"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable, because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the "modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications," and the "stock of deserts."[400]
The "afflictions" (kleśa) are well known as five, viz., ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word avidyá, "ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an avyayíbháva compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word "above-board"?[401] or is it a tatpurusha [or karmadháraya] compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word "town-clerk"? or is it a bahuvríhi compound, where both portions are dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in avidyá (i.e., it would be an instance of what is called the express negation, or prasajya-pratishedha);[402] and consequently, as avidyá would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &c., and the very form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be characterised by (a + vidyá), opposes the "afflictions," &c., and cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for then,—in accordance with the words of the author of the Vṛitti,[403] "there is a bahuvríhi compound which is formed with some word meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of this subsequent word"[404]—we must explain this supposed bahuvríhi compound avidyá as follows: "That buddhi is to be characterised as avidyá (sc. an adjective), of which there is not a vidyá existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an avidyá could not become the source of the "afflictions;"[405] and yet, on the other hand, it ought to be their source,[406] even though it were associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"[407] and were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and the quality of goodness [which is found in the sásmita meditation].
Now it is said [in the Yoga Sútras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field [or place of origin, i.e., source] of the others, whether they be dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be "dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them. This has been expressed by Váchaspati Miśra, in his Gloss on Vyása's Commentary, in the following memorial stanza:—
"The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which are absorbed in the tattvas [i.e., not embodied, but existing in an interval of mundane destruction]; the 'extenuated'[408] are found in yogins; but the 'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact with worldly objects."
"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound avidyá as a dvandva compound,[409] where both portions are equally predominant, because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects. Therefore under any one of these three admissible alternatives[410] the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions' would be overthrown."
[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may have recourse to the other kind of negation called paryudása [where the affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that avidyá means a contradictory [or wrong] kind of knowledge, the reverse of vidyá; and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been said—
"The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence' [or 'non-existence'] when connected with a noun or a root; thus the words abráhmaṇa and adharma respectively signify, 'what is other than a Bráhman' and 'what is contrary to justice.'"
And again—
"We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested from the use in which it has been already employed."