"Not even a fool acts without some object in view;
"Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would be left undone by Him?"—
We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be pleased for a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by compassion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own independence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions], since there is the well-known saying, "One's own body does not hinder one;" nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims;[243] and for this there is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the Śvetáśvatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There is one Rudra only; he admits[244] not of a second," &c. "But then how will you remedy your deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the Veda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's existence by the Veda">[. We reply, that we defy you to point out any reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard to their being produced or in regard to their being known?[245] It cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no possibility of His being produced; nor can it be in regard to their being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again, can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda, for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any yogin endowed with the transcendent faculties (tívra,[246] &c.)
Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is obtained; thus everything is clear.
E. B. C.
NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173.
We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or hetvábhásas of the modern Hindu logic (cf. Siddhántamukt., § 71, Tarkasaṃgr., 55-67), viz., anaikánta, viruddha, asiddha, kálátyayopadishṭa or bádhita, and pratipakshita or sat-pratipaksha. The four first of these generally correspond to the savyabhichára or "erratic," viruddha or "contradictory," sádhyasama or "unproved," and atítakála or "mistimed," i.e., "precluded," as given in the list of fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; but pratipakshita corresponds imperfectly to prakaraṇasama. The prakaraṇasama or "uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available for both sides, as, e.g., the argument, "Sound is eternal because it is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument, "Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same difficulties as the original question, as, e.g., "sound is non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old question, "Is sound eternal?" But the pratipakshita reason is one which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it is a product."
FOOTNOTES:
[205] Cf. Nyáya Sútras, i. 29.