Japan and the Pacific, and a Japanese View of the Eastern Question

by Manjiro Inagaki

Port Hamilton forms the gate of Tong Hai and the Yellow Sea; it cannot, however, become a base of operations for an attack on the Russian force at Vladivostock and the Amoor unless an English alliance is formed with Japan. The above writer shows an ignorance of the importance of the situation of Japan in the Pacific question. Japan holds the key of the North China Sea and Japan Sea in Tsushima.[^[7]] She has fortified that island, and placed it in direct communication with the naval station of Sasebo, also with the military forces of Kumamoto. She also can send troops and fleets from the Kure naval station and the garrison of Hiroshima. She would also, if required, have other naval stations on the coast of the Japan Sea ready for any emergency. In this manner she would be able to keep out the British fleet from attacking Vladivostock and the Amoor through the Japan Sea. Even if she might not be able to do this single-handed she certainly could by an alliance with Russia.

If also Japan occupied Fusan, on the south-eastern shore of the Corea, the Japan Sea would be rendered almost impregnable from any southern attack.

Again, Port Hamilton would be useless as a head station for the Canadian Pacific Railway trade without an Anglo-Japanese alliance. If you look at the map, you can easily appreciate the situation. Japan, with many hundreds of small islands, lies between 24° and 52° in N. lat., its eastern shores facing the Pacific and cutting off a direct line from Vancouver’s Island to Port Hamilton. It must therefore depend mainly upon Japan as a financial and political success.

Japan is now divided into six military districts, while the seas around it are divided into five parts, each having its own chief station in contemplation. The Government are now contemplating establishing a strong naval station at Mororan in Hokkukaido, for the defence of the district and also the shore of the northern part of the mainland, especially of the Tsugaru Strait. The strait of Shimonoseki also has been fortified and garrisoned on both sides, and has close communication from the Kure naval station, and with Hiroshima, and Osaka. Railway communication has also made great strides during the last few years, and rapid transit has consequently greatly improved throughout the empire.

If the Kiushiu, the Loo Choo, and the Miyako Islands are well looked after by the Japanese fleet from the Sasebo naval station, then Japan would be able to sever the communication between Vancouver’s Islands and Port Hamilton, and also between the former place and Hong Kong to a certain extent. The San-Francisco-Hong Kong route would be injured, and Shanghai-Port-Hamilton line would be threatened. Without doubt Japan is the Key of the Pacific.

Reviewing the discussion, we find that Port Hamilton is rather useless with regard to the Japan Sea and the Canadian Pacific railway road without a Japanese alliance, but it would be of immense importance in withstanding a Russian attack on the British interests from the Yellow Sea through Mongolia or Manchooria. It is also an excellent position for any offensive attack upon China in case of war breaking out.

The British occupation of Port Hamilton was very galling to the Chinese nation, in fact, quite as disagreeable as the occupation of Malta and Corsica was to Italy, and the annexing of the Channel Islands and Heligoland to France and Germany. It has therefore somewhat shaken the Anglo-Chinese alliance.

A Chinese alliance, however, is of far greater importance for English interests than the occupation of Port Hamilton. If relations became strained a severe blow would be dealt to English trade and commerce in that part. The main portion of the commercial trade of China is with the United Kingdom and her colonies; for instance, in 1887, the imports of China from Great Britain, Hong Kong, and India amounted to about 89,000,000 tael, while the exports to the same countries were 48,000,000 tael. It is hardly possible to find two countries more closely connected by trade than England and China.[^[8]] The Hamilton scheme was wisely abandoned in 1887, and the English Government obtained a written guarantee from China against a Russian occupation in future years.

Viscount Cranbrook said in his reply to a question asked by Viscount Sidmouth: “That the papers to which he referred did contain a written statement, and a very long written statement on the part of the Chinese Government giving the guarantee in question. It was not a mere verbal statement by the Chinese Government, but a very deliberate note. It was found that the Chinese had received from the Russian Government a guarantee that Russia would not interfere with Corean territory in future if the British did not, and the Chinese Government were naturally in a position, on the faith of that guarantee by the Russian Government, to give a guarantee to the British Government. The Marquess of Salisbury, on the part of her Majesty’s Government, had accepted it as a guarantee in writing from the Chinese Government.”

This policy was undoubtedly an exceedingly wise and good one. By this England not only regained a firm and complete commercial alliance, but also maintained and strengthened a political alliance against Russian attacks from the Corea and indirectly from Manchooria and Mongolia.