Rabbi Jehudah ha-levi explains to the Kuzarite king his faith as follows: “We believe in the God of our forefathers, who brought the Israelites forth from Egypt by signs and miracles, sustained them in the wilderness with manna, divided for them the sea and Jordan, gave them the Law through Moses, exhorted them through His prophets to obey His commandments: in short, we believe all that is written in the Torah” (Kuzari, i. 8). He then explains philosophically “the root of the faith” in the following ten propositions: (1) The universe is finite; (2) it had a beginning; (3) the time of the beginning had to be determined by the Divine Being; (4) God is without a beginning; (5) God is eternal (i.e., without an end); (6) incorporeal; (7) omniscient; (8) all-wise, all-powerful, living; (9) free in His actions; (10) without change. To these must be added the belief in prophecy, in the truth of the prophecies, and in man’s free-will, which he fully discusses in the course of the book.
Rabbenu Bachya, in his “Duties of the Hearts” (חובות הלבבות), considers also faith as one of these duties, and expresses it in the most simple form, “Belief in God and in His Law.” He does not, however, devote a special chapter to faith. The first chapter treats of the distinctively Jewish creed of God’s Unity, but less as a duty of belief than as a duty of research and study for the purpose of philosophically establishing that God is One. The author states only briefly in the prefatory notes to the first chapter, that it is our duty to believe in the Existence, Providence, and Unity of God, as commanded in the verse, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is One.”
Maimonides comprehended our belief in thirteen articles, known as the Thirteen Principles of our Creed. He insists [[173]]on the fact that these articles are not the product of chance; they are the result of long study and deep research. Every one of them is essential, and he who rejects any of them is an infidel (כופר), and puts himself by such rejection outside the Jewish community (יוצא מכלל ישראל).
Rabbi Joseph Albo criticised Maimonides’ thirteen articles of faith (עיקרים). Whilst recognising all of them as true, he would make a difference between fundamental principles (עיקרים) and secondary beliefs (שרשים). The former are all those dogmas by which Judaism falls and stands, without which Jewish faith cannot be imagined; the latter are those principles which are actually true, but Judaism can be conceived without them. To the former he counts, e.g., the belief in the existence of God, to the latter the belief that to Him alone prayer is to be offered. For Judaism cannot be conceived without the belief in God’s existence, but could be conceived without the belief that only God is to be prayed to. Albo further finds fault with Maimonides for not having embodied in the Creed the belief in man’s free-will, in the truth of the Biblical account of the miracles, in the Creatio ex nihilo, and the like. To these objections Maimonides would reply, that the articles enumerated by him were all actually fundamental, the question whether Judaism could be imagined without this or that principle being of no importance whatever; and that the dogmas named by Albo as omitted, were implied in the Thirteen Principles. According to Albo there are three fundamental principles (עיקרים): Existence of God, Revelation, and Reward and Punishment. The first includes four articles (שרשים): Unity of God, His Incorporeality, Eternity, and Perfection; the second implies three: God’s Omniscience, Divine inspiration, and Divine messengers (prophets); the third only one: Providence. Albo’s criticisms on Maimonides have passed away without effect. The Principles [[174]]of Faith as formulated by Maimonides have found their way into the daily Prayer-book in prose and poetry, and have since formed an essential element in every text-book of Jewish religion. Modern theologians erroneously quote Albo in favour of rejecting some of the articles, because he speaks of three fundamental principles; but they forget that Albo never rejects any of the thirteen principles; he only insists on making a difference between those which are more and those which are less fundamental.
On the First Principle, pp. 22 sqq.
Maimonides does not mention the term Creator except in the beginning of each paragraph as a substitute for “God.” He employs the philosophical term “First Cause” in defining the existence of God. In the sixty-ninth chapter of the first book of “The Guide” we find the explanation thereof. He says: “The philosophers, as you know, call God the First Cause (עִלָּה and סִבָּה); but those who are known by the name Mutakallemim (Mohammedan theologians) are very much opposed to the use of that name, and prefer to call Him ‘Maker’ (פּוֹעֵל), believing that there is a great difference whether we use the one term or the other. They argue thus: Those who say that God is the Cause, implicitly assume the coexistence of the Cause with that which was produced by that Cause, and believe that the universe is eternal, and that it is inseparable from God. Those, however, who say that God is the Maker do not assume the coexistence of the maker with his work; for the maker can exist anterior to his work; we cannot even imagine how a maker can be in action unless he existed before his own work. This is an argument advanced by persons who do not distinguish between the potential and the actual. For there is no difference whether we say ‘cause’ or ‘maker;’ ‘cause’ as a mere [[175]]potentiality precedes its effect; and ‘cause’ as actuality coexists with its effect. The same is the case with ‘maker;’ so long as the work is not done, he is a maker potentially, and exists before his work; he is an actual maker when the work is done, and then he coexists with his work.”
“The reason why the philosophers called God ‘the Cause’ and did not call Him ‘the Maker’ is not to be sought in their belief that the universe is eternal, but in other principles, which I will briefly explain to you. Everything owes its origin to the following four causes: the substance, the form, the agens, the final cause. The philosophers believe—and I do not differ from them—that God is the agens, the form, and the final cause of everything; in order to express this, they call God ‘the Cause’ of all things. Every one of these three causes leads, through a chain of causes, to God as the First Cause.” Maimonides further points out in this chapter that the choice of the term by no means decides the question whether the universe has had a beginning or not.
Maimonides has been severely criticised by his successors for the absence of the belief in “Creation from nothing” from the Creed. In “The Guide” Maimonides distinctly states that the arguments for “Creation from nothing” and the arguments against it are equi-balanced, and that for this reason he follows the literal interpretation of the Scripture as regards Creation. Were the arguments in favour of the eternity of the universe stronger, he would not have found any difficulty in interpreting Scripture accordingly. Such being the view of our great philosopher, he could not make the belief in Creation part of the Creed, or declare that all who denied the Creation from nothing were unbelievers.
However strange this argumentation of Maimonides may appear, and however arbitrary his treatment of Scriptural teaching, his view is not without justification. It seems [[176]]strange that, in spite of all his reverence for the Bible, he should have entrusted himself entirely to the guidance of his own reason, and forced, as it were, the Bible by peculiar interpretations to follow his reasoning. In truth, however, the method of Maimonides is neither strange nor arbitrary. There is no doubt that figurative language is extensively used in the Scriptures, especially in the poetical and the prophetical books. Whether a certain expression or phrase was to be understood in its literal meaning or in a figurative sense must be learnt from the context; in some cases—as, e.g., in the exhortation, “Ye shall circumcise the foreskin of your heart” (Deut. x. 16)—the figurative sense is accepted by all, whilst in other cases opinions are divided. Our decision in favour of the one interpretation or the other is based on our conviction that the Bible contains nothing but truth. When we discover a contradiction between a Biblical statement and the dictates of our reason, we are sure that we have erred either in the right understanding of the words of the Bible or in our reasoning. On finding the mistake in our reasoning we abandon what we have hitherto considered as fully established; but so long as we are unable to discover where our reasoning is faulty, we either suspend our judgment for the present and consider the question as one of the problems which we have not yet been able to solve satisfactorily, or, whenever possible, we attempt to reconcile by figurative interpretation the teaching of the Bible with the results of our research. Maimonides is therefore justified in saying that so long as reason does not decide against the teaching of the Bible in its literal sense he would adhere to the latter, and only if reason were to decide against the Creatio ex nihilo, he would follow reason and interpret Scripture accordingly.
It cannot be denied that Maimonides travelled here on rather slippery ground, and set a dangerous example when [[177]]he admitted that he would interpret Scripture according to his preconceived view of the world’s beginning. But, on the other hand, it must be owned that many passages of the Bible admit of a figurative interpretation, and the reader must follow his own reason and discretion in deciding in each particular case which of the two interpretations is the correct one. Maimonides has not made excessive use of this license.