By 31 October it became evident to the Americans that there was unusual activity on the part of the Japanese, who were apparently building strong defensive positions around Carigara and pouring reinforcements into the town. Statements by reconnaissance parties and reports from guerrillas led to the belief that 2,000 to 3,000 Japanese were in the town and its environs.[35] The enemy was capable of bringing up a considerable number of reinforcements along the Ormoc road, or of attacking the American left flank from the south.[36] The situation remained unchanged on 1 November.

155-MM. GUNS FIRING ON CARIGARA

Plans of X Corps

In view of the apparent strength of the Japanese defenders, General Sibert felt that no means should be left untried to insure the successful reduction of the strong point. Both the corps and division artillery were to fire on the town, with a heavy 15-minute preparation from 0745 to 0800 on the front of the 24th Infantry Division to a depth of 1,000 yards. Immediately thereafter a series of concentrations covering 1,000 yards in depth would be fired from 0800 to 0840, advancing at the rate of 100 yards every four minutes. All available artillery except one light battalion of the 24th Infantry Division would then fire in front of the 1st Cavalry Division to a depth of 1,000 yards from 0845 to 0900. Thereafter the artillery of each division would support its own division.[37]

The 2d Brigade, reinforced, was to seize Carigara from Barugo,[38] while the 34th Infantry would attack along the Jaro-Carigara highway. General Hoffman of the 2d Cavalry Brigade commanded the attack against Carigara. In preparation for the combined assault, the forces of the 1st Cavalry Division had been gathering in the Barugo area.

On 1 November General Hoffman arrived at Barugo, examined the troops, and made last-minute arrangements. The assault from the north was to be in a column of squadrons: 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry; 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry; and the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, in reserve. The squadron last mentioned was to establish and maintain communication with the 34th Infantry, which was to move out in a column of battalions, wait on the outskirts of Carigara until the town had been secured by the 2d Cavalry Brigade, and then flank the town and move on to Capoocan.[39]

During the day of 1 November and the night following, General Suzuki withdrew his troops from Carigara and established very strong positions in the mountains southwest of the town in the vicinity of Limon. By “clever deception as to his strength and intentions,” the enemy completely deluded the Americans into believing that his major force was still in Carigara.[40]

Seizure of Carigara

Unaware of the Japanese withdrawal, the Americans proceeded with the execution of their plans. During the American artillery fire on the morning of 2 November some of the shells landed in the sector of the 7th Cavalry, an accident which delayed the attack until 0935. At that hour the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, followed by the 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, jumped off. Since the bridge over the Canomontag River had been destroyed by the enemy and the river was not fordable, it was necessary to utilize native canoes, only two of which were available. This procedure consumed much time, but by 1130 the troops completed the crossing. Troop E, 5th Cavalry, made contact with the 34th Infantry at 1100. Since the troops encountered no resistance, the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, followed by the 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, entered the town at 1200 and established a perimeter. General Mudge, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, entered the town with the assault cavalry troops.[41] The 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, outposted the western and southern sections of the town. Patrols from the 34th Infantry were already in Carigara.