The Main Body, consisting chiefly of partially empty carriers with a destroyer escort, departed on the 20th, and on the evening of the 22d turned southwest toward Luzon. It was commanded by Vice Adm. Jisabuto Ozawa. The Main Body was to act as a decoy to draw off the main American strength. The Japanese submarines off Formosa were ordered south toward the eastern approaches to the Philippine Archipelago and the 2d Air Fleet, shortly before 23 October, began to arrive on Luzon.[18]
There were two American fleets in Philippine waters—the Seventh Fleet under Admiral Kinkaid, whose superior was General MacArthur, and the Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey, whose superior was Admiral Nimitz. The Seventh Fleet, which consisted of 6 old battleships, 16 escort carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 30 destroyers, and 10 destroyer escorts, had escorted the convoy to Leyte and now stood by to protect it as it unloaded. The Third Fleet was composed of Task Force 38 under Admiral Mitscher. It consisted of four task groups which averaged 23 ships each, divided about as follows: 2 large carriers, 2 light carriers, 2 new battleships, 3 cruisers, and 14 destroyers. The task force was to secure air supremacy over the Philippines, protect the landings, and apply unremitting pressure on Japan. If the opportunity to destroy the major portion of the Japanese fleet should arise or could be created, that destruction was to be its primary task.
The Japanese had 4 carriers, 7 battleships, 19 cruisers, 33 destroyers, and 2 battleship-carriers which carried no aircraft; there were 108 planes on the carriers and about 335 shore-based planes in the Luzon area.[19]
On 23 October two American submarines, the Dace and the Darter, encountered the 1st Diversion Attack Force and sank two heavy cruisers, the Atago and Maya, off the western coast of Palawan. The former was Kurita’s flagship; its sinking forced the Japanese admiral to transfer hurriedly to another vessel. The submarines also seriously damaged another heavy cruiser.
Upon receiving information that the Combined Fleet was steaming toward the Philippines, Admiral Oldendorf’s fire support group of the Seventh Fleet moved to the southern end of Leyte Gulf and formed a battle line across the mouth of Surigao Strait while motor torpedo boats patrolled within the strait and about its southern entrance. Halsey’s Third Fleet moved toward San Bernardino Strait. The escort carriers from Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet cruised off Leyte Gulf.[20]
On the 24th, after receiving a report from the submarine, the carriers of the Third Fleet sent aircraft to search to the west and southwest. These aircraft sighted the main part of the 1st Diversion Attack Force south of Mindoro, and sighted and attacked the smaller force under Admiral Nishimura off Negros, slightly damaging a battleship and a destroyer. The aircraft of the carriers from their position off San Bernardino Strait struck repeatedly at Kurita’s force while the smaller Nishimura force was left to the battleships in the gulf. One Japanese battleship of the 1st Diversion Attack Force was sunk, one heavy cruiser rendered impotent, and minor damage was inflicted on other battleships. The Japanese were forced temporarily “to reverse course to westward.”[21]
The aircraft from the Japanese 2d Air Fleet attempted to aid the naval forces which were moving eastward through the Philippines. In co-operation with some aircraft from the Main Body, which was now about 100 miles east of Luzon, they attacked the northernmost unit of the American carriers. Halsey’s airmen sighted and reported the sacrificial Japanese Main Body in the afternoon. Not knowing that this force consisted mainly of empty carriers and believing that the 1st Diversion Attack Force had been severely damaged, Admiral Halsey withdrew the battleships and carriers of his Third Fleet and steamed north to meet the new threat, leaving San Bernardino Strait wide open. At midnight Kurita’s 1st Diversion Attack Force moved unmolested through San Bernardino Strait and turned south toward Leyte Gulf. The Japanese strategy had worked.
In the early morning hours, Admiral Oldendorf’s warships destroyed the Nishimura force as it sailed into Surigao Strait. Of two battleships, one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers, only the cruiser and one destroyer escaped from the strait, and the cruiser, which had been damaged, was sunk by aircraft from the U. S. carriers the next morning.[22] Admiral Shima’s 2d Diversion Attack Force, entering the same strait thirty minutes after Nishimura’s force, suffered damage to a light cruiser that was hit by American torpedo boats. Shima’s force then made an abortive attack, during which its flagship was damaged by collision, and withdrew without having engaged. The Third Fleet far to the north fell upon the decoy forces, sank all four carriers of the Main Body and thus “wrote an end to the Japanese carrier air force.”[23]
Admiral Kurita’s 1st Diversion Attack Force “for which so much had been sacrificed”[24] encountered Kinkaid’s carriers and destroyers off the coast of Samar. Admiral Kinkaid was ill prepared to meet the main thrust of the Japanese Navy, since his carriers were protected only by destroyers and destroyer escorts. His “handling of the exceedingly difficult situation” was “superb.”[25] The aircraft from his carriers under Rear Adm. Clifton A. F. Sprague rose to the occasion and gave a “magnificent performance,”[26] continually attacking the much stronger 1st Diversion Attack Force. Kurita’s forces sank one carrier, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort but lost three heavy cruisers and had one crippled. The American fighting strength was greatly diminished at the very time it was needed to protect the amphibious shipping that had carried the Sixth Army, and which still lay near the shores of Leyte Gulf. Just as it appeared inevitable that Kurita would move in and deliver the coup de grâce, he suddenly broke off the engagement and retired toward San Bernardino Strait. After the war he stated in justification of this strange move: “The conclusion from our [the Japanese] gunfire and anti-aircraft fire during the day had led me to believe in my uselessness, my ineffectual position, if I proceeded into Leyte Gulf where I would come under even heavier aircraft attack. I therefore concluded to go north and join Admiral Ozawa for coordinated action against your northern Task Forces.”[27]
Said Admiral Sprague: “The failure of the enemy main body and encircling light forces to completely wipe out all vessels of this Task Unit can be attributed to our successful smoke screen, our torpedo counterattack, continuous harassment of enemy by bomb, torpedo, and strafing air attacks, timely maneuvers, and the definite partiality of Almighty God.”[28]