The amphibious shipping allocated to MacArthur was to be made available for such turnaround shipping as would be required. The date of release of the amphibious vessels in order to mount subsequent operations would be announced later, but none were to be released for return to Nimitz’ control without permission from MacArthur. An additional division lift, which was not included, was to return the 77th Division from Guam to Guadalcanal or to a location indicated by Admiral Nimitz.[54]
On 25 September Sixth Army submitted to General Headquarters a schedule of cargo loadings of heavy shipping for the Leyte operation and made suggestions as to heavy shipping for direct movement of troops. All troops and supply ships with the assault convoy which were to depart from Hollandia must arrive in that area not later than A minus 9.[55]
The shipping instructions specified that the ships were to be loaded for selective discharge; all resupply ships transporting rations, clothing, vehicles, weapons, and ammunition would be duplicate loaded; loaded floating reserve ships would be provided; medical supplies would be top loaded to avoid breakage and damage; and sufficient stevedore gear would be placed aboard each ship to handle its cargo. On 25 and 26 September General Krueger’s transportation officer submitted to General Headquarters the heavy shipping requirements for the overwater movement of cargo and troops, respectively. It was considered necessary to utilize “all types of shipping from Navy LSM’s, LST’s, and assault transports to army controlled merchant ships and troop carriers.”[56] Additional shipping was obtained by making use of that which had carried the 1st Marine Division and the 81st Division to Peleliu and Angaur in the Palau Islands.[57] The shipping specified above was assembled at Manus and Hollandia and was assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Division, which were embarking, respectively, at those two ports. The XXIV Corps, after leaving the Hawaiian Islands, was brought to Manus where it remained in its original shipping.
On 8 October General Krueger asked the commanding generals of X Corps, XXIV Corps, and ASCOM, together with the commanding officers of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion and the 21st Infantry Regiment, whether they would be able to meet the target date for Leyte.[58] Upon receiving affirmative replies, he laconically informed General Headquarters: “Sixth Army Forces designated for KING TWO Operations are ready to meet KING TWO Target Date.”[59]
[1] Unless otherwise stated this section is based upon a report by Col H. V. White, G-2 Sixth Army, sub: G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, 20 Sep 44, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 167–70. [↑]
[2] GHQ SWPA Philippine Monthly Combined Sitrep, 15 Jun 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 15 Jun 44. [↑]
[3] GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 4, 11–17 Jun 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 17 Jun 44; GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 5, 18–24 Jun 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 24 Jun 44; AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 216, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 13 Jun 44; GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 6, 25 Jun–1 Jul 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 1 Jul 44; GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 7, 2–8 Jul 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 8 Jul 44; AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 225, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 14 Jul 44. [↑]
[4] AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 228, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 25 Jul 44. [↑]
[5] Notes, WIDEAWAKE Conference, 20 Jul 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 24 Jul 44. [↑]