The following articles strangely enough appeared in one of the English daily papers[[92]]:—
“The tradition, adhered to even by Lord Beaconsfield, of remaining allied with Turkey at all hazards, is no longer advocated even by Conservative occupants of the Foreign Office. Since the occupation by England of Cyprus, and still more of Egypt, Constantinople has lost much of its importance to England. The Russian fleet in the Black Sea would, in the event of war, pass through the Dardanelles, with or without the Sultan’s consent, and advance into the Mediterranean. The rule of the Sultan at Constantinople, therefore, no longer affords a guarantee against a Russian attack of the English possessions in the Mediterranean. Russia already possesses a road to India viâ Merv, and the possession of Constantinople could afford her no resistance in this direction.”
“England, on the other hand, in the event of Russia’s impeding the conveyance of English troops through the Suez Canal, has at her disposal another way to India, one which leads exclusively through British dominions—the new Canadian railway. One no longer thinks of defending India at Constantinople, but in Afghanistan and on the Anglo-Afghan frontier. England has as much interest as the other Powers in preventing Russia from advancing towards Constantinople, but this is no longer held to be a vital interest that would have to be protected even by force of arms.”
This is certainly a serious mistake in policy if backed up by the English Government, even more so than that of the Duke of Wellington, 1827–1830.
If Constantinople were once occupied by Russia, it is certain that Turkey would be a thing of the past, the Russian fleet on the Black Sea would at once sail into the Mediterranean and attack the English supremacy there. The Russian occupation would enable them to withdraw quite 200,000 troops from the Black Sea coasts which could be used for an attack on the Balkans, Armenia, or Central Asia; Cyprus would be lost to England, and Asia Minor to Turkey; Russia would have a largely increased power in the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf would be no longer open to English ships.
If the Franco-Russian alliance of to-day remained firm, and war was to be declared, then England would only have two long routes to India: (a) round the Cape of Good Hope, (b) the new Canadian railway. Lord Charles Beresford said, “With the Cape well fortified and held by a military force, England might laugh at the world.” But the Cape would be unsafe, owing to France having now firm hold of the Indian Ocean “Malta,” viz., Madagascar.
Notwithstanding that the new Canadian route passes exclusively through British dominions, yet it cannot be called a direct route, for it is certainly a seven days longer journey than the Gibraltar route to Calcutta. Russia, on the other hand, could send an immense number of troops in seven or ten days from Moscow to the Afghan frontiers, and in about another extra day from St. Petersburg, or the Caucasian Peninsula.
This would be all in favour of Russia gaining the first military move—a matter of extreme importance in the present advanced stage of military tactics.
This question may also be viewed from two other points:—
First, Cobden[[93]] and Bright were once under the idea that if Russia occupied Constantinople, she would change into a peaceful and civilized nation, and that England would be materially benefited commercially. This was merely an imaginary dream, for there is no doubt in my mind that a Russian occupation of the Turkish capital is a preliminary to shutting out English trade from the Black Sea by heavy protective duties. Second, England has engaged herself, together with the other European Powers, to respect the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire by the Treaties of Paris, London, and Berlin, and still more emphatically by the Anglo-Turkish Convention. If, therefore, she followed the policy of leaving Constantinople to its fate, and simply defended her interests on the Afghan frontiers, she would at once be branded with disgrace, and stigmatized as a breaker of the 1856, 1871, and 1878 Treaties, and a backslider from the Anglo-Turkish Convention.