On Mr. Spencer's Data of Ethics

by Malcolm Guthrie

The view which regards Ethics as explicable by Egoism is a very imperfect and ambiguous one. For what is the Ego spoken of, and of what does it consist? The view which makes egoism the rule of life, and which some suppose may afford the ultimate rationale of Ethics, is identical with the biological view which we have already discussed. No doubt egoism is the rule of life taken in its widest sense. No doubt the adjustment of the Ego to society, and of society to the Ego, is the rule of life. But egoism only becomes ethical when it, in order of growth, includes love of offspring, love of family, love of fellow-man, regard for the tribe, the nation, or humanity at large. As egoism loses its narrowness, as it loses its exclusive regard for personal continuance, and finds itself possessed of affections for others and altruistic considerations, so does it become continually less and less egoistic. It is a matter of chopping logic to say that its action is still essentially selfish, if it does good to others, because it is part of its own nature to do good to others, and it does so to satisfy its own egoistic desires. This only proves that egoism is the rule of life, but does not establish it as the rule of Ethics, which is a very different thing. The ethical rule has been found in the course of the enquiry to be, firstly, the body of injunctions which society lays upon the individual; and, secondly, the conscience which a society of subjective individuals cultivates in each separate Ego, both arising from the growth of altruistic sympathy in the subjective organism of which society is composed. To say that when men act ethically they act from egoism is only to include ethical action in a statement of a more general biological law, and takes the mind off from the special ethical study altogether. Ethical egoism pre-supposes ethical feeling in the Ego, otherwise egoistic morality is obliged to frame for itself a hypothetical society of individuals without feelings, which, of course, puts it out of relation with humanity. Egoism, as a basis of morals, is bound to include altruism, or else it is merely a form of expressing the most general law of Biology.

Egoism however gives, in its highest form, a wide and wise consistency to actions. It pre-supposes a well-ordered mind capable of self-regulation and control. It takes a look all round, and it judges of the eventualities of actions. It sums up its own forces and motives, it takes account of its present and future surroundings and forms a judgment as to the most prudent course of action for securing the fittest life possible for itself and the greatest continuance of such life in the future. A wise and well-judged egoism is very valuable to the community, as well as profitable to the individual. It is not however essentially ethical, and is so only in so far as the individual is properly altruistic. If the egoist is not altruistic, he may become a curse to the society in which he lives, or if on a larger scale—a terrible scourge to humanity at large.

Utilitarianism does not explain ethics, unless the word be accepted as co-extensive with the biological and sociological adjustments which have gone on during the upward growth. No doubt these were all utilities; and, therefore, utilitarianism is so far true. But since the process has been one of accompanying modified feeling, it is only half an explanation, only one feature of the general explanation. It was no common intellectual appreciation of the axiom "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," which caused the evolution of morals. The axiom was itself an after-thought. It may have great use in these days, as the expression of the outcome in feeling and in philosophic thought of processes of evolution, but it was not the ruling principle which produced the evolution. Accepted thus as the outcome, it may be the criterion and guide for future action in detailed adjustments and modifications of ethical judgments or political action, and may have an authority in modern times which it could not have had primordially. But its scope is limited to the formation of deliberate judgments, and it does not impel spontaneous praise or give any force to spontaneous blame. Its judgments are those of the calm reasoner which may very properly modify the opinions of society at large, and thus tend to form an improved conscience, but it will never make a moral impulse or form the base for an ethical ideal.

In an ethical system founded upon an acceptance of biological and sociological evolution, all these systems of previous philosophers find a due place. Egoism cannot be denied as the rule of life, but it is shown that egoism cannot always remain purely egoistic, but at last includes inevitably an altruistic growth. The progress of society involves altruistic conditions. The intrinsic growth of sympathy and the extrinsic imposition of conditions form in a continuous society, by change in the internal constitution of organisms, and by hereditary transmission of such changes, not only an intuitional feeling of right and wrong, but also an intuitional conscience of greater or less development. Thus, we admit and explain the law of right and wrong written upon each civilized human heart. Utilitarianism is recognised as the ultimate outcome of philosophical thought; and, while it is but an inadequate expression in the hands of some writers, it may, perhaps, in its wider expansion by later philosophers, become an adequate and suitable expression of the ethical principle, and a guide for re-adjustments in the recognition of the wider ends and larger views of human organisation.

But any one of these views is inadequate by itself to explain and express the largeness of ethical movement. Only when we seize upon the history of the development of subjectivity, only when we understand the gradual progress from gross beginnings, and recognise the grand movement which carries us forward to we know not what hopeful future, can we properly appreciate the ethical position and the ethical authority. But to one who understands the evolution of organisms and of society, all these varying views fall at once into their natural places in a beautiful harmony. The touch of genius in a Darwin or a Spencer, produces out of the apparent chaos a well-ordered and progressive system.

This is the proper place to notice Mr. Leslie Stephen's very valuable and elaborate work upon "The Science of Ethics." That work is wise in conception, sound as to its basis and construction, beautifully proportioned in its mode of treatment, carefully, and, perhaps, too elaborately worked out in detail.

The original conception is wise in that it excludes metaphysical questions and discussions as to first principles, and limits the range of its considerations to properly-ascertained scientific facts or laws, and to such extensions of scientific surmise as are warranted by the acceptance of the modern doctrine of evolution, expounded by Darwin. The acceptance of this doctrine not only involves the acceptance of historic developments, but justifies, and even necessitates, the acceptance of a supposititious prehistoric development. This hypothetical history, founded on observations of historical order, and of the habits and customs of uncivilised races, is perfectly justifiable. However, the problem, conducted within scientific limits is to consider the groundwork of actual morality (Ch. i.).

Properly to effect this object, it is necessary to study the influence of the emotions as determining conduct. Next, the influence of the reason as determining conduct, and finally, the interaction of the race and the individual (Ch. ii. and iii.).

These preliminaries are succeeded by a study of the moral law as derived from social interests, following upon social necessities, establishing the moral law as natural, and as authoritative (Ch. iv.).

The contents of the moral law are next discussed, in which the virtues of courage, temperance, truth, and the social virtues are considered (Ch. v.).