The Japanese took full advantage of the exposed troops and from machine guns and mortars delivered heavy fire which immobilized the 1st Battalion. The unit was unable to move in any direction until nightfall, when, with the aid of some artillery smoke, the troops began to withdraw. “Men threw away their packs, machine guns, radios and even rifles. Their sole aim was to crawl back through the muck and get on solid ground once more. Some of the wounded gave up the struggle to keep their heads above the water and drowned in the grasping swamp.”[70] After every officer in Companies B and C had been killed or wounded, 1st Sgt. Francis H. Thompson took charge and organized the evacuation. He silenced an enemy machine gun and also assisted in removal of the wounded. As a result of his leadership both companies successfully withdrew and reorganized.[71]
At 1745 five enemy planes strafed the battalion. The advance units of the 1st Battalion withdrew some 300 yards in order to consolidate their defensive positions for the night. During the day Company E of the 2d Battalion reached Patok, and Company G moved out at 2100 to reinforce the 1st Battalion.[72]
During the night of 3–4 November the 16th Division launched a strong counterattack of an estimated two-company strength against the perimeter of the 1st Battalion. Mortar and artillery fires repulsed the assault. There was no further enemy activity during the night. On the morning of 4 November the 1st Battalion moved out against light resistance, advancing about 800 yards and past the scene of the bitter fighting of the previous day. Colonel Dill ordered the 2d Battalion (minus Company E) and one platoon from Company G to move west from Dagami and join the 1st Battalion. The 2d Battalion joined close behind the 1st Battalion in a column. At 1430 the 1st Battalion encountered increased enemy resistance and committed its reserve company on the left flank. The 2d Battalion received orders from Colonel Dill to move up to the left flank of the 1st, but the 2d arrived too late for the two battalions to launch a co-ordinated assault before nightfall. They therefore consolidated their positions for the night, having advanced about 1,000 yards.[73]
The night of 4–5 November was not quiet. The Japanese delivered harassing fire on the 1st Battalion, and at 2205 elements of the 16th Division launched a heavy assault against the perimeter of the 2d Battalion. An artillery concentration immediately stopped the attack, and the Japanese fled, leaving 254 dead and wounded behind them.
The following morning, after the artillery had fired a preparation in front of the 1st and 2d Battalions, the two battalions renewed the attack at 0900 and two companies from the 3d Battalion protected the regimental left (south) flank. The battalions advanced about 1,000 yards before they encountered any strong resistance. The defenses of the 16th Division consisted of a great many concrete emplacements, concealed spider holes, and connecting trenches. By nightfall, at 1700, the two battalions, assisted by the tanks from Company A, 763d Tank Battalion, successfully reduced the enemy to their front and captured the ridge. Each battalion formed its own perimeter and made plans to renew the attack on 6 November.[74]
At 0830 the 1st Battalion, with light tanks in support, moved out in the attack westward against a strong enemy force that was well entrenched in foxholes and pillboxes. Each of these defensive positions had to be reduced before the advance could continue. At 1300 the 2d Battalion moved to the high ground on the right flank of the 1st. The 1st Battalion encountered a strong concrete enemy pillbox which was believed to be a command post, since there were no firing apertures. As grenades had no effect it became necessary finally to neutralize the pillbox by pouring gasoline down the ventilation pipes and setting it afire. Two officers and nineteen enlisted men of the enemy were killed in the pillbox. The Japanese continued to fight tenaciously. There was no withdrawal, but by the end of the day only isolated pockets of enemy resistance remained.[75]
The Japanese 16th Division was taking a bad beating. Its supply of provisions had run out. All the battalion commanders, most of the company commanders, and half the artillery battalion and battery commanders had been killed. On the night of 6 November the 16th Division contracted its battle lines and on the following day took up a new position in the Dagami area. The new position ranged from a hill about four and a half miles northwest of Dagami to a point about three and three-fourths miles northwest of Burauen.[76]
On 7 November all three battalions of the 382d Infantry engaged the enemy and maintained constant pressure against his positions. The 1st and 3d Battalions advanced west, while the 2d Battalion drove north and west. The 3d Battalion encountered the more determined resistance. Advancing, preceded by tanks, it met heavy enemy machine gun and rifle fire. A large enemy force assaulted the troops at close quarters and tried to destroy the tanks, but when the 382d Infantry introduced flame throwers and supporting machine guns, the attackers fell back in disorder. The regiment overran the Japanese defensive positions and killed an estimated 474 of the enemy.[77] Company E of the 2d Battalion had remained in the Patok area, engaged in patrolling and wiping out isolated pockets of enemy resistance.
On 8 November strong patrols from the 1st and 2d Battalions probed west into the hills. They encountered the left flank of the enemy supporting position at a point about 2,600 yards west of Patok. A very heavy rainfall on the night of 8–9 November made an assault against the position impossible on 9 November. After all-night artillery fire, the 1st and 3d Battalions moved out at 0900 on 10 November. They met no resistance, but progress was slow because of the swamps. By 1225 the two battalions, supported by a platoon of light tanks, occupied the ridge formerly held by elements of the 16th Division. The 1st Battalion had advanced 2,500 yards.[78] The 382d Infantry had destroyed all organized enemy resistance in its sector and removed the threat to Dagami.
By this time General Krueger was devoting the main effort of the Sixth Army toward preventing the 35th Army from debouching into Leyte Valley. The 96th Division received orders from General Hodge to halt the relief of the 7th Division and to move north to the Jaro-Palo road and secure the mountain entrances in that sector. The 7th Division was to relieve the 96th Division on the Dagami-Burauen road. A regiment was also to be made available for immediate motor movement to the north and another for a proposed operation on northern Mindanao.[79]