211, Niles' Register, xi, 80.
212, Swift, System of Law, i, 74.
213, Swift, Vindication of the calling of the Special Superior Court, pp. 40-42.
214, Report of the Committee. See also J. H. Trumbull, Historical Notes, pp. 43-47.
215, Connecticut Courant of Aug. 25, 1818.
216, J. H. Trumbull, Historical Notes, pp. 55, 56.
217, Journal of the Convention, pp. 49, 67. (The Connecticut Courant and the American Mercury published the debates of the Convention in full as they occurred.)
218, Trumbull, Historical Notes, p. 60. See also the text, preceding this note, p. 483.
The Constitution of 1818, admirable for the conditions of that time, leaves now large room for betterment. The century-old habit of legislative interference was not wholly uprooted in 1818, and soon began to grow apace. The Constitution stands to-day with its original eleven articles and with thirty-one amendments, some of which, at least in their working, are directly opposed to the spirit of the framers of the commonwealth. The old cry of excessive legislative power is heard again, for the legislature by a majority of one may override the governor's veto, and, through its powers of confirmation and appointment, it may measurably control the executive department and the judicial. Moreover, apart from these defects in the constitution, certain economic changes have resulted in a disproportionate representation in the House of Representatives. The Joint-Stock Act of 1837 gave birth to great corporations, and with railroads soon developed the formation of large manufacturing plants. As a result, there was a rush, at first, of the native born, and, later, of large numbers of immigrants, who swelled the population, to the cities. This, together with the development of the great grain-producing western states, changed Connecticut from an agricultural to a manufacturing state, and from a producer of her own foodstuffs to a consumer of those which she must import from other states.
Such shifting of the population has produced a condition where a bare majority of one in a House of two hundred and fifty-five members may pass a measure that really represents the sentiment of but one-fifteenth of the voters of the state. There results a system of rotten boroughs and the opportunity for a well-organized lobby and the moneyed control of votes. It is asserted that the first section of the bill of rights, namely, "That no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community," is constantly violated by this misrepresentation, which especially affects the population in the cities, and is felt not only in all state measures, but in all local ones about which the legislature must be consulted. As an illustration of the inequality of representation, the following figures are given. In the Constitutional Convention of 1818, 81 towns sent two delegates each, and 39 towns sent one, from communities out of which 11 had a population of less than 1000, and 100 ranged between 1000 and 4000, while only 9 surpassed this last number. In the Constitutional Convention of 1902, 87 towns, with an aggregate population of 781,954, sent each two delegates, while 81, with a combined population of 126,411, sent each one delegate. Thus it happened that in 1902, New Haven, population 108,027, sent two delegates, and the town of Union, population 428, also sent two delegates, while ten other towns, with a population ranging from 593 to 885 each, sent two delegates.