Not only were the laws thus set aside by individuals, but also through the Underground Railroad an organized system of depredation was carried on, whereby thousands of dollars were every year lost to the slaveholder.[163] As an illustration of the extent to which this disregard of law was carried, Mr. Yulee, one of the most extreme of the Southern men, instanced a convention which was then in session in New York "for the very purpose, openly avowed, of congratulation upon their successful violation of the Constitution in respect to fugitives, and to devise ways and means to encourage the escape of slaves."[164]
Such, according to the Southern Congressmen, was the condition of affairs. They then proceeded to contrast it with the situation as contemplated by the Constitution, and supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Prigg case. Mr. Butler insisted that this bill required "nothing more than is enjoined by the Constitution, and which contains the bond of union and the security of harmony; and in the name of Washington, I would invoke all parties to observe, maintain, and defend it." He said it was the handiwork of sages and patriots, and resulted from intelligent concessions, for the benefit of all.[165] Many speeches were filled with prophecies, more or less openly expressed, of the dissolution of the Union. Mr. Soulé said the South must fight for its rights, since it is the weaker of the two sections.[166] It had come down to the question, How could the Union be preserved?[167] Some concessions must be made. Mr. Badger urged the bill, because it "will give assurance, it will satisfy the public mind that the Government is disposed, is truly anxious, to accomplish the restitution of fugitive slaves; sincerely wished and is resolved to do right to the uttermost of its power. The proof of this will be complete, because we furnish the best means for the recovery of the slave himself, and if these fail we can secure prompt and adequate indemnity for the loss."[168]
Arguments against the Bill.
§ 32. Arguments against the bill.—On the Northern side, there seems to have been an admission that some bill of the kind was necessary for the interests of the Union. The opposition dwelt chiefly, therefore, upon the details of the measure. Many considered them unjust, as recognizing only one class of rights, those of the masters. Mr. Chase, from the antislavery wing, demanded that a claim of this kind be put on the same footing as any other statutory right. "Claims of right in the services of individuals found under the protection of the laws of a free State must be investigated in the same manner as other claims of right. If the most ordinary controversy involving a contested claim of twenty dollars must be decided by jury, surely a controversy which involves the right of a man to his liberty should have a similar trial.... It will not do for a man to go into a State where every legal presumption is in favor of freedom, and seize a person whom he claims as a fugitive slave, and say, 'This man is my slave, and by my authority under the Constitution of the United States I carry him off, and whoever interferes does so at his peril.' He is asked, 'Where is your warrant?' and he produces none; 'Where is your evidence of claim?' and he offers none. The language of his action is, 'My word stands for law.'"
CHAPTER III. PRINCIPAL CASES FROM 1789 TO 1860.
§ 33. [Change in character of cases.]
§ 34. [ The first case of rescue (1793).]
§ 35. [President Washington's demand for a fugitive (1796).]
§ 36. [Kidnapping cases.]
§ 37. [Jones case (1836).]
§ 38. [Solomon Northrup case (about 1830).]
§ 39. [Washington case (between 1840 and 1850).]
§ 40. [Oberlin case (1841).]
§ 41. [Interference and rescues.]
§ 42. [Chickasaw rescue (1836).]
§ 43. [Philadelphia case (1838).]
§ 44. [Latimer case (1842).]
§ 45. [Ottoman case (1846).]
§ 46. [Interstate relations.]
§ 47. [Boston and Isaac cases (1837, 1839).]
§ 48. [Ohio and Kentucky case (1848).]
§ 49. [Prosecutions.]
§ 50. [Van Zandt, Pearl, and Walker cases (1840, 1844).]
§ 51. [Unpopularity of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.]
§ 52. [Principle of the selection of cases.]
§ 53. [Hamlet case (1850).]
§ 54. [Sims case (1851).]
§ 55. [Burns case (1854).]
§ 56. [Garner case (1856).]
§ 57. [Shadrach case (1851).]
§ 58. [Jerry McHenry case (1851).]
§ 59. [Oberlin-Wellington case (1858).]
§ 60. [Christiana case (1851).]
§ 61. [Miller case (1851).]
§ 62. [John Brown in Kansas (1858).]
§ 33. Change in character of cases.—The cases of escape which occur in the period beginning with the formation of the Constitution, and ending with the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law in 1850, will be found, in comparison with those of colonial times, much more frequent, more complex in action, and more varied in detail. Instead of many colonies under governments independent one of another, there was now one government and one country; nevertheless, the extinction of the system of bondage and the rise of the antislavery sentiment in the Northern States brought into the cases new and difficult elements. No attempt will be made to mention the cases in their chronological order, or to describe them all. They will be classified into cases of simple escape, of kidnapping, of rescue, and of State interference; and typical examples will be described in each category.
The First Case of Rescue.
§ 34. The first case of rescue.—The first attempt to enforce the act of 1793, of which any record has been discovered, immediately revealed its unfairness, and the indisposition of the North to carry it out.
Mr. Josiah Quincy, then a young lawyer, afterwards known as a public man and the President of Harvard College, has left an interesting account of his connection with the case. "He states that the process was issued by a justice of the peace, that he was retained as counsel for the alleged slave, that he prepared his brief, and went down loaded with all the necessary authorities. He found a great crowd of people assembled; but while he was in the midst of the argument, he heard a noise, and, turning around, he saw the constables lying sprawling on the floor, and a passage opening through the crowd, through which the fugitive was taking his departure without stopping to hear the opinion of the court, and that was the last of that case, and that was the last of the law of 1793 in Massachusetts."[169]