The king, intimidated by the assaults of the assembly upon the members of his council, and more especially by the impeachment of Delessart, had no resource but to select his new ministers from amongst the victorious party. An alliance with the actual rulers of the revolution could alone save liberty and the throne, by restoring concord between the assembly, the supreme authority, and the municipality; and if this union had been maintained, the Girondists would have effected with the court that which, after the rupture itself, they considered they could only effect without it. The members of the new ministry were:—minister of the marine, Lacoste; of finance, Clavière; of justice, Duranton; of war, de Grave, soon afterwards replaced by Servan; of foreign affairs, Dumouriez; of the interior, Roland. The two latter were the most important and most remarkable men in the cabinet.

Dumouriez was forty-seven years of age when the revolution began; he had lived till then immersed in intrigue, and he retained his old habits too closely at an epoch when he should have employed small means only to aid great ones, instead of supplying their place. The first part of his political life was spent in seeking those by whom he might rise: the second, those by whom he might maintain his position. A courtier up to 1789, a constitutionalist under the first assembly, a Girondist under the second, a Jacobin under the republic, he was eminently a man of circumstances. But he had all the resources of great men; an enterprising character, indefatigable activity, a ready, sure, and extensive perception, impetuosity of action, and an extraordinary confidence of success; he was, moreover, open, easy, witty, daring; adapted alike for arms and for factions, full of expedients, wonderfully ready, and, in difficult positions, versed in the art of stooping to conquer. It is true that his great qualities were weakened by defects; he was rash, flighty, full of inconsistency of thought and action, owing to his continual thirst for movement and machination. But his great defect was the total absence of a political conviction. In times of revolution, nothing can be done for liberty or power by him who is not decidedly of one party or another, and when he is ambitious, unless he see further than the immediate objects of that party, and have a stronger will than his colleagues. This it was made Cromwell; this it was made Buonaparte; while Dumouriez, the employed of all parties, thought he could get the better of them all by intriguing. He wanted the passion of his time: that which completes a man, and alone enables him to sway.

Roland was the opposite of Dumouriez; his was a character which Liberty found ready formed, as if moulded by herself. Roland had simple manners, austere morals, tried opinions; enthusiastically attached to liberty, he was capable of disinterestedly devoting to her cause his whole life, or of perishing for her, without ostentation and without regret. A man worthy of being born in a republic, but out of place in a revolution, and ill adapted for the agitation and struggle of parties; his talents were not superior, his temper somewhat uncompliant; he was unskilled in the knowledge and management of men; and though laborious, well informed, and active, he would have produced little effect but for his wife. All he wanted she had for him; force, ability, elevation, foresight. Madame Roland was the soul of the Gironde; it was at her house that those brilliant and courageous men assembled to discuss the necessities and dangers of their country; it was she who stimulated to action those whom she saw were qualified for action, and who encouraged to the tribune those whom she knew to be eloquent.

The court named this ministry, which was appointed during the month of March, le Ministère Sans-Culotte. The first time Roland appeared at the château with strings in his shoes and a round hat, contrary to etiquette, the master of the ceremonies refused to admit him. Obliged, however, to give way, he said, despairingly, to Dumouriez, pointing to Roland: "Ah, sir—no buckles in his shoes." "Ah, sir, all is lost," replied Dumouriez, with an air of the most sympathising gravity. Such were the trifles which still occupied the attention of the court. The first step of the new ministry was war. The position of France was becoming more and more dangerous; everything was to be feared from the enmity of Europe. Leopold was dead, and this event was calculated to accelerate the decision of the cabinet of Vienna. His young successor, Francis II., was likely to be less pacific or less prudent than he. Moreover, Austria was assembling its troops, forming camps, and appointing generals; it had violated the territory of Bâle, and placed a garrison in Porentruy, to secure for itself the entry of the department of Doubs. There could be no doubt as to its projects. The gatherings at Coblenz had recommenced to a greater extent than before; the cabinet of Vienna had only temporarily dispersed the emigrants assembled in the Belgian provinces, in order to prevent the invasion of that country, at a time when it was not yet ready to repel invasion; it had, however, merely sought to save appearances, and had allowed a staff of general officers, in full uniform, and with the white cockade, to remain at Brussels. Finally, the reply of the prince von Kaunitz to the required explanations was by no means satisfactory. He even refused to negotiate directly, and the baron von Cobenzl was commissioned to reply, that Austria would not depart from the required conditions already set forth. The re-establishment of the monarchy on the basis of the royal sitting of the 23rd of June; the restitution of its property to the clergy; of the territory of Alsace, with all their rights, to the German princes; of Avignon and the Venaissin to the pope; such was the ultimatum of Austria. All accord was now impossible; peace could no longer be maintained. France was threatened with the fate which Holland had just experienced, and perhaps with that of Poland. The sole question now was whether to wait for or to initiate war, whether to profit by the enthusiasm of the people or to allow that enthusiasm to cool. The true author of war is not he who declares it, but he who renders it necessary.

On the 20th of April, Louis XVI. went to the assembly, attended by all his ministers. "I come, gentlemen," said he, "to the national assembly for one of the most important objects that can occupy the representatives of the nation. My minister for foreign affairs will read to you the report drawn up in our council, as to our political situation." Dumouriez then rose. He set forth the grounds of complaint that France had against the house of Austria; the object of the conferences of Mantua, Reichenbach and Pilnitz; the coalition it had formed against the French revolution; its armaments becoming more and more considerable; the open protection it afforded to bodies of emigrants; the imperious tone and the undisguised procrastination of its negotiations, lastly, the intolerable conditions of its ultimatum; and, after a long series of considerations, founded on the hostile conduct of the king of Hungary and Bohemia (Francis II. was not yet elected emperor); on the urgent circumstances of the nation; on its formally declared resolution to endure no insult, no encroachment on its rights; on the honour and good faith of Louis XVI., the depositary of the dignity and safety of France; he demanded war against Austria. Louis XVI. then said, in a voice slightly tremulous: "You have heard, gentlemen, the result of my negotiations with the court of Vienna. The conclusions of the report are based upon the unanimous opinion of my council; I have myself adopted them. They are conformable with the wishes often expressed to me by the national assembly, and with the sentiments frequently testified by bodies of citizens in different parts of the kingdom; all prefer war, to witnessing the continuance of insult to the French people, and danger threatening the national existence. It was my duty first to try every means of maintaining peace. Having failed in these efforts, I now come, according to the terms of the constitution, to propose to the national assembly war against the king of Hungary and Bohemia." The king's address was received with some applause, but the solemnity of the circumstances, and the grandeur of the decision, filled every bosom with silent and concentrated emotion. As soon as the king had withdrawn, the assembly voted an extraordinary sitting for the evening. In that sitting war was almost unanimously decided upon. Thus was undertaken, against the chief of the confederate powers, that war which was protracted throughout a quarter of a century, which victoriously established the revolution, and which changed the whole face of Europe.

All France received the announcement with joy. War gave a new movement to the people already so much excited. Districts, municipalities, popular societies, wrote addresses; men were enrolled, voluntary gifts offered, pikes forged, and the nation seemed to rise up to await Europe, or to attack it. But enthusiasm, which ensures victory in the end, does not at first supply the place of organization. Accordingly, at the opening of the campaign, the regular troops were all that could be relied upon until the new levies were trained. This was the state of the forces. The vast frontier, from Dunkirk to Huninguen, was divided into three great military districts. On the left, from Dunkirk to Philippeville, the army of the north, of about forty thousand foot, and eight thousand horse, was under the orders of marshal de Rochambeau. Lafayette commanded the army of the centre, composed of forty-five thousand foot, and seven thousand horse, and occupying the district between Philippeville and the lines of Weissemberg. Lastly, the army of the Rhine, consisting of thirty-five thousand foot, and eight thousand horse, extending from the lines of Weissemberg to Bâle, was under the command of marshal Luckner. The frontier of the Alps and Pyrenees was confided to general Montesquiou, whose army was inconsiderable; but this part of France was not as yet in danger.

The marshal de Rochambeau was of opinion that it would be prudent to remain on the defensive, and simply to guard the frontiers. Dumouriez, on the contrary, wished to take the initiative in action, as they had done in declaring war, so as to profit by the advantage of being first prepared. He was very enterprising, and as, although minister of foreign affairs, he directed the military operations, his plan was adopted. It consisted of a rapid invasion of Belgium. This province had, in 1790, essayed to throw off the Austrian yoke, but, after a brief victory, was subdued by superior force. Dumouriez imagined that the Brabant patriots would favour the attack of the French, as a means of freedom for themselves. With this view, he combined a triple invasion. The two generals, Theobald Dillon, and Biron, who commanded in Flanders under Rochambeau, received orders to advance, the one with four thousand men from Lille upon Tournai—the other, with ten thousand, from Valenciennes upon Mons. At the same time, Lafayette, with a part of his army, quitted Metz, and advanced by forced marches upon Namur, by Stenai, Sedan, Mézières, and Givet. But this plan implied in the soldiers a discipline which they had not of course as yet acquired, and on the part of the chiefs a concert very difficult to obtain; besides, the invading columns were not strong enough for such an enterprise. Theobald Dillon had scarcely passed the frontier, when, on meeting the first enemy on the 28th of April, a panic terror seized upon the troops. The cry of sauve qui peut ran through the ranks, and the general was carried off, and massacred by his troops. Much the same thing took place, under the same circumstances, in the corps of Biron, who was obliged to retreat in disorder to his previous position. The sudden and concurrent flight of these two columns must be attributed either to fear of the enemy, on the part of troops who had never before stood fire, or to a distrust of their leaders, or to traitors who sounded the alarm of treachery.

Lafayette, on arriving at Bouvines, after travelling fifty leagues of bad roads in two or three days, learnt the disasters of Valenciennes and Lille; he at once saw that the object of the invasion had failed; and he justly thought that the best course would be to effect a retreat. Rochambeau complained of the precipitate and incongruous nature of the measures which had been in the most absolute manner prescribed to him. As he did not choose to remain a passive machine, obliged to fill, at the will of the ministers, a post which he himself ought to have the full direction of, he resigned. From that moment the French army resumed the defensive. The frontier was divided into two general commands only, the one intrusted to Lafayette, extending from the sea to Longwy, and the other, from the Moselle to the Jura, being confided to Luckner. Lafayette placed his left under the command of Arthur Dillon, and with his right reached to Luckner, who had Biron as his lieutenant on the Rhine. In this position they awaited the allies.

Meantime, the first checks increased the rupture between the Feuillants and the Girondists. The generals ascribed them to the plans of Dumouriez, the ministry attributed them to the manner in which its plans had been executed by the generals, who, having been appointed by Narbonne, were of the constitutional party. The Jacobins, on the other hand, accused the anti-revolutionists of having occasioned the flight by the cry of sauve qui peut! Their joy, which they did not conceal, the declared hope of soon seeing the confederates in Paris, the emigrants returned, and the ancient regime restored, confirmed these suspicions. It was thought that the court, which had increased the household troops from eighteen hundred to six thousand men, and these carefully selected anti-revolutionists, acted in concert with the coalition. The public denounced, under the name of comité Autrichien, a secret committee, the very existence of which could not be proved, and mistrust was at its height.

The assembly at once took decided measures. It had entered upon the career of war, and it was thenceforth condemned to regulate its conduct far more with reference to the public safety than with regard to the mere justice of the case. It resolved upon sitting permanently; it discharged the household troops; on account of the increase of religious disturbances, it passed a decree exiling refractory priests, so that it might not have at the same time to combat a coalition and to appease revolts. To repair the late defeats, and to have an army of reserve near the capital, it voted on the 8th of June, and on the motion of the minister for war, Servan, the formation of a camp outside Paris of twenty thousand men drawn from the provinces. It also sought to excite the public mind by revolutionary fêtes, and began to enroll the multitude and arm them with pikes, conceiving that no assistance could be superfluous in such a moment of peril.