[224] Ep. 367. p. 134.
[225] Ep. 388. p. 142.
[226] Ep. 370. p. 135.
[227] Ep. 339. p. 851.
[V.] The subject of the dispute between France and Sweden was this: after the unfortunate battle of Norlinguen, the Swedes and their allies being reduced to the last extremity, judged the support of France must be their principal resource. They made no doubt that such an able statesman as Cardinal Richelieu would seize every opportunity to abase, or at least embarrass the house of Austria, the eternal rival of France. James Læfler and Philip Strect were sent in 1634, by the Protestant Princes and States of the Circles and Electoral Provinces of Franconia, Suabia, and the Rhine, to solicit succours from the King of France, and prevail with him to declare war against the Emperor. They proposed that the King should send an army to the Rhine, and advance a large sum of money to enable the allies to recruit their army, which was almost wholly destroyed. They treated with the Cardinal de Richelieu, who endeavoured to avail himself of the situation of affairs and their necessities, to make the most advantageous treaty he could for France. He offered only five hundred thousand Livres, six thousand foot in six weeks, and twelve thousand when they had put France in possession of Benfield: but their powers did not extend to the cession of that place. However they promised it without making any condition; and had not the precaution to stipulate that France should furnish every year the same subsidies which she engaged to give King Gustavus by a treaty which was renewed at Hailbron. The Cardinal gave them hopes that France would declare war against the Emperor; that after the declaration the King would keep twelve thousand men in Germany, and a strong army on the Rhine; advance immediately five hundred thousand Francs to be divided among the army or the allies; nominate a Prince to command the army of twelve thousand men, with a lieutenant under him as his collegue; and have one to assist in his Majesty's name at the Councils of war.
After signing the treaty Læfler and Strect returned to Germany in December 1634.
When a motion was made in the assembly of the Allies at Worms to ratify this Treaty, the High Chancellor of Sweden opposed it. He maintained that it was obscure and ambiguous, and discordant with the private treaty made with Sweden. This Minister was chiefly chagrined at Sweden's losing the principal direction of affairs in Germany by the nomination of a German Prince to be Generalissimo of the allied army. He declared that he thought himself obliged to propose his difficulties to the Queen of Sweden: and besides would send an embassy to Paris on the subject. This then was the business which Grotius had to manage at the Court of France. The Commission was the more delicate as Cardinal Richelieu, a positive man, absolutely required that the treaty made with the Envoys of the German Princes should have its full effect.
It was to confer on this affair that Grotius made a visit to Boutillier, Superintendant of the Finances. The Swedish Ambassador represented, that the Treaty ought not to be in force till Sweden's ratification of it, which could not be expected, as it made void the Treaty of Hailbron. This was not what the Cardinal wanted: he commissioned Father Joseph to employ all his address to bring Grotius into his measures. The Capuchin was the Cardinal's confident, and it was then thought that he was destined to succeed him in the Ministry in case of the Cardinal's death. March 14, the Superintendant sent to acquaint Grotius that he purposed to make him a visit with Father Joseph; but as the Father was taken ill he asked him to go with him to the Convent of the Capuchins; that he ought to have no reluctance to this, since the Cardinal himself had lately visited Father Joseph there when he was ill. Grotius went to the convent, and was conducted from thence to the Garden of the Thuilleries, where he found Boutillier and Father Joseph. After the usual compliments, the Capuchin shewed that the late treaty at Paris was made in consequence of a full power given the Ministers of the German Princes, and concluded and signed without any stipulation concerning the necessity of ratifying it. Grotius replied, that the High Chancellor himself had said the contrary; that the towns who approved of the treaty owned the necessity of its being ratified; that a ratification was so necessary to give a treaty the force of a law, that that which was concluded at Ratisbon, in 1630, by Father Joseph himself, had not its full execution because the King did not think proper to ratify it; that the Swedes only asked what was just, and would consent that some addition should be made to the treaty of Hailbron, if that were proper. Grotius was asked, which article of the late treaty Sweden complained of? he first mentioned that of the Subsidies, the disposition of which was left to the four circles of Germany, though it was on the express condition of receiving them that Sweden had engaged in the war: he added, that it was unjust to take Benfield from the Swedes without giving them an equivalent, since the Germans had given them that place as a pledge. The two French Ministers, unable to make Grotius approve of the treaty of Paris, had recourse to menaces and caresses: they imagined that his instructions bore that he might ratify it provided it was not till the last extremity. Grotius saw through their design, and told them they deceived themselves. They said, they would write to Sweden to complain of the High Chancellor; that the King would no longer treat with Grotius as Ambassador; that orders would be sent to the Marquis de Feuquieres to complain to Oxenstiern himself of his contempt of a signed treaty, and want of due regard to the King. Grotius answered, that the Marquis de Feuquieres had already made representations to the High Chancellor, without effect, on this subject; that if France would not have him for Ambassador, he would be employed elsewhere; that it would be in vain to write to Sweden because Oxenstiern's reasons for not ratifying the treaty of Paris would certainly be approved there. They cooled a little; and gave him to understand, that an alteration might be made in some of the articles, and that the King would consent that the Swedes should not be excluded from the chief command, though the treaty imported that a Prince should be General. Grotius shewed that there were many other articles, which occasioned great difficulty both by their ambiguity and their opposition to the interests of Sweden. The two Ministers put themselves into a passion, and concluded with complaining that they would inform the King and the Cardinal that they could settle nothing with Grotius, and that the Swedes made a jest of treaties. Father Joseph retiring, the conversation became milder with the Superintendant: Grotius shewed that it was the promise of assistance from France, which engaged Sweden in such a burthensome war; that the High Chancellor had done essential services to the common cause; that if the King should drop his alliance with the Swedes, they should be obliged to take care of themselves; that France might give subsidies to the Germans, but it was just that those promised to Sweden should be exactly paid. Grotius informed the High Chancellor of this conference in a letter of the 15th of March, 1635.
Cardinal Richelieu[228], to induce the Swedes to conform more to his measures, spread a report, and even said himself often, that he was in treaty with the Emperor, and the accommodation on the point of being concluded: but Grotius, who knew the Cardinal's character, was not duped by it; and wrote to the High Chancellor that it was only a stratagem of that Minister, and the report ought to make no change in Sweden's conduct.
On the 28th of March the Cardinal sending to acquaint Grotius[229] that he wanted to confer with him, he immediately waited on his Eminence: which shews the inaccuracy of Du Maurier, who assures us that Grotius never saw Cardinal Richelieu whilst he was Minister from Sweden in France, because his Eminence gave not the precedence to Ambassadors.