M. de Flaumont.—That can never be the case; for we are never called upon to do impossibilities. Do you think, for example, that Paul could at one and the same moment, throw himself into the water, and not throw himself into it?
Gustavus, laughing.—That would, indeed, be an impossibility.
M. de Flaumont.—Do you think, then, that he could be obliged to perform an action, and at the same time to do what would render that action impossible?
Henry.—Certainly not.
M. de Flaumont.—It is, then, quite evident, that if it was his duty to perform one of these actions, he ought to have put aside everything calculated to interfere with it; even what would be a duty under other circumstances.
Clementine.—And you think, papa, do you not, that the duty of providing for one's children ought to take precedence of every other?
M. de Flaumont.—No, not of every other, certainly. The first of all duties is to be an honest man, to do no wrong to any one, never to betray the interest committed to one's charge.
Clementine.—But the interests of one's children are surely committed to one's charge.
M. de Flaumont.—But we are first of all responsible for the interests of our own probity, for no one can be charged with these but ourselves. The first thing prescribed to us is, not to be unjust to others; but we are not necessarily unjust to them when we do not render them all the assistance they require; and though the drowning man stood in need of Paul's assistance, it was not an injustice in him to withhold it, for the sake of his children.
Henry.—Because his children had need of it also. But, papa, according to this argument, neither would it have been an injustice not to do for his children all the good they stood in need of; for he was not more necessary to them than he was to the drowning man, who had no one but him to look to for assistance.