Artillery weapons were seldom used by the Japanese to maximum effect. The gunnery techniques were “remarkably undeveloped” and inefficient, the pieces being used singly or in pairs and only rarely as batteries. Their fire was never massed. The gun positions generally were well constructed but they were frequently selected with such high regard for concealment that the fields of fire were limited. The use of mines and demolition charges was poor, the mine fields being hastily and obviously laid.
The troops were well trained and led by officers imbued with a sense of duty. Consequently, “as long as any officers remain alive, the remnants of a ... force are capable of determined action.”[22]
The Japanese view of American methods was summed up by General Tomochika as follows: “The strong points of the American strategy in the Leyte Operation were numerous but the two outstanding points were (1) the overwhelming striking power of the American Army, and (2) the American operations were planned in minute detail and on the whole were carried out scrupulously.”[23]
[1] Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG X Corps et al., sub: Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in K-2 Operation, 25 Nov 44, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 204–212. Unless otherwise stated this chapter is based upon General Krueger’s critique. [↑]
[2] 10th I&HS Eighth Army, Stf Study of Japanese 35th Army on Leyte, Interrog Col Okabayashi, pp. 5–6. [↑]
[3] 7th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Tactics, n. p. [↑]
[4] Krueger’s Critique, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 205. [↑]