CHAPTER XVIII
Logistics
The conquest of Leyte was taking longer than had been anticipated. The decision of the Japanese to make Leyte the decisive battleground of the Philippines had forced the Americans to commit not only the reserve 32d and 77th Infantry Divisions but also the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, the 11th Airborne Division, and elements of the 38th Infantry Division. The inability of the Americans to establish considerable land-based air forces on Leyte, as well as the unexpected Japanese reinforcement program, had retarded the campaign. Not only was the timetable of future operations in the Pacific upset, but a strong possibility existed that it would not be feasible to establish a major logistical and air base on the island—the primary purpose of the operation.
The construction program on Leyte was hampered by conflicting priorities and, as had been foreseen, very poor terrain, bad weather conditions, and a shortage of service personnel.
Construction
Retelling the disagreements and describing the conflicts that arose over the everchanging needs of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces would be involved, tedious, and unprofitable. But the progress of the construction program must be recounted, since it had direct bearing not only on the Leyte Campaign but also on the Mindoro and Luzon operations.
Airfields
The importance of the development of the airfields cannot be overemphasized. The inability of the Sixth Army to meet its construction dates on the airstrips, because of poor soil conditions and heavy rains, prevented the U. S. forces from stopping the flow of Japanese reinforcements and made it impossible for the Allied Air Forces to give sufficient land-based air support to the ground troops. It also forced a postponement of the Mindoro operation. It is well, therefore, to summarize just what had been accomplished in airfield construction.