The latter work was recast by Rabbi Joseph Caro, [[242]]and in the new form, with the new title Shulchan Aruch, it has become the standard work of Jewish law and life, and its authority has been recognised and upheld by Jews in the East and the West. Annotations (‏הגהות‎) were added by Rabbi Moses Isserles, but his opinion, when differing from that of Rabbi Joseph Caro, was only accepted by the Polish and German Congregations, not by the Sephardim.

Rabbi Joseph Caro, Rabbenu Jakob, and Maimonides appear, in their respective codes, not as legislators but as compilers. The Torah and the Talmud were the sources from which they all drew their laws. But laws, minhagim or customs, and institutions (‏תקנות‎) of a post-Talmudic date were not neglected. Questions arising in the course of time, through new and changed conditions of life, are, as a rule, discussed and decided in notes and commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch. There are also numerous special works on such occasional questions; they are called “Responsa” (‏תשובות‎ “Answers,” or ‏שאלות ותשובות‎ “Questions and Answers”), and the importance attributed to them varies according to the reputation of the respective authors.

What is the object of the Divine laws? This is a question that naturally rises in the minds of those to whom they are addressed. But the question has been anticipated by Him “who knoweth the thoughts of the sons of man,” and the answer is found in clear and distinct words in the fountain of living waters, the Torah, that never fails to satisfy our thirst for truth: “Thou shalt keep his statutes and his commandments which I command thee this day, that it may be [[243]]well with thee and thy children after thee” (Deut. iv. 40). “And now, O Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all his ways and to love him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul: to keep the commandments of the Lord and his statutes which I command thee this day, for thy good” (ibid. x. 12, 13). It is for our benefit, for our well-being, that the laws were revealed to us; they serve to make us good and happy; they train us in the mastery over our appetites and desires, in the practice of charity and justice, and in the conception of noble, pure, and lofty ideas, and bring us nearer and nearer in perfection the Being in whose image and likeness we have been created.

What share each individual precept has in the attainment of this end we cannot state with certainty, because in the Torah the reason and purpose of each precept is, with very few exceptions, withheld from us. In many cases our reflection on the nature of a special law, or on the context in which it occurs in the Pentateuch, leads to a discovery of some reason for it. But, whatever reason we may thus discover, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is we who have found it, we whose knowledge is imperfect, and that we or others might in future discover a better reason. If we, e.g., find that certain dietary laws serve to train us in temperance, and see that the virtue of temperance is frequently recommended in the Bible, we may well obey these dietary laws, and strive to be temperate in every respect in accordance with the spirit we detect in them. It would, however, be a gross error if, believing [[244]]the training in temperance to be their only object, we assumed that we could neglect them, and attain the same object by substituting our own insufficient knowledge and imperfect reason for the Will and Wisdom of the most perfect Being. Moralists, our teachers and preachers of ancient and modern times, have found in these precepts an inexhaustible treasure of lessons exhorting to virtue and warning against vice, and the great variety of inferences thus drawn from the same source proves the error of those who imagine that their own exposition is the only right one. Whatever reason we assign to a religious precept, and whatever wholesome lesson we derive from it, our first duty towards the commandment, and towards Him who commanded it, is strict and unconditional obedience.

Maimonides, who may be considered as the representative of the school which seeks to establish a rational explanation for all precepts, admits that the reason we may assign to any of the commandments cannot affect their validity and immutability, and we are bound to obey them, although the supposed reason may be of a local or temporary character. According to Maimonides, the object of the Law is to promote the well-being of our body and the well-being of our soul; and every commandment has therefore some bearing upon one of the following three things: the regulation of our opinions, the removal of sin, or the teaching of good morals. He does not except the “statutes” from this rule, but confesses that in a few cases he is unable to show clearly the relation of the commandment to any of these objects. He also restricts the principle of rational interpretation to the main element in each commandment, [[245]]and does not apply it to its details; the latter, as a rule, do not demand an explanation. He says:—

“The general object of the Law is twofold: the well-being of the soul and the well-being of the body” (Guide, iii. 27). “I am prepared to tell you my explanations of all these commandments (the so-called chukkim or “statutes”), and to assign for them a true reason supported by proof, with the exception of some minor rules and of a few commandments. I will show that all these and similar laws must have some bearing upon one of the following three things, viz., the regulation of our opinions or the improvement of our social relations, which implies two things: the removal of wrong-doing and the teaching of good morals” (ibid. xxviii.). “The repeated assertion of our Sages that there are reasons for all commandments, and the tradition that Solomon knew them, refer to the general purpose of the commandments, and not to the object of every detail. This being the case, I find it convenient to divide the six hundred and thirteen precepts into classes; each class to include many precepts of the same kind. I will first explain the reason of each class of precepts, and show their common object, and then I shall discuss the individual commandments and expound their reasons. Only very few will be left unexplained, the reason for which I have been unable to trace unto this day. I have also been able to comprehend in some cases even the object of many of the conditions and details of the laws as far as it can be discovered” (ibid. xxvi.).

“It is also important to note that the Law does not take into account exceptional circumstances; it is not based on conditions which rarely occur.” “We must [[246]]therefore not be surprised when we find that the object of the Law does not fully appear in every individual case.” “From this consideration it follows that the Law cannot, like medicine, vary according to the different conditions of persons and times. Whilst the cure of a person depends on his particular constitution at the particular time, the Divine guidance contained in the Law must be certain and general, although it may be effective in some cases and ineffective in others. If the Law depended on the varying conditions of man, it would be imperfect in its totality, each precept being left indefinite. For this reason, it would not be right to make the fundamental principles of the Law dependent on a certain time or a certain place. On the contrary, the statutes and the judgments must be definite, unconditional, and general, in accordance with the Divine words: ‘As for the congregation, one ordinance shall be for you and for the stranger’ (Num. xv. 15). They are intended, as has been stated before, for all persons and for all times” (ibid. xxxiv.).

In the present treatise our religious duties will be expounded under the following seven heads:—

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