The landing of the 77th Division on the west coast of Leyte brought into sharper focus the difficult job of giving adequate logistical support to the tactical units. The Sixth Army supply lines were tenuous. There was a shortage of shipping, and furnishing supplies to the troops fighting in the mountains was especially difficult.
In planning for the amphibious movement of the 77th Division, the resupply shipping set up for the division was as follows: on 9 December, two days after the division’s landing at Deposito, 12 LSM’s and 4 LCI’s would bring in supplies; on 11 December, 12 LSM’s and 5 LCI’s would bring in additional supplies; and on 13 December 12 LSM’s and 4 LCI’s would carry further supplies to the division. Thereafter, 3 LSM’s would be assigned the task of supplying the 77th Division.[9]
Table 3—Airdrops by 11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron, 11 November-25 December 1944
| Branch | Supplies | Weight in Pounds | Percent ofTotal |
| Total | 1,167,818 | 100.0 | |
| Quartermaster | Rations | 445,916 | 38.3 |
| Miscellaneous | 357,061 | 30.4 | |
| Ordnance | Ammunition | 337,761 | 28.9 |
| Medical | Supply and Equipment | 21,308 | 1.8 |
| Signal | Supply and Equipment | 4,546 | 0.4 |
| Chemical | Chemical Warfare Supplies | 1,226 | 0.2 |
| Units Supplied | Weight | Percentof Total | |
| Total | 1,167,818 | 100.0 | |
| 11th Airborne Division | 388,570 | 33.3 | |
| 1st Cavalry Division | 301,058 | 25.8 | |
| 32d Infantry Division | 167,859 | 14.3 | |
| 24th Infantry Division | 126,004 | 10.7 | |
| Guerrillas | 91,054 | 8.7 | |
| 96th Infantry Division | 52,973 | 4.2 | |
| 77th Infantry Division | 14,800 | 1.1 | |
| 112th Cavalry Regiment | 10,300 | 0.8 | |
| 7th Infantry Division | 4,200 | 0.3 | |
| Others | 11,000 | 0.8 | |
Source: Report of Transportation Officer, Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, p. 271.
The Japanese had sunk two LSM’s near Baybay on 4 December and damaged several other vessels during the Deposito landing.[10] Because of the extreme shortage of shipping that resulted, General Hodge suggested to General Bruce on 8 December that thirty trucks, which had been scheduled for delivery on the first two convoys of resupply shipping, be sent overland along the Abuyog-Baybay mountain road and used to shuttle supplies of the division between the two towns. These supplies could be sent forward to the 77th Division when its beachhead merged with that of the 7th Division.[11] On the following day the first resupply for the 77th division left Abuyog in a convoy of trucks which went over the mountains to Baybay, where LCM’s took the cargo and moved it to the area of the 77th Division.[12]
At 2100 on 10 December, General Hodge notified General Bruce that the second echelon of resupply was to arrive at 2359 on the following day at any beach that General Bruce desired. The supplies consisted of 40,000 rations, 1,000 gallons of 80-octane gasoline, 500 gallons of diesel oil, 100 tons of ammunition, and 10 tons of medical supplies. Certain tactical and service units were also to be sent forward. The third echelon, which was scheduled to arrive on the west coast on the night of 14–15 December, was to consist of the remaining units of the 77th Division and “considerable resupply.”[13]
As the tide of battle swept the 77th Division farther northward, its line of supply and that of the 7th Division became very thin. About 15 December the supply officer of the XXIV Corps summarized the situation to the corps chief of staff. Between 19 and 25 December three resupply echelons, consisting of twenty-four LSM’s and five LCI’s carrying 3,250 tons of supplies, were to arrive on the west coast. He believed this amount was insufficient. According to his calculations, the daily requirements for two divisions in heavy fighting were 500 tons of supplies. He estimated that the supplies of the 77th Division could not last beyond 18 December. By 19 December the division would be in short supply unless 100 truck loads of supplies could be sent over the mountains before that time. The convoy that was to go forward on the 19th would carry only two days’ supplies and there would be a three-day interval before the arrival of the next convoy. The XXIV Corps, therefore, was faced with the problem of moving 200 truck loads of supplies during those three days merely to keep even. After 25 December, one and a half days’ supply would be sent overwater every three days. Since the supply officer of the XXIV Corps had strong doubts that the road would stand “a movement involving 300 trucks every three days” it was believed that the supply situation would steadily worsen.[14]
On 15 December General Krueger sent a radio message to Admiral Kinkaid reviewing the critical supply situation and requesting that sufficient amphibious shipping be made available immediately to carry supplies to the forces on the west coast. Admiral Kinkaid acquiesced, and on 22 December a resupply convoy arrived at Ormoc with “sufficient supplies and equipment to alleviate the critical situation.”[15]
By 26 December a general level of five to ten days’ supply of all classes had been built up, a level that was maintained throughout the rest of the operation. The XXIV Corps utilized to the maximum the available space on the LSM convoys, and units on the west coast employed all available motor transportation to supplement the tonnage on the convoys. Finally, the supplies were pooled in dumps at Ipil and Ormoc and then allotted to the units.