Academica

by Marcus Tullius Cicero

[§15]. haesitaverunt: Goer. cf. De Or. I. 40. Constitutam: so in [14]. Delitisceret: this is the right spelling, not delitesceret, which one good MS. has here, see Corssen II. 285. Negavissent: "had denied, as they said." Tollendus est: a statement which is criticised in [74]. Nominibus differentis ... dissenserunt: genuine Antiochean opinions, see the Academica Posteriora [17], [43]. De se ipse: very frequent in Cic. (cf. Madv. Gram. 487 b). Diceret: this is omitted by the MSS., but one has agnosceret on the margin; see n. on [88]. Fannius: in his "Annals." The same statement is quoted in De Or. II. 270, Brutus 299. Brutus had written an epitome of this work of Fannius (Ad Att. XII. 5, 3).

[§16]. Veteribus: Bentley's em. of MSS. vetera: C.F. Hermann (Schneid Philol. VII. 457), thinking the departure from the MSS. too great, keeps vetera and changes incognita into incondita, comparing De Or. I. 197, III. 173. A glance, however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the word always means merely "disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here is not one between order and no order, but between knowledge and no knowledge, so that incognita is far better. I am not at all certain that the MSS. reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were not knowledge, but mere opinion." The conj. of Kayser veri nota for vetera (cf. [76]) and investigatum below, is fanciful and improbable. Quod investigata sunt: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again disturbs the text which since Madv. Em. 127 supported it (quoting T.D. V. 15, Liv. XXXV. 16) had been settled. Holding that illa in the former sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects nihilne est igitur actum as a dittographia (!) from [15] nihilne explicatum, and reads quot for quod with Bentl. For the meaning cf. T.D. III. 69 and Arist. on the progress of philosophy as there quoted. Arcesilas Zenoni ... obtrectans: see n. on I. [34]. These charges were brought by each school against the other. In Plutarch Adv. Colotem p. 1121 F, want of novelty is charged against Arcesilas, and the charge is at once joyfully accepted by Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was often excused by the provocation Zeno gave, see Aug. Contra Acad. II. 14, 15 and notes on fragm. [2] and [35] of the Academica Posteriora. Immutatione verborum: n. on I. [33]. This phrase has also technical meanings; it translates the Greek τροποι (Brut. 69) and αλληγορια in De Or. II. 261, where an ex. is given. Definitiones: n. on [18]. Tenebras obducere: such expressions abound in Cic. where the New Academy is mentioned, cf. [30] (lucem eripere), N.D. I. 6 (noctem obfundere) Aug. Contra Ac. III. 14 (quasdam nebulas obfundere), also the joke of Aug. II. 29 tenebrae quae patronae Academicorum solent esse. Non admodum probata: cf. the passage of Polybius qu. by Zeller 533. Lacyde: the most important passages in ancient authorities concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is important to note that Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became the source of information about his teacher's doctrines. Tenuit: cf. the use of obtinere in De Or. I. 45. In Aeschine: so Dav. for the confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher see Zeller 533. As two MSS. have hac nonne Christ conj. Hagnone which Halm, as well as Baiter takes; Zeller 533 seems to adopt this and at once confuses the supposed philosopher with one Agnon just mentioned in Quint. II. 17, 15. There is not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known at all, from these two passages only.

[§17]. Patrocinium: for the word cf. N.D. I. 6. Non defuit: such patronage was wanting in the time of Arcesilas ([16]). Faciendum omnino non putabant: "Epictetus (Arrian, Diss. I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a sceptic by saying ουκ αγω σχολην προς ταυτα" (Zeller 85, n.). In another passage (Arrian, I. 5) Epict. says it is no more use arguing with a sceptic than with a corpse. Ullam rationem disputare: the same constr. occurs in [74] and Pro Caecina 15, Verr. Act. I. 24. Antipatrum: cf. fragm. [1] of Book I. Verbum e verbo: so [31], D.F. III. 15, T.D. III. 7, not verbum de verbo, which Goer. asserts to be the usual form. Comprehensio: cf. I. [41]. Ut Graeci: for the ellipse of the verb cf. I. [44] ut Democritus. Evidentiam: other translations proposed by Cic. were illustratio (Quint. VI. 2, 32) and perspicientia (De Off. I. 15). Fabricemur: cf. [87], [119], [121]. Me appellabat: Cic. was the great advocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (D.F. III. 15). Sed tamen: this often resumes the interrupted narrative, see Madv. Gram. 480. Ipsa evidentia: note that the verb evidere is not Latin.

[§18]. Sustinere: cf. [70]. Pertinaciam: the exact meaning of this may be seen from D.F. II. 107, III. 1. It denotes the character which cannot recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to see the force of an opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term to the Academics, cf. n. on [14], [66], also I. [44] and D.F. V. 94, N.D. I. 13, in the last of which passages the Academy is called procax. Mentitur: cf. [12]. Ita negaret: this ita corresponds to si below,—a common sequence of particles in Cic., cf. [19]. Ακαταληπτον: the conj. of Turnebus καταληπτον is unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in negaret. Visum: cf. I. [40]. Trivimus: cf. I. [27]. Visum igitur: the Greek of this definition will be found in Zeller 86. The words impressum effictumque are equivalent to εναπεσφραγισμενη και εναπομεμαγμενη in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to be a real alteration (‛ετεροιωσις) of the material substance of the soul through the action of some external thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal does on wax, cf. Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes. Ex eo unde esset ... unde non esset: this translation corresponds closely to the definition given by Sextus in four out of the six passages referred to by Zeller (in Adv. Math. VIII. 86 Pyrrh. Hypotyp. III. 242, the definition is clipt), and in Diog. Laert. VII. 50 (in 46 he gives a clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just referred to). It is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of his Academica) that Cic. omits to represent the words κατ' αυτο το ‛υπαρχον. Sextus Adv. Math. VII. 249 considers them essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at Electra, mistook her for an Erinys. The φαντασια therefore which he had although απο ‛υπαρχοντος (proceeding from an actually existent thing) was not κατα το ‛υπαρχον, i.e. did not truly represent that existent thing. Aug. Cont. Acad. II. 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses it thus; his signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest habere quod falsum est. Iudicium: κριτηριον, a test to distinguish between the unknown and the known. Eo, quo minime volt: several things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the possibility of knowledge on a ground quite different from the καταληπτικη φαντασια, which he pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to suit his own. As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf. [11], Sextus Pyrr. Hyp. I. 235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans believed all things to be ακαταληπτα, Philo held them to be καταληπτα, and Numenius in Euseb. Praep. Ev. XIV. 8, p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice as a renegade. (2) is evident from the Academica and from Sextus as quoted above. The foundation for knowledge which he substituted is more difficult to comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to be in their own nature καταληπτα (‛οσον δε επι τη φυσει των πραγματων αυτων καταλ.). But Arcesilas and Carneades would not have attempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that things in themselves were incognisable, but that human faculties do not avail to give information about them. Unless therefore Philo deluded himself with words, there was nothing new to him about such a doctrine. The Stoics by their καταληπτικη φαντασια professed to be able to get at the thing in itself, in its real being, if then Philo did away with the καταλ. φαντ. and substituted no other mode of curing the defects alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to reside in sense, he was fairly open to the retort of Antiochus given in the text. Numenius treats his polemic against the καταλ. φαντ. as a mere feint intended to cover his retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position is afforded in [112] of this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be expressing the views of Philo, and not those of Clitomachus as he usually does. It would seem from that passage that he defined the cognisable to be "quod impressum esset e vero" (φαντασια απο ‛υπαρχοντος εναπομεμαγμενη), refusing to add "quo modo imprimi non posset a falso (‛οια ουκ αν γενοιτο απο μη ‛υπαρχοντος), cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely tried to show that the cognisable was equivalent to the δηλον or πιθανον of Carneades, hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful statement of the latter that the wise man would "opine," that is, would pronounce definite judgments on phenomena. (See [78] of this book.) The scarcity of references to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a more exact view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little or nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book entitled Academica (pp. 313—316 of the reprint by Orelli). With regard to (3), it it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie" consisted. He denied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that they were apostles of doubt, to be correct ([12]). I may add that from the mention of Philo's ethical works at the outset of Stobaeus' Ethica, he would appear to have afterwards left dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important for us is, that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the new Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as genuinely Academic. Revolvitur: cf. De Div. II. 13, also [148] of this book. Eam definitionem: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that all knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility depends on the truth of the individual perception of sense.

[§§19]—[29]. Summary. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain the truth of every sensation, Epicurus must see to that. Things which impede the action of the senses must always be removed, in practice we always do remove them where we can ([19]). What power the cultivated senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch! ([20]). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we arrive at definitions and ideas ([21]). If these ideas may possibly be false, logic memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible ([22]). That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false? ([23]) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her? There must he some ground on which action can proceed ([24]). Credence must be given to the thing which impels us to action, otherwise action is impossible ([25]). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never be discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, should be brought to light ([26]). Syllogisms are rendered useless, philosophy too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis ([27]). Hence the Academics have been urged to allow their dogma that perception is impossible, to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades said, would be inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the supposition that there can be any true perception ([28]). Antiochus declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if they had not even confidence in their one dogma ([29]).

[§19]. Sensibus: it is important to observe that the word sensus like αισθησις means two things, (1) one of the five senses, (2) an individual act of sensation. Deus: for the supposed god cf. T.D. II. 67. Non videam: this strong statement is ridiculed in [80]. De remo inflexo et de collo columbae: cf. [79], [82]. The κωπη εναλος κεκλασμενη and περιστερας τραχηλος are frequently mentioned, along with numerous other instances of the deceptiveness of sense, by Sext. Emp., e.g. Pyrrhon. Hypot. I. 119-121, Adv. Math. VII. 244, 414. Cicero, in his speech of the day before, had probably added other examples, cf. Aug. Cont. Ac. III. 27. Epicurus hoc viderit: see [79], [80]. Epic. held all sensation, per se, to be infallible. The chief authorities for this are given in R. and P. 343, 344, Zeller 403, footnote. Lumen mutari: cf. Brut. 261. Intervalla ... diducimus: for this cf. Sext. Pyrrh. I. 118 πεμπτος εστι λογος (i.e. the 5th sceptic τροπος for showing sense to be untrustworthy) ‛ο παρα τας θεσεις (situs) και τα διαστηματα (intervalla) και τους τοπους. Multaque facimus usque eo: Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 258 παντα ποιει μεχρις αν τρανην και πληκτικην σπαση φαντασιαν. Sui iudicii: see for the gen. M.D.F. II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut. Persa V. 2, 8, quoted by Goer. Sui cuiusque: for this use of suus quisque as a single word see M.D.F. V. 46.

[§20]. Ut oculi ... cantibus: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on the other hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary. Quis est quin cernat: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here (D.F. II. 27). Umbris ... eminentia: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses umbra and lumen, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk. σκια and σκιασμα are opposed to λαμπρα; cf. also σκιαγραφειν, adumbrare, and Aesch. Agam. 1328. Cic. often applies metaphorically to oratory the two words here used, e.g. De Or. III. 101, and after him Quintilian, e.g. II. 17, 21. Inflatu: cf. [86] (where an answer is given) and αναβολη. Antiopam: of Pacuvius. Andromacham: of Ennius, often quoted by Cic., as De Div. I. 23. Interiorem: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's Socrates and the Socratic Schools, 296. Quia sentiatur: αισθησις being their only κριτηριον. Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages referred to in R. and P. and Zeller will show) conj. cui adsentiatur, comparing [39], [58]; cf. also [76]. Inter eum ... et inter: for the repetition of inter cf. T.D. IV. 32 and Madv. Gram. 470. Nihil interesse: if the doctrine of the Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when he fancied himself in pleasure, and vice versa; thus the distinction between pleasure and pain would be obscured. Sentiet ... insaniat: For the sequence cf. D.F. I. 62 and Wesenberg's fine note on T.D. V. 102.

[§21]. Illud est album: these are αξιωματα, judgments of the mind, in which alone truth and falsehood reside; see Zeller 107 sq. There is a passage in Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours; it is too long to quote entire: αισθησεσι μεν ουν μοναις λαβειν ταληθες (which resides only in the αξιωμα) ου δυναται ανθρωπος. ... φυσει γαρ εισιν αλογοι ... δει δε εις φαντασιαν αχθηναι του τοιουτου πραγματος "τουτο λευκον εστι και τουτο γλυκυ εστιν." τωι δε τοιουτωι πραγματι ουκετι της αισθησεως εργον εστιν επιβαλλειν ... συνεσεως τε δει και μνημης. Ille deinceps: deinceps is really out of place; cf. [24] quomodo primum for pr. quom. Ille equus est: Cic. seems to consider that the αξιωμα, which affirms the existence of an abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the existence of a concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from the Greek texts. Expletam comprehensionem: full knowledge. Here we rise to a definition. This one often appears in Sextus: e.g. Adv. Math. VII. ανθρωπος εστι ζωον λογικον θνητον, νου και επιστημης δεκτικον. The Stoic ‛οροι, and this among them, are amusingly ridiculed, Pyrrh. Hyp. II. 208—211. Notitiae: this Cic. uses as a translation both of προληψις and εννοια, for which see Zeller 79, 89. In I. [40] notiones rerum is given. Sine quibus: δια γαρ των εννοιων τα πραγματα λαμβανεται Diog. VII. 42.

[§22]. Igitur: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv. Gram. 480. Consentaneum: so Sextus constantly uses ακολουθον. Repugnaret: cf. I. [19] and n. Memoriae certe: n. on [106]. Continet: cf. contineant in [40]. Quae potest esse: Cic. nearly always writes putat esse, potest esse and the like, not esse putat etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a clause. Memoria falsorum: this difficulty is discussed in Plato Sophist. 238—239. Ex multis animi perceptionibus: the same definition of an art occurs in N.D. II. 148, D.F. III. 18 (see Madv.), Quint, II. 17, 41, Sext. Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 188 τεχνην ειναι συστημα εκ καταληψεον συγγεγυμνασμενων ib. III. 250. Quam: for the change from plural to singular (perceptio in universum) cf. n. on I. [38], Madv. D.F. II. 61, Em. 139. Qui distingues: Sext. Adv. Math. VIII. 280 ου διοισει της ατεχνιας ‛η τεχνη. Sextus often comments on similar complaints of the Stoics. Aliud eiusmodi genus sit: this distinction is as old as Plato and Arist., and is of constant occurrence in the late philosophy. Cf. Sext. Adv. Math. XI. 197 who adds a third class of τεχναι called αποτελεσματικαι to the usual θεωρητικαι and πρακτικαι, also Quint. II. 18, 1 and 2, where ποιητικη corresponds to the αποτ. of Sext. Continget: "will be the natural consequence." The notion that the verb contingit denotes necessarily good fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer on T.D. III. 4. Tractabit: μελλει μεταχειριζεσθαι.

[§23]. Cognitio: like Germ. lehre, the branch of learning which concerns the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of καταληψις here. In quibus: the antecedent is not virtutum, as Petrus Valentia (p. 292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby, but multa. This is shown by etiam; not merely the virtues but also all επιστημη depends on καταληψεις; cf. I. [40], [41], with notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367. Stabilem: βεβαιον και αμεταπτωτου. Artem vivendi: "tralaticium hoc apud omnes philosophos" M.D.F. I. 42. Sextus constantly talks about ‛η ονειροπολουμενη περι τον βιον τεχνη (Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 250) the existence of which he disproves to his own satisfaction (Adv. Math. XI. 168 sq). Ille vir bonus: in all ancient systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness of the sapiens must be proof against the rack; cf. esp. D.F. III. 29, 75, T.D. V. 73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the σοφος in Plato's Gorgias. Potius quam aut: Lamb. ut; but I think C.F. Hermann is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic. never inserts ut after potius quam with the subj. Tischer on T.D. II. 52 affirms that ut is frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf. De Off. I. 86, Aug. Cont. Ac. II. 12 who says the sapiens of the Academy must be desertor officiorum omnium. Comprehensi ... constituti: cf. the famous abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit. Iis rebus: note the assumption that the sensation corresponds to the thing which causes it. Adsensus sit ... possint: nearly all edd. before Halm read possunt, but the subj. expresses the possibility as present to the mind of the supposed vir bonus. Cf. Madv. Gram. 368.