Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

by M. Hamlin Cannon

In September 1944 Sixth Army G-2 estimated that the Japanese forces on Leyte consisted mainly of 16th Division units and service troops—a total of 21,700 troops. The 35th Army had just been activated on Cebu and was to be charged with the defense of all the Visayan Islands. It was estimated that the Leyte garrison consisted of the following combat troops: 20th Infantry Regiment, 3,000; 33d Infantry Regiment, 3,000; 16th Division Reconnaissance Regiment, 1,000; elements of 102d Division, 1,700; 7th Independent Tank Company, 125; and 16th Division Headquarters troops, 1,800. The total amounted to 10,625 men. In addition there were 1,000 base-defense troops and 10,075 service troops.

It was believed that the Japanese would commit one division on the day of the landing and the equivalent of another division, assembled from the tactical reserves on the island, not later than three days after the landing. For the next ten days, five to eight regiments might be sent in from neighboring islands. These would constitute the “maximum numbers of reinforcements predicated upon the existence of conditions most favorable to the enemy.”[6] The enemy had an undetermined number of tanks and armored cars. The only artillery known to be available were some coastal defense guns emplaced along the east coast and some artillery pieces on the hills overlooking Tacloban.

Sixth Army believed that on Leyte there were five operational airfields; three probably operational or under construction; seven nonoperational; and one seaplane base. The two most important operational airstrips were the one at Tacloban with forty-five hardstandings and the one at Dulag with twenty hardstandings. The Tacloban airstrip could accommodate both bombers and fighters. At the time of the invasion, it was estimated that the Japanese could oppose the amphibious movement and the landing with 442 fighters and 337 bombers from airfields scattered throughout the Philippines.

Although the possibility existed that the Japanese Fleet, which was based in waters near the home islands, might move to the Philippines, such a move was considered doubtful. It was believed that the principal and immediate threats consisted of a strong cruiser-destroyer task force; submarines; and motor torpedo boats and similar craft.

Sixth Army concluded that the town of Tacloban, with its important port and airfield, was the key to the Japanese defense of the island. Consequently, a strong perimeter defense of the town and the surrounding area was expected. Since it was impossible for the Japanese, with a limited number of their troops on the island, to defend all of the east coast, strong forces and emplaced defensive positions were likely to be concentrated at road junctions and at the operational airfields. Mobile reserves would almost certainly be held in readiness at key points in Leyte Valley, ready to be rushed to the east coast areas under attack. It was assumed that strong defenses were already established in the Ormoc area and along the northeast coast of Ormoc Bay, since the port of Ormoc could be used to bring in reserves from the other islands in the archipelago. A strong garrison was expected at Carigara to protect the northern approaches to Leyte Valley and to repel any amphibious landing through Carigara Bay.

The plan for the liberation of Leyte called for more men, guns, ships, and aircraft than had been required for any previous operation in the Pacific. For the first time ground troops from the Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific were to join and fight the foe under a common commander. General MacArthur, who had left Luzon in a motor torpedo boat, was to return to the Philippines with a vast armada—the greatest seen in the Pacific up to that time.

The Tactical Plan

The Southwest Pacific Area was the command responsibility of General MacArthur. He had under his command Allied Air Forces, Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney commanding; Allied Naval Forces, Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid commanding; Allied Land Forces, Gen. Sir Thomas Blamey commanding; United States Army Services of Supply (SWPA), Maj. Gen. James L. Frink commanding; and Alamo Force, which was virtually Sixth Army, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger commanding.

On 31 August 1944 General MacArthur issued his first formal directive covering projected operations in the Philippines. The Leyte operation was known as King II. The Southwest Pacific forces were to “seize objectives in the Mindanao, Leyte and Samar areas in order to establish air, naval and logistic bases to cover subsequent operations to complete the reoccupation of the Philippines.” The assigned target dates were as follows: southern Mindanao, 15 November 1944; northwestern Mindanao, 7 December; and Leyte Gulf-Surigao Strait area, 20 December. The Sixth Army, covered by Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet and supported by the Allied Air and Naval Forces, was directed to carry out the three operations.[7] On 15 September General Krueger received word that the Talaud and Mindanao operations had been canceled and that the target date—designated as “A Day”—for the Leyte operation had been advanced to 20 October.[8]