[67] Ep. 890.
[XXIV.] After his return from England, Grotius happened to be one day at the Assembly of the States of Holland and West-Friesland when an affair of consequence was under consideration. The States had granted commissions to several Privateers, some of which made depredations on the friends of the Republic, and, afterwards quitting the country, scowered the seas, refusing to return though summoned. Some people of Pomerania who had been ill used by these Corsairs, applied to the States for redress. The Question therefore was, Whether the States were answerable for the act of those privateers, either as having employed bad men in their service, or neglected to require security from them on giving them commissions. Grotius' advice being asked, his opinion was, that the States were only bound to punish the offenders, or deliver them up, if taken; and, for the rest, to make satisfaction to the sufferers out of the effects of the pirates. We learn from himself on what he grounded his opinion[68]. The States, said he, were not the cause of those unjust practices, nor had any part in them: so far from it they have prohibited, by express ordonnances, the injuring of our friends. They were not obliged to ask security from the privateers, since, without granting formal commissions, they might permit all their subjects to plunder the enemy, as was formerly practised; and the permission they granted to those privateers was not the cause of the damage they did to our allies, since any private person may, without such permission, fit out vessels, and sail on a cruize. Besides, it was impossible to foresee that these privateers would turn out wicked; and there is no taking such precautions as to employ only honest men. When a prince's troops, whether by sea or land, contrary to his order, injure his friends, he is not responsable for it; as appears from what has been acknowledged by France and England. To make one answerable for the acts of those who are in his service, even when no fault of his gave any occasion to them, would be to decide the question not by the law of nations, but by the civil law; and even the rule is not general in the civil law.
The States were determined by this opinion.
FOOTNOTES:
[68] De jure belli et pacis, lib. 2. c. 17. § 20.
[XXV.] The multitude of affairs with which Grotius was oppressed, and the continual journeys he was obliged to make, left him no time for cultivating Polite Literature. In the midst of his occupations Du Maurier, the French Ambassador in Holland, and his particular friend, having resolved to begin a course of study, applied to Grotius for directions. We shall here give an extract from his answer[69], because it may be of use to grown persons desirous of acquiring literary accomplishments.
He shortened his method as much as he could out of regard to Du Maurier's age, dignity, and affairs. He advises him to begin with Logic, not that of Aristotle, which is too long, and contains many things of no great use: an abridgment was sufficient, such as Du Moulin's, the most esteemed at that time. "But your assistant, says he, must read the best that has been written on the subject, and communicate to you what is most remarkable: much may be learnt in an hour or two spent in this manner." The same method he would have observed in the other sciences, and even with regard to books; that is to say, the person under whom Du Maurier studies must read the best writers on every subject; and extract what is most essential, to be repeated to him. After Logic he directs him to the study of Physics, which he would not have carried too far; and recommends some plain and short abridgement: he could think of none at that time but Jacchæus. He is of opinion, that as in Logic the rules of syllogism are chiefly to be attended to, so in Physics the enquiry into the nature and functions of the soul is of most importance. After Physics he advises him to proceed to Metaphysics, of which he might get some notion from Timplerus' book, which is neither long nor obscure. The study of Moral Philosophy is to be begun with Aristotle, whose books to Nicomachus are the best. "Your reader, says he, must give you in a small compass what the ablest interpreters have said. It is also necessary to be acquainted with the sentiments of the different sects of Philosophers; for without that knowledge you will be much at a loss in reading the Ancients, and profit little by them." To unbend after this serious study, some other short and agreeable books that have a relation to it may be read: such as Ecclesiasticus, the Wisdom of Solomon, Theognis, Phocilides, the Golden Verses ascribed to Pythagoras, Epictetus's Enchiridion, Hierocles, and the Commentaries of Arrian; not omitting the Characters of Theophrastus. What the Poets have written on Morality may also be perused; with some select Tragedies of Euripides, Terence's Comedies, and Horace's Epistles. Young people and grown persons admire different things in these writings: the beauty of the style pleases the first: the others learn by them to know men. To these works may be added Cicero's Offices, a piece not enough esteemed, purely because it is in the hands of every one; some of Seneca's Epistles, the Tragedies that go under his name; and the best of Plutarch's smaller pieces. After having gone through Aristotle's Politics, the excellent extract by Polybius of Republics is to be read; with the Harangues of Mecænas and Agrippa to Augustus, in Dion; and Sallust's Letter to Cæsar. Plutarch's Lives of Pericles, Cato, the Gracchi, Demosthenes, and Cicero, must not be omitted: much may be learned too from Cicero's Letters to Atticus, if they were translated by one well acquainted with the Roman History of that period.
After this would be the proper time for reading Aristotle's Rhetoric: for, as is well remark'd by that great man, who possessed all the arts and sciences in an eminent degree, from Morals and Politics must the arguments be drawn that are to convince mens understandings; that is to say, it is impossible to be truly eloquent without extensive knowledge. The better to perceive the use of the precepts it would be proper to read with attention some Orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, particularly those which relate to public Affairs, such as the Philippics, the Olinthiacs, the Oration pro lege Manilia, that against the Agrarian Law, and some others. The next thing, to be applied to is Jus publicum, that is to say, the knowledge of the different forms of government, the Conventions between Nations, and, in fine, whatever regards Peace and War. The treatises of Plato and Cicero On Laws shew in what manner the principles of this law are to be deduced from morality. It will not be unprofitable to read likewise, or at least to run over the second book of St. Thomas Aquinas, especially what he says of Justice and Laws: The Pandecta, particularly the first and last book, the first and the three last books of Justinian's Codex, point out the use to be made of those principles. The Lawyers who have best handled the questions relating to the Law of Nations and Jus publicum, are Vasquès, Hotoman, and Gentilis. After the acquisition of these several branches of knowledge, the study of History will be extremely useful, by the application which may be made of the examples to the precepts. History is to be begun with an abridgement of universal history; such as Justin, Florus, and the abridgement of Livy. But in reading History a man ought to please his own taste: for they all contain many useful things: and we retain best those we read with pleasure. In general, we ought not to begin with the most ancient, but with such as, being nearer our own times, have greater relation with what we know already: we may afterwards go back to what is more distant. It is proper to observe, that there is more advantage to be reaped from reading the Greek historians who have written the history of Rome, than the Latin, who have treated the same subject; because Foreigners give more attention to the public manners and customs, than the Natives.
M. du Maurier received this Letter with the highest satisfaction; he permitted several copies to be taken of it, and it was printed by the Elzevirs in 1637, in a collection of several Methods of Study, under the title of De omni genere studiorum recte instituendo.
Grotius acquaints us[70] that it was published with out his consent.