Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

by M. Hamlin Cannon

At 2300 on 22 October General Makino issued an order for the defense of the island by the Japanese 16th Division. He organized his troops into the Northern and Southern Leyte Defense Forces. The Southern Defense Force was to protect the Dulag-Burauen road and the airfields in the vicinity of Burauen. It was in the zone of action of the 7th Division. The Northern Leyte Defense Force[29] was to remain on Catmon Hill, the high ground south of Tanauan, and the high ground south of Palo. Elements were to be in the vicinity of Tabontabon and Kansamada, and a unit was to protect the artillery positions north of Catmon Hill. The 16th Engineer Regiment (less three platoons) was to be prepared to demolish the roads connecting Dagami and Burauen and those connecting Dagami and Tanauan, in order to check the advance of American tanks. Simultaneously, the main force of the unit was to secure the road running northwest from Dagami to Tingib. The division reserve and command post were to be in the vicinity of Dagami.[30]

At 0900 on 23 October the 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry, sent a patrol to investigate the enemy situation west of Pikas and near the Guinarona River. At 1130 the patrol reported that there were a few Japanese on a hill near Pikas. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 383d Infantry, moved out at 1200 with the 2d Battalion in the lead. At 1430 Company G, the leading company, surprised some Japanese who were swimming in the Guinarona River. They were “literally caught with their pants down.”[31] The leading companies were able to rout the enemy and continue the advance despite small forays which were broken up; about fifty of the enemy were killed. At 1810 the 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry, reached the high ground on the north bank of the Guinarona River, 600 yards west of Pikas. A force of approximately 100 Japanese attacked the battalion as it was establishing a night perimeter. Fortunately the Americans, just fifteen minutes before, had put their machine guns and mortars in position and were thus able to fire their weapons immediately and repulse the attack. The 3d Battalion, 383d Infantry, closed in on the area at 1900 and each battalion set up a perimeter for the night.[32]

During the day the regiment received a small quantity of supplies by Filipino and carabao trains and by airdrop from Navy planes. The amount of food came to about one-half ration for each man. On the following day Colonel May ordered the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, to remain in position until a supply route could be established.[33]

Early on 24 October General Bradley told Colonel May to hold his present positions and sent out patrols to find roads, trails, and solid ground that could be used as or converted into supply routes to the rear.[34] The communications between the regiment and the 96th Division were very hard to maintain, since the only radios the troops could move inland were hand-carried sets of short range.

In the early morning hours of 25 October a division reconnaissance patrol, with light tanks and a motorized engineer platoon, went along Highway 1 with the mission of reconnoitering the highway as far north as the Binahaan River and making contact with the X Corps. By 1300 the patrol reached the river near Tanauan and found a damaged bridge. By 1600 the bridge had been repaired and the patrol pushed through Tanauan and made contact with Company K of the 19th Infantry, 24th Division, the first between the X and XXIV Corps since the landing.

The 382d Infantry spent 23 October patrolling. Contact was established and maintained between all of the battalions of the regiment during the day. Although the forward movement was slowed to allow much-needed supplies to come up, an advance of 600 yards was made. As the regiment advanced farther inland it became apparent that the entire area was composed of swamps and rice paddies. The roads were only muddy trails and were impassable for wheeled vehicles. The M29 cargo carriers and LVT’s were pressed into service to carry supplies, but the numerous streams and waist-deep swamps soon halted all vehicular traffic. The task of supply and of evacuation of wounded soon assumed staggering proportions. For days the troops had had little food since priority had been given to the indispensable ammunition. Filipino and soldier carrying details were the only means by which the front lines could be supplied.[35]

FILIPINO CIVILIAN GUIDES U.S. TANK to Japanese positions in Julita.

On the morning of 24 October General Bradley ordered the 382d Infantry to have its 2d Battalion close in on Anibung. The 3d Battalion was to occupy Hindang and the 1st Battalion was to proceed through Hindang to a position about 500 yards farther north.[36]

At 0830 the 1st and 3d Battalions, 382d Infantry, moved astride the narrow trail that led to Tabontabon, with the 3d Battalion echeloned to the right rear. The 1st Battalion passed through Bolongtohan at 0930 and moved on in a northwesterly direction toward Hindang. At 1105, as the 1st Battalion was pushing through Hindang, it came under enemy rifle fire. The Japanese had dug spider holes under the huts, and a trench extended along the western end of the barrio. The 1st Battalion, assisted by troops from Company B, 763d Tank Battalion, moved through the town, leaving the 3d Battalion the job of mopping up. The 3d Battalion reached Hindang at 1530 and immediately attacked the enemy force there. The Japanese offered only slight resistance and then fled, abandoning thirty-six well-constructed defensive positions. At 1610 the barrio was secured.