The Development of Religious Liberty in Connecticut

by M. Louise Greene

The conduct of the Federal party, both within and without Connecticut from 1808 to 1815, was quite as much the real cause of their downfall in the state as that coalition between clergy and lawyers described by Dr. Beecher as causing the breakdown of party machinery and its ultimate ruin. Glancing somewhat hastily at some of the most far-reaching acts of the Federalists, we find first the Federal opposition to the embargo that from December 22, 1807, for over a year paralyzed New England commerce. In February, 1809, John Quincy Adams, who had recently resigned the Massachusetts senatorship because of his unpopular support of the embargo, informed President Jefferson that the measure could no longer be enforced. He assured the President that the New England Federalist leaders, privily encouraged by England, were preparing to break that section off from the union of the states if the embargo were not speedily repealed. This information, whether accurate or not, so influenced the President and his advisers that the Non-intercourse Act, applying only to France and England, replaced the embargo, whose repeal took effect from March 4, 1809. In the following December, Madison's administration (in the belief that France had withdrawn her hostile decrees) limited non-intercourse to England alone, after having vainly urged upon her a repeal of her Orders in Council. With the embargo lifted, New England commerce revived, and Connecticut seamen, Connecticut farmers, Connecticut merchants, together with artisans of all the allied industries that were called upon in the fitting out of ships and cargoes, enjoyed two years of prosperity. The period was given over to money-getting, and the ordinary rules of national or commercial honesty were flung to the winds. Napoleon sold licenses to British vessels to supply his famishing soldiers stationed in continental ports, while forged American and British papers were openly sold in London. So enormous were the profits of a successful voyage that the possibility of capture only added zest to the American ventures and contributed not a little to the daring of the privateers in the years of the war. So enriched was the state that by May, 1811, Connecticut had so far recovered from her late financial distress that the "state owed no debt and every tax was paid," while her exports were: domestic, $994,216; foreign, $38,138, or a total of $1,032,354.

The ninety days' embargo of 1812, the declaration of war (June 18,1812), and the patrolling of Long Island Sound by a British fleet, brought such desolation to Connecticut that ships again lay rotting at the wharves, ropewalks and warehouses were deserted, cargoes were without carriers, and seamen were either scattered or idling about, a constant menace to the public peace. National taxes to support a detested war were laid upon the people at a time when their incomes were ceasing, and their homes and property were laid bare to a plundering enemy. "A nation without fleets, without armies, with an impoverished treasury, with a frontier by sea and land extending many hundreds of miles, feebly defended" by fortifications old and neglected, had rushed headlong into war with the strongest nation of the earth without "counting the cost." Such was the opinion of the Federalists everywhere and, at first, of the large wing of the Republican party who preferred peace. The Federalists of Connecticut, when they saw a small majority sweep the nation into the conflict with Great Britain, believed the war threatened liberty of speech. They feared military despotism, when the general government demanded the control of the militia; and that the war would prostrate" their civil and religious institutions by increasing taxation and loss of income." [c] They feared "national dismemberment" when the war measures, together with the presence of the British fleet blockading the coast, alternately angered the people almost to rebellion against an apparently indifferent central government, or drove them into plans for self-defense. Much of the opposition in New England is in part accounted for by the rebound towards Federalism which the declaration of the war caused, and by the belief that the national election of 1812 would be a Federal victory. Though it turned out to be a defeat, it consolidated and so strengthened that party in New England that before the close of 1813 all the state executives were Federalists and were arrayed against the administration. The Republicans kept their hold upon the minority, partly by the diversion of the capital, thrown out of the carrying trade, into privateer ventures, war supplies, and manufactures.

At the beginning of the war, Governor Griswold, of Connecticut, backed by both houses of the legislature, joined with Governor Strong of Massachusetts (supported only by the House of Representatives) in a refusal to place the militia under regular officers of the United States army. They refused also to allow the quotas called for by General Dearborn (under the Act of Congress of April 10, 1812), for the expedition against Canada, to leave the state. These executives claimed that the troops were not needed to execute the laws of the United States, to suppress insurrection, or to repel invasion,—the only three constitutional reasons giving the President the right to consider himself "commander in chief of the militia of the several states." [207] By taking such a stand, the state governors assumed to decide whether a necessity existed that gave the President his constitutional right to call out the militia. Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, in his "Memoir of Governor Strong," exonerates that executive by pleading his intense convictions of duty, his loyal patriotism, and his later efficient aid [d] in defending the eastern coast of the state. Mr. Lodge reminds his reader that the governor's position was supported by the best lawyers, whom he had been at great pains to consult concerning state and federal rights, which, at that period, had not been so carefully examined and discriminated between as since. The same pleas may be urged for Governors Griswold [e] and Smith. The Connecticut legislature immediately passed an act for raising twenty-six hundred men for state defense under state officers. Governor Griswold's successor, Gov. J. Cotton Smith, when Decatur was blockaded in the Thames, when the descent upon Saybrook was made, at the attack upon Stonington, and during those months when the enemy hovered upon the long exposed coast line, kept a large force of militia ready for duty. The state supported these troops, for, in the wrangle over officership, the national government refused the promised supplies.

The New England Federalists soon found seven great reasons for party action. They were the uncertain success of the war by land; the great commercial distress; [f] the possession by the enemy of a large part of Maine; the publication of the terms upon which England would grant peace; [g] the proposed legislation in the fall of 1814, providing for the increase of the United States army by draft or conscription; the proposed modified form of impressment of sailors; and the bill allowing army officers to enlist minors and apprentices over eighteen years of age, with or without consent of parents or guardians. [h] These measures drove the New England Federalists, at the call of Massachusetts, to the formation of the Hartford Convention. The Connecticut legislature approved the sending of delegates by a vote of 153 to 36 opposed. Massachusetts and Rhode Island answered with like enthusiasm. New Hampshire and Vermont hesitated, but the counties of Cheshire and Grafton in the former state and of Windham in the latter sent each a delegate to the convention. Rhode Island sent four delegates and Massachusetts twelve, of whom George Cabot was elected president of the convention. Connecticut furnished the secretary of the convention, and later its historian in Theodore Dwight of Hartford. She also sent seven other delegates, namely: Chauncey Goodrich, mayor of Hartford, and from 1814 to 1815 governor of the state; John Treadwell, ex-governor; James Hillhouse, who had served as United States representative and senator; Zephaniah Swift, United States representative and later chief judge of superior court of Connecticut; Calvin Goddard, United States representative; Nathaniel Smith, United States representative and later judge of the supreme court; and Roger Minot Sherman, a distinguished lawyer and member of the state legislature. All the delegates to the Hartford Convention were men of high character, and most of them well-known leaders of the Federal party. The convention lasted for three weeks, and, as its sessions were conducted with the greatest secrecy, many prejudicial rumors and surmises arose. The Massachusetts summons had bidden the delegates convene for measures of safety "not repugnant to our obligations as members of the Union," and the convention acknowledged that it found the greatest difficulty in "devising means of defense against dangers, and of relief from oppressions proceeding from the act of their own Government without violating constitutional principles or disappointing the hopes of a suffering and injured people." The secrecy, the known antagonism to the Administration, the knowledge of New England's early disbelief in the cohesive power of the Union, and the convention's demands and resolutions, combined to give a bad and traitorous reputation to the Hartford Convention that has never been absolutely cleared away.

As early as 1796, over the signature "Pelham," there had appeared in the "Hartford Courant" a series of articles written with great ability and keen foresight as to the difficulties that would arise in making any impartial legislation for a nation composed of parts having such diverse economic systems as those of the North and the South. The articles suggested the development of two nations instead of one. During the War of 1812, various suggestions had been thrown out by different newspapers enlarging upon the resources of New England and hinting at a separate peace with England. There were not a few who, upon learning of the resolutions of the convention, felt that "Pelham" was a close adviser of its measures if not one of its delegates. Public opinion was so wrought up by the assumed disloyalty of the Hartford Convention that in 1815 it forced the publication of the convention's brief and non-committal "Journal." From it little more was learned than that the convention had resolved that the different states should take measures to protect themselves against draft by the national government, that New England should be allowed to defend herself, and for that purpose should have returned to each of her states a reasonable share of the national taxes to meet the expense of their arming. In addition, each New England state should set apart a certain portion of her militia under her governor to give aid in cases of extremity should she be called upon by the governor of another state. At the close of the convention, delegates were appointed to proceed to Washington with these resolutions and also with six proposed amendments to the national constitution. These demands and resolves were reinforced by the proposal that should the Administration refuse to consider the propositions, another convention should be held in the following summer to consider further action. When the delegates arrived in Washington with the resolutions, of which two state legislatures had meantime approved, the news of peace had been declared. In the general jubilation they saw fit to leave their message undelivered. For years the taint of rebellion clung to the Hartford Convention, and forced its secretary, in 1833, to publish his "History," a defense of its members and their measures. Even this did not remove the stigma. The delegates had in their own communities always retained their reputation for high personal character, but politically they were irretrievably ruined by their participation in the Hartford gathering. They had dealt their party in their states a mortal blow, and the Hartford Convention has been well named "the grave of the Federal party."

However much the members of the convention swathed their sentiments in expressions of allegiance to the Union, at least until extreme provocation should force a separation; or however much they declared their conviction that peace, not war, should be the time chosen for such a separation, and that, first of all, distinction should be carefully made between a bad constitution and a bad government, and a good constitution or government badly administered, there was no doubt but that they proposed to push nullification to the point of active resistance within what they considered their legal rights. They had also proposed a set of amendments which they knew stood no chance of meeting with approval from any number of the states. Moreover the Hartford Convention, whatever its intentions, seriously alarmed and embarrassed the Administration. Because of the consequences of their policy, its members were culpable in the opinion of all who hold that, in the distress of war, to hamper one's own government is to lend assistance to the enemy. [j]

The war at first was not popular, but made friends for itself as it progressed. Connecticut sailors were among the seamen that England had impressed, and Connecticut captains had surrendered ships and rich cargoes at the command of the mistress of the seas. But the naval triumphs of the first year caught the popular fancy, for "not until the Guerriere's colors were struck to the Constitution had a British frigate been humiliated on the ocean." The victories on land were about equally balanced. The disclosures of English perfidy in attempting through her secret agents [k] to detach New England from the Union before war should break out, and during the conflict, by favoritism to Massachusetts, helped to increase the supporters of the war policy. Further, the war brought out the latent powers of the nation, both for defense and for prosperity. The gradual introduction of machinery since 1800 had enlarged the small manufactories of Connecticut, and begun the exchange of products between near localities. But before the War of 1812 no manufacturing in Connecticut had achieved a notable success. [l] There was invention and skill, [m] and often profit, in the home market for the coarser products, but there was a general tendency to prefer imported goods of finer make. The war cut off such supplies, and the need created a paying demand and developed an ability to supply it. The political party that conducted the war to a successful finish developed the policy of protection of infant industries, and the tariff of 1816 gave birth to Connecticut as a manufacturing state. The repeal of the obnoxious war measures, the speedy reduction of the national expenses, and the promise of prosperity smoothed out lingering resentment. The Federal party was virtually extinct outside of its last strongholds in New England and Delaware. In the Era of Good Feeling following the war the whole people composed one party, with principles neither those of the original Federal party nor those of the original Republican party, but a combination of both." [n]

In New England during the War of 1812, as in the Revolution, the clergy had been the nucleus of the local dominant party, and with its leaders had been bitter opponents of the "unrighteous war." [208] Consequently the Congregational clergy shared in the popular disapproval and condemnation that overtook the Federalists. In Connecticut, for a time, the Standing Order by its affiliation with the Federal party prolonged its control. of the state. But the tide was turning. Dr. Lyman Beecher, Dr. Dwight's able lieutenant, made vigorous and laudable efforts to uphold the Dwights, the Aaron and Moses, as it were, of the waning political power. The "Home Missionary Society," [o] Bible societies, the "Domestic Missionary Society for the Building up of Waste Places," and the many branches of the "Society for the Suppression of Vice and Promotion of Good Morals" [p] did much good among those who welcomed them. Where their results were simply those of a morality enforced by law, they caused still greater dissatisfaction with the ruling party. [q] The union of the clergy and lawyers was not as influential as had been anticipated in the early days of 1812. Soon after the war the clergy adopted a less vigorous policy, preferring an attitude of defense against calumny and a withdrawal from politics. [r]

The elections showed the change in public opinion. At the April election, 1814, the Federals reelected Governor Smith, while the Republican candidate, Mr. Edward Boardman, received 1629 votes. The following year, notwithstanding Governor Smith's reëlection, Mr. Boardman polled 4876 votes, and the Republicans made a gain of twenty in the House of Representatives, while in the fall nominations for Assistants, the highest Federal vote was 9008 and that of the Republicans was 4268. [209]

In January, 1816, "a meeting of citizens from various parts of the state" was held in New Haven to agree upon a nomination for governor and lieutenant-governor, which would bind together the Republicans and such of the Federalists as were opposed to the Standing Order. Oliver Wolcott and Jonathan Ingersll were unanimously agreed upon. Oliver Wolcott had been living out of the state for fourteen years, and for most of that time had not been in politics. His Republican supporters had had time to forget him as a staunch Federalist, and remembered him only as a man of parts who had held the secretaryship of the treasury under Washington and Adams, and who had "opposed the Hartford Convention; like Washington was a friend to the Union, a foe to rebellion; with mild means resisted bigotry, with a glowing heart favored toleration." [210] As he had approved the policy of the general government since the days of Madison, he was pronounced an available candidate. A good Congregationalist, he would not offend the Federalists, would be acceptable to the Republicans, and would stand to the capitalists and farmers as favorable to a protective tariff and to more equitable taxation within the state. The prestige given him by the executive abilities of his father and grandfather in the gubernatorial chair also counted in his favor. The candidate for lieutenant-governor was Jonathan Ingersoll, a Federalist, an eminent New Haven lawyer, a prominent Episcopalian, senior warden of Trinity Church, and chairman of the Bishop's Fund. He had had political training in the Council, 1792-1798, and had been judge of the Superior Court, 1798-1801, and again from 1811 to 1816. His nomination was the price of the Episcopal vote, for "it was deemed expedient by giving the Episcopalians a fair opportunity to unite with the Republicans, to attempt to affect such change in the Government as should afford some prospect of satisfaction to their united demands."