The rule of a club over the individuals composing it, the rule of a church over its members, the rule of any body of men over its constituent units is founded upon the ethical principle, however trifling or however serious the objects of the particular association may be. Those slight or those important social penalties or commendations which fill up the course of everyday life in business, in the workshop, in social intercourse—the familiar judgments of companions or contemporaries—are all of them ethical valuations of conduct. Slight though some of them may be, they are still enforcements of social opinions. Man is hedged in on all sides by forces limiting his action to certain lines of conduct, and this social pressure is as much the basis of the most forceful ethical commands or prohibitions as of the most ephemeral influences. The only difference consists in the importance of the mode in which the various actions affect the general welfare. But this we shall have occasion to treat of hereafter in greater detail. It is, however, all a matter of the greater or lesser degree in which it affects the welfare of the temporary organisation, the welfare of the family, or the welfare of the permanent community, of which the individual forms a part.
But it is evident that as the stage of development differs, and as nations differ in their environments, so there will be different standards of conduct at different times and places. And therefore, again, there will be different standards of morality for different sets of purposes. This must be acknowledged at once.
Hence arise the questions, What can be the obligation of a relative morality? and—Is there no absolute morality with its imperatives universal in space and in time?
The question as to absolute morality we reserve: meanwhile we confine our considerations to a study of the influence of Society upon individuals. This is disclosed in a study of Sociology.
Living together in a social state necessitates certain negative and, eventually, positive duties.
"Whether the members of a social group do or do not co-operate, certain limitations to their individual activities are necessitated by their association; and after recognising these as arising in the absence of co-operation, we shall be the better prepared to understand how conformity to them is effected when co-operation begins.[13]
"What shape, then, must the mutual restraints take when co-operation begins? or rather, what, in addition to the primary mutual restraints already specified, are those secondary mutual restraints required to make co-operation possible? * * * * The reply will be made clearer if we take the successive forms of co-operation in the order of ascending complexity. We may distinguish as homogeneous co-operation (1) that in which like efforts are joined for like ends that are simultaneously enjoyed. As co-operation that is not completely homogeneous we may distinguish (2) that in which like efforts are joined for like ends that are not simultaneously enjoyed. A co-operation of which the heterogeneity is more distinct is (3) that in which unlike efforts are joined for like ends. And lastly comes the decidedly heterogeneous co-operation, (4) that in which unlike efforts are joined for unlike ends."[14]
The social attainment reaches a full development in the last mentioned case.