A Sketch of Assam: With some account of the Hill Tribes

by Major John Butler

Under the Burmese Government, the Assamese at Suddeah were placed under a Khamtee Gohain, or chief; and when the province was conquered in 1824–25, Captain Neufville sanctioned the innovation, bestowing on a Khamtee chief the title of Suddeah Khawa. But the rights of the Assam régime had devolved on the British Government, with whom it rested to revert to the former rule wherever it might be deemed expedient: and that without any injustice to the Khamtees, as they had no claim whatever to the title in question. The assumption of the title of Suddeah Khawah, by the Khamtees is variously described. It is currently believed that Chunderkant Rajah—feeling himself insecure on the throne whilst he had to contend with the Boora Gohain and the ex-Rajah Poorunder Sing—invited the Khamtees to return to Suddeah, and bestowed on one of the Khamtee chiefs the title of Suddeah Khawa; in order, by this arrangement, to secure, through their means, a retreat for himself, if unfortunate at a future day. But in 1820 A.D., the Burphokun having been murdered, with the connivance, it was supposed, of Rajah Chunderkant, the Burmese became his enemies, and returned and dethroned him, shortly afterwards, placing on the throne Jugesur Sing, who was the last prince of the Assam dynasty. In this interval of anarchy, the Khamtees had re-established their influence and power to such an extent as to overawe almost the whole of the tribes of the frontier; and their authority at Suddeah was paramount. The Assamese, though greatly reduced in numbers by oppression and deaths, and from being carried off and sold into slavery by the Singphoos and Burmese, were all now permanently under the control of the Khamtees; but on the submission of the latter to the British Government, a settlement was made with them, leaving the internal management of the tribes to their own chiefs, who were exempt from taxation, but under the obligation of performing military service to the state when required. Revenue, however, was to be paid for the Assamese subjects under their management, and cases of murder, wounding, arson, and petty thefts above fifty rupees were disposed of by British officers.

The military population of the Suddeah district, on the north bank of the Burrampooter, was estimated at this period to be—Assamese, 691, Khamtees, 428, men capable of bearing arms: multiply these numbers by three, for old men, women, and children, we shall reach a census of 4476 souls. On the south bank, in the district of Saikwah, according to the same calculation, there were,—Assamese, 616, Khamtees, 248, which, with old men, women, and children, amounted in all to 3456 persons; thus making the united population on the north and south banks of the Burrampooter, in the districts of Suddeah and Saikwah, 7,932 persons.

In the year 1829, notwithstanding the Khamtees were bound by treaty to pay allegiance to the British Government, such was the intriguing character of the Khamtee Suddeah Khawa Gohain, that the strongest ground existed for believing him to be engaged in a traitorous combination against us. He was the first person who invited the Burmese into the country, and having a relative residing at Ava, he maintained not only with that court, but throughout the frontier, a general correspondence. In the absence of a European military officer, or Political Agent at Suddeah, a native manager or Suznatee, was generally the channel of all communications between the chiefs and the British Government. But in the years 1834–35, Captain Charlton was placed in charge of the Khamtee chiefs, and the Suddeah and Saikwah districts; and by the measures he adopted to check the traffic in slaves, and protect the Assam population from the oppressive exactions of the Khamtees, he created the utmost dissatisfaction among the latter, and caused them to be highly incensed. Moreover, in December 1834, instructions were issued requiring a census of the population to be taken; with the view of levying a capitation tax, to be renewed every five years, in lieu of military service to the state. When this innovation was proposed, it was urged that the state of society among these tribes was such, that the materials for direct taxation were not available; that the introduction of our rule would cause too violent a shock to the habits and usages of the rude people; and that the result, in all probability, would be a harassing rebellion, which would retard the progress of improvement. Concurring in these views, the Government deemed it unsafe fully to enforce the plan of assessment. The Assamese residing within the Suddeah territory were taxed at the rate of one rupee per head; but the Khamtee tribes were exempted from this imposition, on condition of their performing military service as they had hitherto done under the Assamese and British Governments.

Notwithstanding this concession, however, an insubordinate spirit was immediately manifested by the tribes, and it thus became necessary to deprive them of the muskets given them by Captain Neufville, and to depose the Khamtee Suddeah Khawa Gohain. The loss of this title and usurped sovereignty over the Assamese was grievously felt by the Khamtees, and from that period their estrangement from the British Government may fairly be dated. About this time, also, the Khamtee Suddeah Khawa Gohain was arraigned on a charge of slave-dealing,—an unfortunate occurrence, which rendered the Khamtee chiefs still more indisposed to our rule. Serious apprehensions were thenceforth entertained of an open revolt, and combination with our enemies. Nevertheless, not to appear distrustful of their intentions, they were invited to accompany Lieut. Charlton, in the rainy season of 1835, in the expedition against the Duffa Gaum’s force at the stockade of Gackwah; in storming which place the Runowa, the Tow Gohain of Derack (who was wounded in the neck), and the Captain Gohain accompanied him, and were said to have behaved bravely, and been present when Lieut. Charlton was wounded. It was confidently asserted, however, that though these chiefs did accompany Lieut. Charlton when he took the advanced stockade or guard-house, there were not more than five or six men in it, who ran away immediately; and it is probable that the Khamtee chiefs were aware of there being so few men, as they afterwards completely abandoned Lieut. Charlton when he so gallantly attacked the large stockade. Indeed, from the whole of their conduct subsequently, there is every reason to conclude that they were in league with the enemy, for they made no attempt to obstruct his retreat, and said openly that they could not be expected to fight now that a census was taking of their subjects for the purpose of assessing them; and that they got no presents as was formerly the custom. In the cold season of 1835, the Political Agent led another expedition against the Duffa Gaum, and accepted the voluntary offer of the Khamtee chiefs to accompany him: not in a well-grounded belief in the sincerity of the proposal, but as a matter of policy, with the view of rendering the Duffa Gaum doubtful of their intentions; and thinking it safer to keep an eye upon them, whilst close at hand, rather than to leave them in the rear. In these operations, all previous suspicions of their disaffection were completely confirmed, for in no one instance did the principal chiefs afford any support, and they even took care not to place their contingents within fire on the first day. Subsequently, when placed on the line of the Duffa Gaum’s retreat, they made no effort to obstruct it, otherwise the chief would have been captured; and there is every reason to believe that the negotiation was entirely defeated through their efforts, in concert with others.

The difficulty, however, of substantiating matters of this kind in this frontier, amongst these wild tribes, is exceedingly great, for a great deal of correspondence on such subjects is carried on by symbols and tokens: such as pieces of buffalo flesh, short swords, muskets, ball, powder, &c.; but at the very time the Khamtees were posted to cut off the Duffa Gaum’s retreat, one of their chiefs deserted to him, and doubtless gave the intelligence the enemy stood in need of; and it is currently reported that they fired on the British troops, with whom they were co-operating, more than on the enemy. It is even believed that the Khamtees were aware of the Duffa Gaum’s irruption from the first, and promoted it, with the view of finding us occupation on the frontier, and thereby preventing the realization of our plans for assessing them, as they were firmly impressed with the belief that it was our intention to reduce them to a level with the Assamese. It is true that they offered to pay taxes at one rupee per head, on condition of being exempted from military service, but that they were sincere in this offer was not credited: had the measure been enforced, they would probably have resisted it, or moved out of our territory.

In the beginning of 1837, a marked spirit of disaffection existed amongst the Khamtee chiefs, and it was generally understood that they had combined with the Abors and Mishmees to subvert our power; and they had probably encouraged the Abors to attack us, in the hope of making themselves of consequence and thereby recovering their former power over the Assamese. Or it might have been with a view of preventing the extension of taxation to themselves, which, notwithstanding our promises to the contrary, they expected would be enforced when necessary or convenient. In the latter end of 1837, the Khamtees made an inroad on the Mishmees, averring that the Mishmees had taken away their slaves some years ago; but there is no record of the existence of any real pretext for violence. On the contrary, it appears that the Khamtees sold the subjects of the British Government to the Mishmees. The real motive for the incursion is supposed to have been that the Runoah and Tawah Gohains intended proceeding to a particular spot in the Mishmee hills, with the view of expelling a portion of that tribe and of ultimately withdrawing themselves from the authority of the British Government, to which they had evinced no cordial feeling of attachment. In fact, both in 1835 and 1837 it was recommended to the Government that the Khamtees should be located elsewhere than at Suddeah, in order that unpleasant collisions might be avoided, and our peaceable Assamese subjects be induced more cheerfully to submit to taxation.

The only incident that transpired worthy of notice in 1838 was that, without any permission, the Khamtees commenced preparing some lands for cultivation about a day’s journey from Suddeah; alleging as their reason the scarcity of good land at Suddeah. This plea was, however, untenable: the real cause was that the paucity of the population at Suddeah had rendered it necessary for the Government officers to make requisitions for coolies to work on the roads, although considerably higher wages had been paid than in other parts of the country, and the dread of these requisitions had induced the Khamtees to think of removing.

Thus passed the years 1836, 37 and 38: rumours of an insurrection being about to break out were occasionally prevalent, but it was supposed that the Khamtees had too much good sense to league with other lawless and disaffected tribes and hazard a rebellion, unless supported by a large Burmese army. In the following year, however, the deceitful calm was suddenly disturbed. About half past 2 o’clock on the morning of the 28th January, 1839, the clouds that had long been gathering, burst on the doomed post of Suddeah. The Khamtees, including a few Moolooks and Singphoos and others, in number about six hundred fighting men, divided into four parties—impressed with their own importance and strength, and perhaps stimulated to greater daring by opium—insidiously set fire to the houses of the officers and huts of the soldiers and camp followers, at different points; at the same time furiously attacking with short swords, spears, &c., the stockade and Assam Light Infantry in their lines, and the quarters of the artillery. Notwithstanding that the attack was totally unlooked for, and the greatest confusion prevailed from the extensive conflagration and uproar throughout the station—the Sipahees being surrounded by their wives and families, and knowing that the enemy cut up men, women, and children, indiscriminately—the panic was of short duration. Discipline soon came into play; a few men got together, headed by their officers, and retook the stockade in fifteen minutes. The enemy then confined their remaining exertions to cutting up a few helpless individuals in the bazaar; but after a few rounds of grape and round shot from a carronade and a six-pounder which had been fired, at the commencement of the attack, they fled from the cantonment of Suddeah in three bodies, leaving behind them twenty-one men killed on the spot. The loss of killed and wounded on our side, including men, women, and children, amounted to eighty persons. The political agent, Lieutenant-Colonel White, who had only arrived at Suddeah a few days before the attack, placing too much confidence in the illusive permanence of Khamtee allegiance, did not deem it necessary to have for his protection a guard of Sipahees at his house; and on this eventful night he had left his bungalow on the first alarm, and was proceeding by the nearest route to the lines, when he was met by a party of the enemy, who instantly attacked him. He fell, pierced with nine spear wounds. It is a matter of great regret that this officer should have lost his life from the want of proper precaution, for, had a guard been placed at his house, there is little doubt but that he would have fought his way in safety to the troops in the lines, as other officers did. Being a benevolent, brave, talented officer, his death was deeply lamented by the corps; more particularly as he was the only European who met an untimely end on this memorable morning.

The Khamtees, it is reported, had long endeavoured to persuade the Singphoos to join them in their intended outbreak and massacre of our troops, and some had assented to share in the promised plunder of the district; but whether they hesitated from fear of the consequences, or that the Khamtees anticipated the day of attack from a sanguine expectation of accomplishing their design through their own prowess, unassisted by other tribes, we had no means of ascertaining: further than that the Singphoos, excepting a few in the neighbourhood of Suddeah, on this occasion showed their foresight and prudence in not being implicated in the reckless rebellion. But as the Singphoos, immediately after the Suddeah catastrophe, attacked and burnt several villages in the Saikwah district, it is evident they were prepared to take advantage of the surprise of the post had our troops been defeated or annihilated.

The Moolooks engaged in this conspiracy were well affected to the British Government, and at first refused to join the Khamtees in attacking our troops; but the Moolook Gaum, or chief, having been instantly barbarously murdered by the Khamtees for declining to act against us, his little band was intimidated and compelled reluctantly to follow the dreaded Khamtee leaders. A few Mishmees, who were also at this time on a visit to Suddeah for trading purposes, were unfortunately induced to join in the treacherous affray, and many that were fighting for their lives were slain by the troops. Some of the Suddeah Assamese population were likewise implicated, and punished by the law with the severity their temerity and ingratitude deserved: for they had received no provocation, neither had they any grievances to resent or redress.