"Although this military expedition possesses no immediate significance for political history, yet it is of high importance, not only for our knowledge of the East, but also for that of the Greek character; and the accurate description which we owe to Xenophon is, therefore, one of the most valuable documents of antiquity. We see a band of Greeks of the most various origin, torn out of all their ordinary spheres of life, in a strange quarter of the globe, in a long complication of incessant movements, and of situations ever-varying and full of peril, in which the real nature of these men could not but display itself with the most perfect truthfulness. This army is a typical chart, in many colors, of the Greek population—a picture, on a small scale, of the whole people, with all its virtues and faults, its qualities of strength and of weakness—a wandering political community, which, according to home usage, holds its assemblies and passes its resolutions, and at the same time a wild and not easily manageable band of free-lances. They are men in full measure agitated by the unquiet spirit of the times, which had destroyed in them their affection for their native land; and yet how closely they cling to its most ancient traditions! Visions in dream and omens, sent by the gods, decide the most important resolutions, just as in the Homeric camp before Troy: most assiduously the sacrifices are lit, the pæans sung, altars erected, and games celebrated, in honor of the savior gods, when at last the aspect of the longed-for sea animates afresh their vigor and their courage.
"This multitude has been brought together by love of lucre and quest of adventure; and yet in the critical moment there manifest themselves a lively sense of honor and duty, a lofty heroic spirit, and a sure tact in perceiving what counsels are the best. Here, too, is visible the mutual jealousy existing among the several tribes of the nation; but the feeling of their belonging together, the consciousness of national unity, prevail over all; and the great mass is capable of sufficient good-sense and self-denial to subordinate itself to those who, by experience, intelligence, and moral courage, attest themselves as fitted for command. And how very remarkable it is that in this mixed multitude of Greeks it is an Athenian who by his qualities towers above all the rest, and becomes the real preserver of the entire army! Xenophon had only accompanied the army as a volunteer; yet it was he who, obeying an inner call, re-awakened a higher, a Hellenic consciousness, courage, and prudence among his comrades, and who brought about the first salutary resolutions. Possessing the Athenian superiority of culture which enabled him to serve these warriors as spokesman, negotiator, and general, to him it was essentially due that, in spite of unspeakable trials, they finally reached the coast." [Footnote: "History of Greece," vol. iv., pp. 191, 192.]
II. THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA.
On the fall of Athens, Sparta became the mistress of Greece. Her power and his own wealth induced Lysander to appear again in public life. He first attempted to overthrow the two regal families of Sparta, and, by making the crown an elective office, secure his own accession to it. But he failed in this, although, on the death of A'gis, King of Sparta, he succeeded in setting aside Leo-tych'i-des, the son and rightful successor of Agis, and giving the office to Agesila'us, the late king's brother. The government of Sparta now became far more oppressive than that of Athens had been, and it was not long before some of the Grecian states under her sway united in a league against her.
The part which the Greek cities of Asia took in the expedition of Cyrus involved them in a war with Persia, in which they were aided by the Spartans. Agesila'us entered Asia with a considerable force (396 B.C.), and in the following year he defeated the Persians in a great battle on the plains of Sardis, in Lydia. But in 394 the Spartan king was called home to avert the dangers which threatened his country in a war that had been fomented by the Persian king in order to save his dominions from the ravages of the Spartans. The King of Persia had supplied Athens with a fleet which defeated the Spartan navy at Cni'dus, and Persian gold rebuilt the walls of Athens. A battle soon followed between the Spartans on one side and the Thebans and Athenians on the other, in which the former were defeated and Lysander was slain. On the other hand, Athens and her allies were defeated, in the same year, in the vicinity of Corinth, and on the plains of Corone'a. Finally, after the war had continued eight years, and Sparta had virtually lost her maritime power, the peace of Antal'cidas, as it is called, was concluded with Persia, at the instance of Sparta, and was ratified by all the states engaged in the contest (387 B.C.).
By the treaty with Persia, Athens regained three of the islands she had been obliged to relinquish to Sparta under Lysander; but the Greek cities in Asia were given up to Persia, and both Athens and Sparta lost their former allies. It was the unworthy jealousy of the Grecians, which the Persian king knew how to stimulate, that prompted them to give up to a barbarian the free cities of Asia; and this is the darkest shade in the picture. Though Sparta was the most strongly in favor of the terms of the treaty, yet Athens was the greatest gainer, for she once more became an independent and powerful state.
It was not long before ambition, and the resentment of past injuries, involved Sparta in new wars. When her thirty years' truce with Mantine'a had expired, she compelled that city, which had formerly been an unwilling ally, to throw down her walls, and dismember her territory into the four or five villages out of which it had been formed. Each of these divisions was now left unfortified, and placed under a separate oligarchical government. Sparta did this under the pretext that the Mantine'ans had supplied one of her enemies with provisions during the preceding war, and had evaded their share of service in the Spartan army. The jealousy of Sparta was next aroused against the rising power of Olynthus, a powerful confederacy in the south-eastern part of Macedonia, which had become engaged in hostilities with some rival cities; and the Spartans readily accepted an invitation of one of the latter to send an army to its aid.
The expedition against Olynthus led to an affair of much importance. As one of the divisions of the Spartan army was marching through the Theban territories it turned aside, and the Spartan general treacherously seized upon the Cadme'a, or Theban citadel, although a state of peace existed between Thebes and Sparta (382 B.C.). The political morality of Sparta is clearly exhibited in the arguments by which the Spartan king justified this palpable and treacherous breach of the treaty of Antal'cidas. He declared that the only question for the Spartan people to consider was, whether they were gainers or losers by the transaction. The assertion made by the Athenians on a prior occasion was confirmed—that, "of all states, Sparta had most glaringly shown by her conduct that in her political transactions she measured honor by inclination, and justice by expediency."
On the seizure of the Theban citadel the most patriotic of the citizens fled to Athens, while a faction upheld by a Spartan garrison ruled the place. Thebes now became a member of the Spartan alliance, and furnished a force for the war against Olynthus. After a struggle of four years Olynthus capitulated, the Olynthian Confederacy was thereby dissolved, and the cities belonging to it were compelled to join the Spartan alliance. As a modern historian observes, "Sparta thus inflicted a great blow upon Hellas; for the Olynthian Confederacy might have served as a counterpoise to the growing power of Macedon, destined soon to overwhelm the rest of Greece." The power of Sparta had now attained its greatest height, but, as she was leagued on all sides with the enemies of Grecian freedom, her unpopularity was great, and her supremacy was doomed to a rapid decline.