General Scott

by Marcus J. Wright

"General Winfield Scott."

General Scott was impressed with the belief that Mr. Marcy, the Secretary of War, and Hon. Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, the Secretary of the Treasury, had the fullest confidence in his ability, and favored giving him the substantial direction of the war. He was also impressed with the kindness and confidence extended to him by President Polk, but on his arrival in New Orleans he was shown a letter from Alexander Barrow, then a Senator in Congress from Louisiana and a personal friend of General Scott, informing him that the President had asked that the grade of lieutenant general be established in the army, and that on the passage of such an act by Congress it was the intention of the President to confer this rank, and consequently the command of the army, upon Thomas H. Benton, then a Senator from Missouri. This was a great shock to General Scott, and he attributed it to political motives. He reasoned this way: "Scott is a Whig; therefore the Democracy is not bound to observe good faith with him. His successes may be turned to the prejudice of the Democratic party. We must, however, profit by his military experience, and if successful, by force of patronage and other helps, continue to crown Benton with the victory, and thus triumph both in the field and at the polls."

He reached the Brazos Santiago, near the mouth of the Rio Grande, in Christmas week, and proceeded from there to Camargo, where he expected to meet General Taylor, but, by some mismanagement or delay, his notification to General Taylor did not reach the latter.

A confidential dispatch from General Scott to General Taylor was opened, read, and freely discussed at headquarters at Monterey. A duplicate was sent forward, but the party in charge of it was killed at Villa Gran and the dispatch delivered to General Santa Anna. Taylor had made a movement toward Tampico, and hence did not receive the first dispatch delivered at Tampico. In the later dispatch General Scott had written him that he might have his choice of two armies—either remain as the commander of Northern Mexico, or accompany General Scott in command of a division toward the City of Mexico, with every assurance in either case of confidence and support.

General Scott anticipated the difficulty of timely concentration of forces off the Brazos large enough to give hope of success. He thought it necessary to have fifteen thousand troops, of which five thousand were to be regulars, and to have the co-operation of the navy. The time named for the concentration was the middle of January, so that the army might reach Vera Cruz by February 1st. He had requested the advice of General Taylor on these matters and all others in regard to the proposed campaign. He had intimated, in a letter of November 15th, that it would be necessary to withdraw a large number of troops from General Taylor, and thus reduce him to the defensive, while he thought it absolutely necessary for success that General Taylor should have a force sufficient to act offensively in the direction of San Luis Potosi. In addition to the volunteers and regulars at Tampico and those moving there, he desired that Worth's division of regulars, Duncan and Taylor's field batteries, a thousand mounted men, and all the volunteer infantry that could be spared be sent to General Taylor, only retaining a force sufficient to hold Monterey and protect his communications to Point Isabel. From New Orleans General Scott had written the Secretary of War that he approved of the rendezvous at Pensacola rather than at Brazos for the ordnance and ordnance stores. He also urged that volunteers be forwarded rapidly to Brazos. Subsequently he wrote the Secretary of War asking that ships with troops and supplies be ordered to Lobos Island. He addressed a letter to General George M. Brooke, commanding at New Orleans, giving detailed orders of what he required of him. He also wrote to Commodore Conner, and made suggestions about joint operations.

Failing to meet General Taylor, as he hoped and endeavored to do, with a view of a full and free conference, he felt compelled to issue orders detaching from the army of the Rio Grande such regular troops as were deemed necessary to lead the volunteers for the capture of Vera Cruz and the move on the capital, leaving General Taylor with a force sufficient to maintain himself at Monterey. He intended, had he seen General Taylor, to advise him to contract his line to the Rio Grande. General Taylor, supported by the authorities in Washington, favored the movement on the City of Mexico from Monterey and via San Luis Potosi, but General Scott had already formulated and determined on the movement which he made with such brilliant success. Orders were accordingly issued from Camargo, January 3, 1847, for the movement of troops from Monterey, and General Scott returned to Brazos Santiago. The embarkation for Vera Cruz was delayed by the non-arrival of the troops from Monterey and want of transportation. The Lobos Islands was selected as the place of rendezvous. This point is one hundred and twenty miles from Vera Cruz. When the greater part of the troops had arrived, they sailed past Vera Cruz and anchored, on March 7th, at Anton Lizardo, from which point it was determined to make the necessary reconnoissances.

General Scott was at this time ignorant of the movement of General Santa Anna toward Monterey, and expected, on landing or attempting to land, to be met by a formidable force of the enemy. On March 9th, the weather proving good, the fleet, consisting of some eighty vessels, including transports, moved up the coast with the naval steamers and five gunboats. General Scott was on board of the Massachusetts, and as she moved up, the troops from the decks of the vessels cheered him with great enthusiasm. The anchorage was made outside the range of the enemy's guns. General Scott had provided sixty-seven surf boats, and in these and some cutters fifty-five hundred men—the boats being steered by sailors furnished by Commodore David Conner—passed the Massachusetts and repeated their cheers to the commanding general. The whole force was landed at half past five in the afternoon, without the loss of a man or a boat and without serious opposition from the enemy. The remainder of the force was soon landed, amounting in all to something less than twelve thousand men.

The following appeared in the New Orleans Bulletin of March 27, 1847: "The landing of the American army at Vera Cruz has been accomplished in a manner that reflects the highest credit on all concerned; and the regularity, precision, and promptness with which it was effected has probably never been surpassed, if it has been equaled, in modern warfare. The removal of a large body of troops from numerous transports into boats in an open sea, their subsequent disembarkation on the sea beach, on an enemy's coast, through a surf, with all their arms and accouterments, without a single error or accident, requires great exertion, skill, and sound judgment.

"The French expedition against Algiers in 1830 was said to be the most complete armament in every respect that ever left Europe; it had been prepared with labor, attention, experience, and nothing had been omitted to insure success, and particularly in the means and facilities for landing the troops. This disembarkation took place in a wide bay, which was more favorable than an open beach directly on the ocean, and (as in the present instance) without any resistance on the part of the enemy; yet only nine thousand men were landed the first day, and from thirty to forty lives were lost by accidents or upsetting of boats; whereas on the present occasion twelve thousand men were landed in one day, without, so far as we have heard, the slightest accident or loss of life."

Both the city and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa were strongly garrisoned and well provisioned. It was General Santa Anna's opinion that the garrison at Vera Cruz and the castle could successfully resist a siege until the annual breaking out of the yellow fever, upon which he depended to cause the withdrawal of the American troops; hence he devoted himself to the collection of troops to advance on General Taylor. General Scott says: "The walls and forts of Vera Cruz in 1847 were in good condition. Subsequent to its capture by the French, under Admiral Baudin and the Prince de Joinville, in 1838, the castle had been greatly extended, almost rebuilt, and its armament about doubled. Besides, the French were allowed to reconnoiter the city and castle and choose their positions of attack without the least resistance, the Mexicans deprecating the war with that nation, and hence ordered not to fire the first gun. Of that injunction the French were aware. When we approached, in 1847, the castle had the capacity to sink the entire American navy." Soon after the landing was effected, General Scott, accompanied by Colonel Joseph G. Totten and other officers of his staff, reconnoitered the land side of the city, the reconnoissance of the water front having been previously made.