[§§49]—[53]. Antiochus attacked these arguments as soritae, and therefore faulty ([49]). The admission of a certain amount of similarity between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false ([50]). We contend that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we require before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we make light of the sensations we had while in it ([51]). But, say our opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our waking ones. This we deny ([52]). "But," say they, "you allow that the wise man in madness withholds his assent." This proves nothing, for he will do so in many other circumstances in life. All this talk about dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our attention ([53]).
[§49]. Antiochus: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and similar subjects. Ipsa capita: αυτα τα κεφαλαια. Interrogationis: the sorites was always in the form of a series of questions, cf. De Div. II. 11 (where Cic. says the Greek word was already naturalised, so that his proposed trans. acervalis is unnecessary), Hortens. fragm. 47, and n. on [92]. Hoc vocant: i.e. hoc genus, cf. D.F. III. 70 ex eo genere, quae prosunt. Vitiosum: cf. D.F. IV. 50 ille sorites, quo nihil putatis (Stoici) vitiosius. Most edd. read hos, which indeed in [136] is a necessary em. for MSS. hoc. Tale visum: i.e. falsum. Dormienti: sc. τινι. Ut probabile sit, etc.: cf. [47], [48] and notes. Primum quidque: not quodque as Klotz; cf. M.D.F. II. 105, to whose exx. add De Div. II. 112, and an instance of proximus quisque in De Off. II. 75. Vitium: cf. vitiosum above.
[§50]. Omnia deum posse: this was a principle generally admitted among Stoics at least, see De Div. II. 86. For the line of argument here cf. De Div. II. 106 fac dare deos, quod absurdum est. Eadem: this does not mean that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when one of them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n. on [40]. Similes: after this sunt was added by Madv. In suo genere essent: substitute esse viderentur for essent, and you get the real view of the Academic, who would allow that things in their essence are divisible into sharply-defined genera, but would deny that the sensations which proceed from or are caused by the things, are so divisible.
[§51]. Una depulsio: cf. [128] (omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi), De Div. II. 136 (omnium somniorum una ratio est). In quiete: = in somno, a rather poetical usage. Narravit: Goer., Orelli, Klotz alter into narrat, most wantonly. Visus Homerus, etc.: this famous dream of Ennius, recorded in his Annals, is referred to by Lucr. I. 124, Cic. De Rep. VI. 10 (Somn. Scip. c. 1), Hor. Epist. II. 1, 50. Simul ut: rare in Cic., see Madv. D.F. II. 33, who, however, unduly restricts the usage. In three out of the five passages where he allows it to stand, the ut precedes a vowel; Cic. therefore used it to avoid writing ac before a vowel, so that in D.F. II. 33 ut should probably be written (with Manut. and others) for et which Madv. ejects.
[§52]. Eorumque: MSS. om. que. Dav. wrote ac before eorum, this however is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a guttural condemned in n. on [34]. For the argument see n. on [80] quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non quid videatur. Primum interest: for om. of deinde cf. [45], [46]. Imbecillius: cf. I. [41]. Edormiverunt: "have slept off the effects," cf. αποβριζειν in Homer. Relaxentur: cf. ανιεναι της οργης Aristoph. Ran. 700, relaxare is used in the neut. sense in D.F. II. 94. Alcmaeonis: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is often quoted by Cic., e.g. D.F. IV. 62.
[§53]. Sustinet: επεχει; see on [94]. Aliquando sustinere: the point of the Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness the εποχη of the sapiens becomes habitual; he gives up the attempt to distinguish between true and false visa. Lucullus answers that, did no distinction exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it, even in the sane condition. Confundere: so [58], [110], Sext. A.M. VIII. 56 (συγχεουσι τα πραγματα), ib. VIII. 157 (συγχεομεν τον βιον), VIII. 372 (‛ολην συγχεει την φιλοσοφον ζητησιν), Plut. De Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos p. 1077 (‛ως παντα πραγματα συγχεουσι). Utimur: "we have to put up with," so χρησθαι is used in Gk. Ebriosorum: "habitual drunkards," more invidious than vinolenti above. Illud attendimus: Goer., and Orelli write num illud, but the emphatic ille is often thus introduced by itself in questions, a good ex. occurs in [136]. Proferremus: this must apparently be added to the exx. qu. by Madv. on D.F. II. 35 of the subj. used to denote "non id quod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri debuerit." As such passages are often misunderstood, I note that they can be most rationally explained as elliptic constructions in which a condition is expressed without its consequence. We have an exact parallel in English, e.g. "tu dictis Albane maneres" may fairly be translated, "hadst thou but kept to thy word, Alban!" Here the condition "if thou hadst kept, etc." stands without the consequence "thou wouldst not have died," or something of the kind. Such a condition may be expressed without si, just as in Eng. without "if," cf. Iuv. III. 78 and Mayor's n. The use of the Greek optative to express a wish (with ει γαρ, etc., and even without ει) is susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has many such points of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most of the functions of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on D.F. II. 35 seems to imply that he prefers the hypothesis of a suppressed protasis, but as in his Gram. 351 b, obs. 4 he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be certain.]
[§§54]—[63]. Summary. The Academics fail to see that such doctrines do away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and seals is childish ([54]). They press into their service the old physical philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much ridiculed by them ([55]). Democritus may say that innumerable worlds exist in every particular similar to ours, but I appeal to more cultivated physicists, who maintain that each thing has its own peculiar marks ([55], [56]). The Servilii were distinguished from one another by their friends, and Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the appearance of an egg which hen had laid it ([56], [57]). We however, do not much care whether we are able to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that they say is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between individual sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58). Equally absurd are those "probable and undisturbed" sensations they profess to follow. The doctrine that true and false sensations are indistinguishable logically leads to the unqualified εποχη of Arcesilas (59). What nonsense they talk about inquiring after the truth, and about the bad influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero, the panegyrist of philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian darkness? (61) By holding that knowledge is impossible you weaken the force of your famous oath that you "knew all about" Catiline. Thus ended Lucullus, amid the continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then Catulus said that he should not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus were to induce me to change my view (63).
[§54]. Ne hoc quidem: the common trans. "not even" for "ne quidem" is often inappropriate. Trans. here "they do not see this either," cf. n. on I. [5]. Habeant: the slight alteration habeat introduced by Goer. and Orelli quite destroys the point of the sentence. Quod nolunt: cf. [44]. An sano: Lamb. an ut sano, which Halm approves, and Baiter reads. Similitudines: cf. [84]—[86]. The impossibility of distinguishing between twins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was a favourite theme with the sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no two things were absolutely alike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the Stoic view, was practically refuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who took two twins, and made one deposit money with Aristo, while the other after a time asked for the money back and received it. On this subject cf. Sextus A.M. VII. 408—410. Negat esse: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places esse second, especially at the end of a clause. Cur eo non estis contenti: Lucullus here ignores the question at issue, which concerned the amount of similarity. The dogmatists maintained that the similarity between two phenomena could never be great enough to render it impossible to guard against mistaking the one for the other, the sceptics argued that it could. Quod rerum natura non patitur: again Lucullus confounds essential with phenomenal difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on [50]. Nulla re differens: cf. the nihil differens of [99], the substitution of which here would perhaps make the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the common Gk. term απαραλλακτος (Sext. A.M. VII. 252, etc.). Ulla communitas: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of Lamb. nulla after the fine note of Madv. (Em. 154), approved by Halm and other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the Stoics may be stated thus suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec est in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas (ουδε ‛υπαρχει επιμιγη απαραλλακτος). This opinion is negatived by non patitur ut and it will be evident at a glance that the only change required is to put the two verbs (est) into the subjunctive. The change of ulla into nulla is in no way needed. Ut [sibi] sint: sibi is clearly wrong here. Madv., in a note communicated privately to Halm and printed by the latter on p. 854 of Bait. and Halm's ed of the philosophical works, proposed to read nulla re differens communitas visi? Sint et ova etc. omitting ulla and ut and changing visi into sibi (cf. Faber's em. novas for bonas in [72]). This ingenious but, as I think, improbable conj. Madv. has just repeated in the second vol. of his Adversaria. Lamb. reads at tibi sint, Dav. at si vis, sint, Christ ut tibi sint, Bait. ut si sint after C.F.W. Muller, I should prefer sui for sibi (SVI for SIBI). B is very frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip in. Eosdem: once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps intentional misconception of the sceptic position; see n. on [50]. Before leaving this section, I may point out that the επιμιγη or επιμιξια των φαντασιων supplies Sext. with one of the sceptic τροποι, see Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 124.
[§55]. Irridentur: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the constant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext. A.M. IX. 1. Absolute ita paris: Halm as well as Bait. after Christ, brackets ita; if any change be needed, it would be better to place it before undique. For this opinion of Democr. see R. and P. 45. Et eo quidem innumerabilis: this is the quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has yet been proposed, cf. [125]. Nihil differat, nihil intersit: these two verbs often appear together in Cic., e.g.D.F. III. 25.
[§56]. Potiusque: this adversative use of que is common with potius, e.g.D.F. I. 51. Cf. T.D. II. 55 ingemescere nonnum quam viro concessum est, idque raro, also ac potius, Ad Att. I. 10, etc. Proprietates: the ιδιοτητες or ιδιωματα of Sextus, the doctrine of course involves the whole question at issue between dogmatism and scepticism. Cognoscebantur: Dav. dignoscebantur, Walker internoscebantur. The MSS. reading is right, cf. [86]. Consuetudine: cf. [42], "experience". Minimum: an adverb like summum.