"With the army faithful to its allegiance and the navy probably equally so, and a Federal Executive for the next twelve months of firmness and moderation, which the whole country has a right to expect—moderation being an element of power not less than firmness—there is good reason to hope that the danger of secession may be made to pass away without one conflict of arms, one execution, or one arrest for treason. In the meantime it is suggested that exports might be left perfectly free, and, to avoid conflicts, all duties on imports be collected outside of the cities in forts or ships of war."
Again, October 31st, the general suggested to the Secretary of War that a circular should be sent at once to such of those forts as had garrisons to be on the alert against surprises and sudden assaults; but no notice seems to have been taken of the judicious and wise suggestion.
On December 12th General Scott arrived in Washington. He had been confined to his bed for a long time and was physically very much depleted. He again personally urged upon the Secretary of War the views expressed in his note from West Point of October 29th as to strengthening the forts in Charleston Harbor, Pensacola, Mobile, and the Mississippi River below New Orleans. The Secretary did not concur in these views. Finally General Scott called on the President, on December 15th, in company with the Secretary, and urged upon the chief Executive the importance of re-enforcing the forts mentioned; but no action was taken. After the Secretary of War [Floyd] had resigned his position in the Cabinet he was given a reception in Richmond, which called out the remark from the Examiner, of that city, that if the plan invented by General Scott to stop secession had been carried out, and the arsenals and forts put in the condition he wanted them to be, "the Southern Confederacy would not now exist."
On December 28th he wrote a note to the Secretary expressing the hope: 1. That orders may not be given for the evacuation of Fort Sumter [this was after Major Anderson had withdrawn his forces from Fort Moultrie and concentrated at Sumter]. 2. That one hundred and fifty recruits may be instantly sent from Governor's Island to re-enforce that garrison, with ample supplies of ammunition and subsistence, including fresh vegetables, as potatoes, onions, turnips, etc. 3. That one or two armed vessels be sent to support the said fort. In the same communication he calls the Secretary's attention to Forts Jefferson (Tortugas) and Taylor (Key West). On December 30th he addressed the President and asked permission, "without reference to the War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits from New York Harbor to re-enforce Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, and subsistence," and asked that a sloop of war and cutter might be ordered for the same purpose as early as the next day. The documents show that from General Scott's first note, referred to and quoted herein, down to the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, he was persistent in his efforts to have the Southern forts, or as many of them as the means at hand would permit, re-enforced and garrisoned against surprise and capture; but little heed was paid to his importunities.
On the day before the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln General Scott addressed William H. Seward, who, it was known, would become Secretary of State in Lincoln's Cabinet, what is called the "Wayward sisters" letter, and which is quoted in full:
"Washington, March 3, 1861.
"Dear Sir: Hoping that in a day or two the new President will have happily passed through all personal dangers and find himself installed an honored successor of the great Washington, with you as the chief of his Cabinet, I beg leave to repeat in writing what I have before said to you orally, this supplement to my printed 'Views' (dated in October last) on the highly disordered condition of our (so late) happy and glorious Union.
"To meet the extraordinary exigencies of the times, it seems to me that I am guilty of no arrogance in limiting the President's field of selection to one of the four plans of procedure subjoined:
"I. Throw off the old and assume the new designation, the Union party; adopt the conciliatory measures proposed by Mr. Crittenden or the Peace Convention, and my life upon it, we shall have no new case of secession; but, on the contrary, an early return of many, if not of all, the States which have already broken off from the Union. Without some equally benign measure the remaining slaveholding States will probably join the Montgomery Confederacy in less than sixty days, when this city, being included in a foreign country, would require a permanent garrison of at least thirty-five thousand troops to protect the Government within it.
"II. Collect the duties on foreign goods outside the ports of which the Government has lost the command, or close such ports by act of Congress and blockade them.