The arrival of these troops was in accord with a plan embodied in the order which had been taken from the dead Japanese officer on the previous day. This plan envisaged a grand offensive which was to start in the middle of November. The 41st Infantry Regiment of the 30th Division and the 169th and 171st Independent Infantry Battalions of the 102d Division were to secure a line that ran from a hill 3,500 yards northwest of Jaro to a point just south of Pinamopoan and protect the movement of the 1st Division to this line. With the arrival of the 1st Division on this defensive line, a coordinated attack was to be launched—the 1st Division seizing the Carigara area and the 41st Infantry Regiment and the 26th Division attacking the Mt. Mamban area about ten miles southeast of Limon. (See Map 2.) The way would then be open for a drive into Leyte Valley.[54]

General Krueger was quick to realize the significance of this order. Since General Suzuki apparently wished to make the mountains of northern Leyte the battleground for the island, Krueger disposed his forces to meet the enemy threat. The X Corps was to continue its drive south down Highway 2 but at the same time was to dispose units in the central mountain range to protect the exits from Ormoc Valley into Leyte Valley. The XXIV Corps was to send a reinforced regiment into the hills northwest of Dagami to prevent any Japanese from infiltrating into Leyte Valley, and the corps was also to be prepared to assist elements of the X Corps that guarded the trail running from Daro to Dolores, a village about six miles northeast of Ormoc. A regiment of the XXIV Corps was to be placed in Sixth Army Reserve at Dagami, where the central mountain range began.[55]

General Sibert then ordered the 24th Division to continue its attack south. The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, under Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham, which was expected to arrive on 14 November, was to relieve elements of the 1st Cavalry Division that guarded the beaches in the Carigara-Barugo area. The 1st Cavalry Division was then to drive southwest from the central mountains and relieve some of the pressure against the 24th Division.[56]

General Hodge at the same time ordered the 96th Division to seize the high ground between Jaro and Dagami, secure all routes of exit from the west coast through the central mountain range, and send patrols through the passes to the west coast of Leyte. The division was also ordered to maintain in the vicinity of Dagami one infantry regiment in Sixth Army Reserve. At the same time elements of the 7th Division had reached the shores of Ormoc Bay in the vicinity of Baybay and were ordered to send patrols toward Ormoc and to prepare the route for a future advance in strength.[57]

If the attention of the Japanese could be fastened upon the X Corps in the north and northeast, it might be possible for General Krueger to put into effect his plan to send a strong force from the XXIV Corps over the mountains far to the south along the Abuyog—Baybay road to the eastern shores of Ormoc Bay in order to reinforce elements of the 7th Division already there. This force was to drive north toward Ormoc while elements of the X Corps pushed south toward the town along Highway 2. It might even be possible later to land an amphibious force, perhaps as large as a division, at a point just below Ormoc. But first it was all-important that the Japanese be contained in Ormoc Valley and that their attention continue to be directed to the north.[58]

On 9 November General Irving ordered the 24th Division to launch a co-ordinated assault on the following day to drive the 1st Division from Breakneck Ridge and also deny it commanding ground from which the Japanese could conduct delaying actions just south of the barrio of Limon. (See Map 13.) The 21st Infantry was to drive south along Highway 2 and the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was to proceed west from its position on the east flank of the enemy and establish a roadblock on Highway 2 about 2,000 yards south of Limon. The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, was to make a wide enveloping movement around the west flank of the 57th Infantry and seize the high ground known as Kilay Ridge which was about 700 yards from Highway 2 and west of the proposed roadblock of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry. General Irving announced: “Success of the Leyte Campaign depends upon quickly and completely destroying hostile forces on our front.”[59]

By the morning of 10 November the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, had reorganized and re-equipped itself. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the regiment were disposed along a ridge southwest of Pinamopoan. The companies of the two battalions were intermingled.[60]

The rains continued to pour down upon the troops, and the thick mud was slippery and treacherous underfoot. After the artillery had fired a ten-minute concentration on Breakneck Ridge, the 21st Infantry attacked at 0945. Company A, the lead company, passed through Company E and pushed south. At 0955 Company G seized OP Hill. Simultaneously, Company I moved to the site of the destroyed bridge 300 yards east of OP Hill. Company L moved toward the high ground 300 yards southeast of its position and at 1120 secured this ground.

Colonel Verbeck then ordered the 1st Battalion to attack a ridge 200 yards to its front by maneuvering through the defiles on each side of the enemy-held spur. The maneuver was unsuccessful and the 1st Battalion resumed its former position.[61] The Japanese resisted all efforts of the 2d Battalion to move down the reverse slope of OP Hill.[62] During the day the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, moved out to secure the commanding positions south of Limon.[63]

The ten guns of the 2d Battalion, 1st Artillery Regiment of the 1st Division, were moved to a position east of Limon where they could be used to assist the 57th Infantry Regiment.[64] During the night of 10–11 November the 57th Infantry severed the telephone lines from the headquarters of the 21st Infantry to all of the regiment’s battalions.