conferred upon Prince Schwartzenberg, and other questions were subsequently started as to the object of the campaign. As long as the French occupied Germany, the most pressing anxiety was to get rid of this heavy yoke. Having once reached the Rhine, there was no confederation, no imminent danger; the soil was covered with the wrecks of Napoleon's empire, and Germany had recovered her ancient independence. The sole remaining possessions of the French in that country were some fortresses, which, after a siege of longer or shorter duration, must revert to their ancient sovereign. The house of Austria had ceased to be afraid of France, but had begun to entertain some apprehensions with regard to Russia. The Russians had been taught the road towards the south of Europe, and they were likely to remember it.

In the opinion of Metternich, France, with a certain degree of power and a definite extent of territory, was necessary to the balance of power in Europe; and he took care this should be mentioned in the manifesto published by the allied armies on the Rhine. This manifesto, of which the idea belonged to Metternich, was executed by Gentz. Austria, being now free from danger in Germany, could, without risk, lend assistance to the threatened empire of France. The family connexion with Napoleon was not yet broken; his moral influence, it is true, was greatly weakened; but his powerful mind was in its pristine vigour, and he was still capable of making some daring attempt. These long-sighted views were clearly displayed in the conversation between Metternich and M. de St. Aignan. Austria, already embarrassed by her position with regard to France and Russia, would gladly have withdrawn from a war which no longer closely affected her own interests; but a principle, fatal to Napoleon, had been admitted,—the allied powers were no longer at liberty to enter into a treaty the one without the other. When Lord Castlereagh arrived on the Continent, he gave additional solidity to this tendency to unite in a common cause; and the implacable enemy of Napoleon, Count Pozzo di Borgo, had been despatched to London to request the presence of the prime minister of England on the Continent. They were desirous of rendering the alliance incapable of future alteration, for the first successes beyond the Rhine had naturally given birth to two separate questions: one relating to territory in the new settlement of the boundaries in Europe; the other, a moral question, as to the form of government which should be established in France in case the allied armies should take possession of Paris. The interests of England and Austria were differently affected from those of Russia and Prussia by the arrangements that might be entered into.

In the first place, what would they do with the most important conquests? Russia was in possession of Poland, Prussia of Saxony, and Austria of a great portion of Italy. Should the Emperor Alexander attempt to set up a sort of kingdom in Poland, the interests of Austria would suffer. Again, could Prussia be permitted to enlarge her dominions by the addition of Saxony? All these questions were already subjects of debate in the diplomatic body, which, to all outward appearance, was still perfectly united; the most unlimited confidence in each other was expressed by all parties, but, in reality, interest and selfishness were the prevailing feelings. Lord Castlereagh shewed great ability at this juncture by constituting himself the general bond of union of the coalition.

With regard to the questions connected with the government of France, it was hardly possible to suppose Austria would agree to a project of a change of dynasty, when an archduchess held the reins of government as regent. The Emperor Alexander had entered into a private contract with Bernadotte, whose feelings against Napoleon were very bitter. Alexander would agree to any form of government that might be proposed, but in the conference at Abo all possibilities had been discussed, even one which might place Bernadotte at the head of affairs in France. England, though well inclined towards the Bourbons, did not make their restoration so indispensable a condition as to render debates upon matters of more personal interest subordinate to it. Lord Castlereagh had explained this to the exiled princes; they had not yet been permitted to land upon the Continent, and the Comte d'Artois did not arrive at Dole until January, 1814.

It is particularly in this point of view that the history of the Congress of Chatillon is deserving of a serious study. At this meeting there was still an evident desire on the part of Austria to conclude a treaty on the basis of the balance of power in Europe; but, from the very commencement, Metternich must have discovered that the position of Austria was no longer the same as at the beginning of the campaign. All moral influence had now passed over to the side of the Emperor Alexander, who had become the arbiter of the destinies of the coalition; Prussia and Austria only appeared in the light of useful auxiliaries, the principal influence and popularity rested with the czar; he alone was talked of, and the negotiations were especially addressed to his cabinet. The military treaty of Chaumont, which fixed the number of troops to be furnished by the coalition, was dictated by Lord Castlereagh, who was afraid of a dissolution of the alliance. It was then declared that the allied powers would never sheathe the sword till they had reduced France within the limits it occupied in 1792; and, for this purpose, each cabinet promised a contingent of 150,000 men under arms, England agreeing to furnish a subsidy.[5]

From this period Metternich found himself in a very delicate position. As the events of the war gradually brought the allies nearer to Paris, the Emperor of Austria could not with any degree of propriety take a part in military operations whose object was the capture of a metropolis governed by the archduchess. Metternich, who was in correspondence with Maria Louisa, could no longer control the course of events, and, perhaps, this princess, weary of seeing herself surrounded by so much littleness of mind, avidity, and folly, as were exhibited by the relations and supporters of Napoleon, when the regency was at Blois, might not have been sorry to get rid of her fictitious dignity. The Emperor Francis II. remained at Dijon, while the bold advance of Schwartzenberg laid Paris at the mercy of the allies.

A reproach has constantly been cast upon Metternich for his conduct upon this occasion; how, it is said, could he sanction a proceeding which rent the imperial crown from the brow of Maria Louisa? I believe, at this time, all idea of the continuance of the empire had been abandoned, its time had passed away: there are seasons when the force of public opinion carries every thing before it, and now there was a sort of weariness of mind, people were tired of Napoleon and his military system, the string drawn too tight had snapped asunder. A retrospect must be taken of that time, and it will explain the resolution of the allies. It would have been difficult to maintain even the regency of the empress, and at the same time carry out the military engagements entered into at Chaumont. In France all were tired of the war, a general rising had taken place in Europe, nor would Napoleon have submitted to the degradation of a kingdom bounded by narrower limits than the Rhine. No doubt the regency would have been the most complete triumph of the Austrian system, but what would have become of Napoleon under the regency? would he have resigned himself to so humiliating a situation? would he not have been stifled in the small kingdom of France? The proceedings in Paris were quite independent of Metternich, who was not even present at them. The Emperor Alexander had acquired so overwhelming an influence in the senate with the patriots of 1789, that no cabinet, even of the first order, would have contended with it. The archduchess had been conducted from Blois to her father, Francis II., without any discussion taking place concerning the regency or the empire. Talleyrand had said, "The restoration of the Bourbons is a principle; every thing else is an intrigue:" and this expression put an end to all negotiations that had not the return of Louis XVIII. for their object. The diplomatic corps were occupied with the Treaty of Paris, which produced the re-establishment of order, the general peace, the restoration of the Bourbons, and the settlement of the boundaries of the French territory, which had been the principal object and most important result of the campaign. But this was not all; the immense empire of Napoleon was in ruins, and how should these important fragments with which the world was overspread be divided? Might Francis II. resume the old imperial crown, which he had resigned at the treaty of Presburg? In spite of the strong predilection then entertained for ancient customs, Metternich felt that the crown of Charlemagne would be merely an empty title unsupported by any real influence, and it would have been a cause of offence to Prussia, whose jealousy would have been roused by the existence of a German empire in close contiguity with her own kingdom, which embraced nearly a third of the population of Germany. With the strong instinct which forms part of his character, Metternich felt that, for the future, Austria, while retaining a great general influence over Germany, had better strive to become a southern sovereignty, having Gallicia at one extremity, and Dalmatia at the other, and including the Lombardo-Venetian territories, under the ancient and magnificent iron crown. He carried this idea into the Congress of Vienna, when the new constitution of the European sovereignties was to be established on a general basis, and he took care to bring it forward again upon every occasion in which the diplomatic system of Austria was displayed. This alone affords an explanation of the extreme and constant solicitude evinced for the possession of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and the constant tendency, both by means of conquest and commerce, towards the shores of the Adriatic.