[54] Herbert Spencer, Data of Ethics, § 45.
[55] What is Reality? by Francis Howe Johnson (Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston), pp. 475–498.
[56] Lecky, in History of European Morals, says: "In all nations and in all ages, the ideas of interest and utility on the one hand and of virtue on the other, have been regarded by the multitude as perfectly distinct, and all languages recognize the distinction. The terms honor, justice, rectitude, or virtue, and their equivalents in every language, present to the mind ideas essentially and broadly differing from the terms prudence, sagacity, or interest. The two lines of conduct may coincide, but they are never confused, and we have not the slightest difficulty in imagining them antagonistic. When we say a man is governed by a high sense of honor, or by strong moral feeling, we do not mean that he is prudently pursuing either his own interests or the interests of society." ... "There is no fact more conspicuous in human nature than the broad distinction, both in kind and degree, drawn between the moral and the other parts of our nature. But this on utilitarian principles is altogether unaccountable. If the excellence of virtue consists solely in its utility or tendency to promote the happiness of men, we should be compelled to canonize a crowd of acts which are utterly remote from all ordinary motives of morality." Vol. I, Chap. I.
[57] Moral Science (Boston, 1867), pp. 39–44.
[58] Christian Ethics, p. 104.
[59] Borden P. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, p. 113.
[60] B. F. Cocker, Theistic Conception of the World, p. 377.
[61] Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II, § 15.
[62] Principles of Ethics, pp. 39–40. For a clear exposition of this distinction, see Dr. D. S. Gregory's Christian Ethics, Pt. I, Divis. III, sec. 1.