The ninth commandment: FALSEHOOD. Of this baseness, five specimens only shall suffice.
Sanchez, a very renowned author, in his work on "Morality and the Precepts of the Decalogue," part 2, book 3, chap. 6, no. 13, thus decides: "A person may take an oath that he has not done any certain thing, though in fact he has. This is extremely convenient, and is also very just, when necessary to your health, honour, and prosperity!" Charli, in his Propositions, no. 6, affirms that, "He who is not bound to state the truth before swearing, is not bound by his oath." Taberna in his vol. 2, part 2, tract 2, chap. 31, p. 288, asks: "Is a witness bound to declare the truth before a lawful judge?" To which he replies: "No, if his deposition will injure himself or his posterity." Laymann, in his works, book 4, tract 2, chap. 2, p. 73, proclaims: "It is not sufficient for an oath, that we use the formal words, if we had not the intention and will to swear, and do not sincerely invoke God as a witness." All those principles are sanctioned by Suarez in his "Precepts of Law," book 3, chap. 9, assertion 2, p. 473, where he says, "If any one has promised or contracted without intention to promise, and is called upon oath to answer, may simply answer, NO; and may swear to that denial."
The idea of obtaining truth, therefore, from a thorough-going Papist, upon any subject in which his "honour" is concerned—and every Papist's honour is indissolubly conjoined with "the Church"—is an absurdity so great, that it cannot be listened to with patience, while the above decisions are the authorised dogmas which the Roman Priests inculcate among their followers. How well the nuns of Montreal have imbibed those Jesuitical instructions, Maria Monk's "Awful Disclosures" amply reveal.
The Sixth Commandment: MURDER. The following miscellaneous decisions are extracted from the works of the regularly sanctioned Roman authors, of the very highest character and rank in that community.
In his famous volume called "Aphorisms," p. 178, Emmanuel Sa writes—"You may kill any person who may be able to put you to death—judge and witnesses—because it is self-defence."
Henriquez, in his "Sum of Moral Theology," vol. 1, book 14, chap. 10, p. 859, decides that "a Priest is not criminal, if he kill the husband of a woman with whom he is caught in adultery."
Airault published a number of propositions. One of them says, that "a person may secretly kill another who attempts to destroy his reputation, although the facts are true which he published." The following must be cited in Latin. "An lieitium sit mulieri procurare abortum? Posset ilium excutere, ne honorem suum amittat, qui illi multo pretiosior est ipsa vita." "An liceat mulieri conjugatæ sumere pharmacum sterilitatis? Ita satius est ut hoc faciat, quam ut marito debitium conjugale recuset." Censures 319, 322, 327.
In his Moral Theology, vol. 4, book 32, sec. 2, problem 5, Escobar determines, that "it is lawful to kill an accuser whose testimony may jeopard your life and honour."
Guimenius promulged his seventh Proposition in these words: "You may charge your opponent with false crimes to destroy his credit; and you may also kill him."
Marin wrote a book called "Speculative and Moral Theology." In vol. 3, tract 23, disputation 8, sec. 5, no. 63, p. 448, are found the following sentences: "Licet procurare abortum, ne puella infametur." That doctrine is admitted, "to evade personal disgrace, and to conceal the infamy of Monks and Nuns." no. 67, p. 429. In no. 75, p. 430, of the same work, Marin writes: "Navarrus, Arragon, Bannez, Henriquez,, Sa, Sanchez, Palao, and others, all say, that a woman may use not only missione sanguinis, sed aliis medicamentis, etsi inde pereat foetus." With that doctrine also agrees Egidius, in his "Explication of the Decalogue," vol. 5, book 5, chap. 1, doubt 4; and Diana in his work upon Morality, part 6, tract 8, resolution 27, fully ratifies his sanction.